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"That's another thing we've learned from
your Nation", said Mein Herr, "map-making.
But we've carried it much further than you.
What do you consider the largest map that
would be really useful?"
"About six inches to the mile."
"Only six inches!" exclaimed Mein Herr. (...)
We actually made a map of the country, on
the scale of a mile to a milet"
"Have you used it much?" I enquired.
"It has never been spread out, yet," said Mein
Herr: "the farmers objected: they said it
would cover the whole country, and shut out
the sunlight! So we now use the country as its
own map, and I assure you it does nearly as
well."
Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno concluded,
1893,  chapter  11.
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Introduction and summary
This thesis describes a microsimulation model for analyzing the effects of
abolishing the marriage relief in the Dutch income tax system. The analysis
consists of four parts, each of which is in a separate chapter.
Chapter 1 is an introduction and consists of two parts. The first part is about
individualization of income tax. Individualization means that the benefit a person
receives or the tax amount a person has to pay depends solely on the person's
own income and wealth. The presence of a partner, and the partner's income and
wealth, play no role. In the past decades, the Dutch tax system has developed
from a system based on breadwinners, where one-earner families were the norm,
to an individualized system where each person is taxed separately. The marriage
relief (i.e. the right for the partner without income to transfer his/her right to tax
exemption to the breadwinner)  is one of the few non-individualized elements that
remain. In the debate about individualization, there are two other elements, apart
from the marriage relief, that play a role, namely extra tax allowances for singles
and individualization of benefit rights.
Analysis of the arguments that come up in the discussion about individualization
shows that it is difficult to design a system of taxes and benefits that does not
contain inconsistencies with respect to the treatment of different household types.
Two examples may illustrate this. In the fifties, the tax and benefit system was
based on the idea that the one-earner family was the norm. However, the tax
system based on this principle contained financial incentives which encouraged
people to live alone. Nowadays, the fact that the share of singles is constantly
increasing is one of the arguments for an individualized tax system. But, in such
an individualized tax system it is expensive to be a single. These two examples
illustrate that a tax system may well undermine the principal ideas about house-
hold types, on which it is based. In this thesis such combinations of principal
choices are called 'unstable', whereas stable combinations lead to a tax system
which confirms the underlying principal ideas.
In this thesis, the principal reason for analyzing tax individualization is not to find
an optimal way to treat different household types. It is because the present Dutch
system causes price distortions for females who wish to participate on the labor
market. Their marginal net wage rate depends on their household situation,
whereas an optimal allocation of labor supply requires that marginal net wages
depend only on productivity. In the present system, married women have a lower
net wage than single women, and thus their labor supply is under the efficient
level. That is why it is interesting to analyze the effect of tax individualization  on
female labor supply. This thesis, however, is only concerned with the marriage
relief.
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The second part of chapter 1 is about application of microsimulation techniques
for policy purposes. Because the effects of income tax individualization may well
differ widely over individuals, a macro approach is not very useful, and micro-
simulation is the best technique available. Microsimulation uses a data set of
individual observations, representative of the total population, of whom all
relevant characteristics are known, such as age, sex, and labor market situation.
The effects of a tax policy measure are then calculated for each individual in the
data set, and next the labor supply reactions of individuals are assessed. The total
change in labor supply is the sum of all individual supply reactions. Thus, it is
possible that some individuals reduce their labor supply whereas others supply
more labor. The various kinds of models that exist can be categorized according
to two criteria: the way changes in individual characteristics over time have been
modelled (static versus dynamic models), and the kind of behavioral reactions
that the model describes (only first-order income effects, second-order behavioral
effects, or third order cyclical effects). Thus there are 2x3 makes 6 kinds of
models. The model in this thesis is dynamic, which means that all individual
characteristics can change over time, and it describes only second-order effects:
the individual responses to income tax individualization.
This means that the demand side of the labor market is ignored in the model. The
model might, however, be added as a module to a macro-economic model, which
does describe the demand side of the labor market. Such an exercise is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
Chapter 2 is about a technical aspect of microsimulation, namely a method to
reduce the variance of the simulation outcomes. The variance exists because
computer-generated random numbers are used. To simulate, e.g., marriage, the
computer draws a pseudo-random number between 0 and 1 for every individual in
the data set. If this random number is smaller than the individual's marriage
probability, the model simulates a marriage and otherwise not. Thus, the total
simulated number of marriages depends  on the random numbers  and is therefore a
random variable with a variance. This may lead to erroneous results, especially in
policy effects. That is the reason why variance reduction is important.
The sorting method in chapter 2 does not use computer-generated random
numbers. The method starts by sorting the data set with respect to all relevant
characteristics (age, sex, income, labor market situation) that determine the
individual transition probabilities. Suppose there are K different characteristics.
Then every individual in the data set can be characterized as a point in the K-
dimensional space Rx. So, the whole data set is then a scatter in IR: The sorting
method starts from this scatter. It chooses a set of K-dimensional intervals
(according to certain criteria) in this scatter and it ensures that within each
interval the simulated number of transitions  is near to its expectation. A deviation
in a certain interval is then compensated in the nearest intervals. The appendix to
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this chapter contains a proof that under the sorting method, the variance of the
simulated number of transitions is lower than under the Random Number method.
Moreover, the sorting method does not take up more computer time than the
Random Number method. Nevertheless, the sorting method does have drawbacks.
It is difficult to find an algorithm that makes an optimal choice of a set of
intervals. The algorithm that was used in this thesis is fast, but does not find an
optimal set of intervals.
Next, the sorting method is illustrated on a simple demographic model of
marriage, birth, and mortality. The sorting method is indeed effective in predict-
ing the size of the flows between the various states. The variance of the results  is
smaller than under the Random Number method. But for analyzing policy effects
(the difference between two flows in two different model runs, characterized by
different probabilities) a powerful variance reduction technique exists for the
Random Number method, namely Common Random Numbers (CRN). For policy
effects, the sorting method does not always produce smaller variances than CRN.
Finally, the illustrations show that the sorting method is more accurate for
analyses of subgroups within the data set, than the Random Number method. The
conclusion of this chapter is that the sorting method has important advantages
over the Random Number method.
In chapter 3 the relation between labor supply and income is estimated empiri-
cally. It is a Markov model describing transitions between labor market states.
The model distinguishes four different states: 'full-time', 'part-time', 'disabled'
and 'out of the labor market'. The dependent variable is the probability for an
individual to move from one labor market state into another. The explanatory
variables are individual characteristics, such as age, sex, marital state, education,
and, of course, the potential net income the individual will have in each of the
four possible states. This last variable is included to allow analysis of incomes
policy measures.
This model extends from other models that have been applied in the Netherlands,
but that do not contain incomes data. The inclusion of incomes data makes the
model more complex than it would otherwise have been. Of course, the model
might be improved even further: for instance, by including more states ('part-
time' might be split into 'small part-time job' and 'large part-time job'), or by
modelling more explicitly the mutual effects of partner's behavior. Nevertheless
this model is a good base for the simulations of income tax individualization in
chapter 4.
The estimation results are plausible and confirm the results of other authors:  men
do not react strongly to incomes policy, contrary to women. For women, the
reaction depends on their household situation. In particular it is the presence of
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small children which affects women's choice to supply labor, and again in the
choice between 'full-time' and 'part-time'.
In chapter 4 the estimated coefficients are applied to calculate the effects of
income tax individualization. This is materialized in abolishing the marriage
relief, which is a double tax exemption for breadwinners. Abolishment is finan-
cially advantageous for two-earners, and disadvantageous for one-earners. The
overall effect is an increase of the tax revenues  for the government. Two compen-
sation methods have been analyzed: generic compensation via an increase of the
general tax exemption, and specific compensation via the children's allowance.
Under both compensation methods, female labor supply increases in the long term
by about 14 percentage points. But, as has been indicated above, this is only the
pure supply effect. If the demand side of the labor market were included in the
model, the effects would, most probably, be smaller: extra labor supply induces a
wage decrease, which in turn causes a decrease of labor supply. The extra labor
supply is concentrated in the 'part-time' state, the more so under compensation
via the children's allowance.
The first-year effects are much smaller than the long-term effects: female labor
supply increases by about 2 percentage points. As in the long term, this extra
supply is concentrated in the state 'part-time'. For the division of labor within
households, tax individualization has two opposite effects. Both the number of
two-earner households, and the number of households supplying no labor,
increase. So, the dichotomy between working and non-working households grows.
As income tax individualization does not seem to affect male labor supply, we
may conclude that it is not an effective instrument to make the division of labor
within households more equal.
Finally, the effects of income tax individualization are analyzed for the lower
educated part of the population. The lower educated react more often by increas-
ing part-time labor, than higher educated persons.  This is a further increase of the
dichotomy between working and non-working households.
1. Problem and Method
This chapter explains the reasons why the effects of individualization  of the
tax system on female labor supply in the Netherlands are interesting enough
to analyze (section   1.1), and justifies the choice  for the instrument of micro-
simulation (section   1.2). Both sections  end  in a conclusion.
1.1 THE DISCUSSION ABOUT INDIVIDUALIZATION OF TAX AND BENE-
FITS
This    section is organized as follows. In section    1.1.1    the term individu-
alization is defined. Section 1.1.2 presents a historical overview    of   the
taxation of spouses   in the Netherlands. Section 1.1.3 analyzes the kinds  of
arguments used in the discussion that accompanied the changes in the tax
treatment of spouses. Section    1.1.4 then formulates the problem   that   is
analyzed in this thesis.
1.1.1    Definition of individualization
In the past decades, the Dutch tax system has shown a gradual development
from joint to separate taxation of spouses. The Dutch term for this develop-
ment (after translation) is 'individualization'. This term may be confusing,
because it has different meanings in different policy fields. In this thesis, the
term 'individualization of income tax' means that members of a household
are taxed separately, as opposed to tax systems like the French 'quotient
familial' in which the tax amount paid by one spouse depends on the other
spouse's income. In an individualized tax system, the tax amount does not
depend   on   the  presence   of  a  partner   or  on  the  partner's    income.   The  word
sometimes applies to the system of benefits as well: in an individualized
benejits   system,   means   tests   apply  only   to   own  income,   not  to   the  partner's
income'. Moreover,  the very presence  of a partner does not affect the benefit
amount.
In Dutch politics, three fundamentally different meanings of the term
'individualization' are also used:
- adapting benefits to the specific needs of the receiver, in order to give
higher benefits to persons with higher needs (for instance, because of a
physical handicap);
- as a demographic phenomenon: the fact that families are splitting up and
people are living in smaller households;
' Means tested benefits depend on income or wealth.
6
-  as a social problem: the hypothesis that modern people are becoming more
self-oriented and egotistical.
The existence of such different interpretations of the word may cause
confusion. A good example is the fact that opponents of individualization of
the tax and benefit system often motivate their standpoint by pointing to
perceived disadvantages of individualization as a social problem or as a
demographic phenomenon. However, as will become clear below, an
individualized system of tax and benefits might even be an effective instru-
ment to stimulate people to form households, and it certainly does not
stimulate demographic individualization. Moreover, there is no reason to
assume a causal relationship between the social problem (if it exists) and the
demographic phenomenon.
Individualization of social insurance premiums is not taken into account in
this study. The reason for this omission is as follows. There are two kinds of
social insurance regulations: employee's insurances (e.g. against unemploy-
ment) and social security, such as the compulsory old-age pensions (AOW)
and pensions for widows and orphans (AWW). Contributions for the first
kind, employee's insurances, have a one-to-one relationship with the poten-
tial benefit that the employee is entitled to when unemployed. These benefits
are not means tested and bear no relationship with the beneficiary's house-
hold situation. As long the insurance principle and a one-to-one relationship
between contributions and benefits are maintained, there is no reason to let
the contributions dependt on the household situation. Hence the individu-
alization debate is not relevant for employee's insurances.
For social security, the situation is different. The relationship between
contributions and potential benefits is more tenuous. Premiums are mostly
income-related, whereas the benefits are flat-rate. If the contributor's income
increases, his or her rights do not increase, so he or she has to pay more
premium for the same insurance policyz. This applies to old-age pensions,
and widows and orphans pensions. Moreover, the relationship between rights
and premiums becomes even more tenuous as benefit rights are mostly not
individualized. For instance, old-age pensions depend on the presence of a
partner, and on the partner's age and income. This tenuous relationship
between premiums paid and benefit rights makes it difficult to define
individualization of social security premiums. Some interest groups hold that
individualization means that married women are to be exempted from these
premiums, as they extract no extra rights from the fact that they pay pre-
miums: they would also be entitled to a benefit if they did not have an
income. However, this is not only true for married women, but for every
2 There are ceilings for the premium amounts for public insurance, but they are
higher than the benefit amounts themselves would justify.
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citizen. Taken to the extreme, this argument could also mean that married
women should be exempted from the obligation to pay taxes. In fact, there
are many similarities between taxes and social security contributions. This is
the reason why social security premiums were incorporated in the tax system
during the 1990 tax reform. In this thesis, individualization of social security
premiums means the same as for taxes: the amount paid does not depend on
the presence of a partner, nor on partner's income.
Although the term 'individualization' may cause confusion, it is used
throughout this thesis to describe a tax system in which the tax unit is the
individual, and the tax amount is independent of a person's household type.
Whenever the word is used in a different meaning, this will be clearly indi-
cated. Individualization is broader than separate filing, because the latter does
not exclude different treatment of singles from cohabitators.
1.1.2    Taxation of spouses in the Netherlands
After the Second World War the Dutch tax system slowly became more
individualized. Before 1965, married women  were not supposed  to pay taxes;
their labor incomes were viewed as part of their husband's income and taxed
accordingly through him.
Between 1965 and 1973, married women were formally recognized as tax-
payers but still the amount of tax was calculated by adding their labor
income to their husband's income.  In view of the progressive tax system,  this
meant that married women faced relatively high marginal tax rates.
After 1973, married women's labor income was taxed separately, although
their tax exemption level was substantially lower than the exemption levels
of singles or married men. Income from other sources than labor was still
treated as part of the husband's income. Married women's marginal tax rate
was relatively high because of their low exemption level, but it was no
longer as high as their husband's marginal tax rate. Ceilings for social
insurance premiums were valid at the household level, which decreased the
marginal rates for married women with high incomesi
The  system was further individualized   by  the tax changes   in   1984  and   1990.
Married women are now treated separately for almost every part of their
income and for tax deductions. Exceptions are income parts and deductions
that are difficult to assign to one individual, such as income from property or
gifts. Ceilings for social insurance premiums have also been individualized,
even though the benefits have not.
3  The household premium ceiling for old-age pensions and the like was justified
by the fact that benefit entitlements also were formulated at the household level.
V
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The most important changes are presented in table  1.1. The table is restricted
to  changes  in the treatment of household types. Other important tax changes,
which took place in the same period, are ignored 4
Table 1.1 Changes in tax treatment of household types, 1965-1990
Year Changes in tax treatment of couples
1965
Married women formally tax-payers
(but still joint taxation of total household income)
1973 Separate
taxation of labor income
(but married women have low exemption level)
Individual ceilings for social security premiums
1984 Exemption levels independent of sex, and transferable
No difference between married and unmarried couples
1990 Single' s allowance abolished
In accordance with Dutch tradition, the income effects of all these changes
were kept to a minimum. That is to say, the changes in net incomes before
and after each reform within households were small. According to Van
Herwaarden and De Kam (1989), the income effects were so small, that
these tax changes were "much ado about nothing". They base this statement
on   table 1.2, which shows   that the average   tax  rate of various household
types did not change very much between 1970 and 19905.
However, the average tax rate is not the only important variable: Van
Herwaarden and De Kam (1989) ignore marginal tax rates, which decreased
for the majority of married women. Apparently, equal treatment of the sexes
resulted in a decrease of most marginal rates. The income effects were
neutralized by manipulation  of tax exemption levels and social insurance pre-
miums. Although income positions did not change very much, financial
incentives  did. This could well be one of the causes of the increase in female
labor supply    in the Netherlands between    1970    and    1990    (see    also    WRR,
1990: 214-215).
4     For   instance,   the   1990 tax reform   was also meant to simplify   the tax system
substantially. The number of tax brackets decreased from eight to three.
5      The 1984 changes were disadvantageous for two-earners, and those    of    1990
were favorable.
9
Table 1.2 Absolute change in average tax rate 1970-1990 for four household types
Tax base two-earners
(guilders of singles one-earners
1985/1990) married unnnarried
30,000                    0                   -2                    0                     1
40,000                   -2                   -2                    0                     1
48,000                    0                   -1                     1                     0
60,000                      2                      2                      2                      0
75,000                     1                    2                    2                    2
90,000                     1                    2                    1                    2
120,000                      2                      3                     -1                       1
250,000                   -2                    0                   -4                    0
Source: Van Herwaarden and De Kam (1989)
The   manipulation   of tax exemption levels is shown in figure   1.1   for   the
period 1973-1993   in a selected group of households6. Major tax reforms
were carried out in the years 1984 and 1990. Before 1984, married men had
the highest exemption levels, married women the lowest, and singles were
positioned in between.
In real terms, exemption levels Married man, 1-earner 16-stayed fairly constant until the
tax   reform   of  1990.   The   rise in 14-
exemption levels after that year . 12-Maniedmgkam                 +.---
#'as meant to compensate 1110-1  l
increases in the marginal tax 1    8 -            Singl'. ov" "»--j 
rate in the same period in the     8 6-
first tax bracket. Thereby,    the                4-
income effects of these  2- Married woman, 2-earner
increases at the minimum level 01
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
were softened. Year
Figure 1.1 Tax exemption levels forAlthough exemption levels various household types, 1973-1993 (real
stayed fairly constant in 1984, amounts,  in 1985 guilders  x   1000)
the tax reform brought changes
for couples, because the division
of taxes within the household changed. The decrease in the husband's
exemption level was a tax increase, which was only partly offset by the
6 The figure does not show the exemption levels of single parents and singles
under 35. Single parents were treated as singles before  1984,  and  from  that  year
on their exemption levels were about 50% higher than those of singles. Young
singles' exemption levels were between those of married women and old singles
before   1984,  and  the   same as those of two-earners after   1983.
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increase in the wife's exemption. In general, married women's marginal
wage rates increased and husbands' wage rates decreased 7 Couples where
both partners had a high income, experienced an income decrease by the
individualization of ceilings for social insurance premiums.
Moreover,    from    1984 on, unmarried cohabitators were treated as married
couples. Before that, if wage rate and labor supply did not differ very much
between the partners in a couple, marriage was not financially beneficial.
Twice the singles' exemption level was about 30% higher than the exemp-
tion   level   for a married   man   plus   that   for a married woman. Before    1984,
this encouraged unmarried cohabitation, as unmarried couples were treated as
two  singles. As figure 1.1 shows, between   1984  and 1990 unmarried couples
still stood to gain by presenting themselves as two singles instead of as two
cohabitators: twice the exemption level for singles (older than 27) was 50%
higher than the combined exemption level for a couple. This stimulated
administrative fraud, and therefore    from    1990    on, all singles    get   hal f   the
exemption level for a couple:
The   conclusion from figure   1.1   is that there   is no fundamental law about  the
sizes of exemption levels. In the past decades these levels have been used as
a policy instrument to smooth the individualization process by keeping the
income effects, as presented by income charts, at a minimum. Nowadays,
exemption levels are one of the few parts of the tax system that are not
individualized. To illustrate this, it is useful to take a closer look at the dis-
cussion on individualization. This is done in the next section.
1.1.3 Pros and cons of individualization
The changes in the tax system, as described in the previous section, were
accompanied by much debate on the treatment of household types by the tax
and benefit system. It would not be possible, nor would it be very interest-
ing, to review all the literature on this debate. Proponents of individualization
are, among others, ER (1989), Jansweijer (1987), and VA (1994). These
authors propose to abolish the double exemption level for one-earners. A
proponent of joint taxation is CCO (1988). An interesting survey of the
arguments for and against individualization can be found in Committee-
Stevens (1991: chapter 21).
i The reason is that, for most couples, the woman's hourly wage and total labor
income is lower than the man's.
8      For the motivation of abolishing the single' s exemption, see Committee-Stevens
(1991:166).
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Debates on individualization of taxes and benefits tend to get emotional.
There are three reasons for this. First, the tax treatment of different house-
hold types is interpreted as a sign of government approval or disapproval.
That is why a proposal to increase income tax for a certain kind of house-
hold type may be felt by these groups as an attack on their way of life.
Secondly, pragmatic considerations often lead to conclusions that conflict
with conclusions from principles. For instance, even proponents of a Nega-
tive Income Tax at the level of the current minimum benefit admit that it is
currently not feasible because the cost is prohibitive (CPB, 1992: 183). On
the other hand, even ardent supporters of the current benefit system have to
admit that the system is complex and easy to defraud. Debaters tend to get
angry when arguments on principles are contradicted with pragmatic ones.
The third and last reason for the debate getting emotional  is that, even if the
debate focuses on principles, there is no one-to-one relationship between
principles and policy choices. People who agree on certain principles, may
well disagree on other principles, and then make different policy choices. On
the other hand one and the same policy choice may follow from different
principles. This may seem strange, and therefore the rest of this section
analyzes the relation between the principles and policy choices that play a
role in the debate on individualization.
1.1.3.1   Principles,   pragmatics,   and  policy  issues
Table 1.3 below shows the policy choices  that the debate is about,   and  the
kind of arguments that play a role. There are three policy choices that play a
role in the debate, and three kinds of arguments: principled arguments,
implementation arguments,  and the side-effects  of the tax system.
Table 1.3 Arguments about individualization of taxes and benefits
policy choices - allowances for singles and single parents (higher tax
exemptions)
- joint taxation of spouses
- joint minimum benefits for cohabitators
principled -  is there one household type that is superior to others?
arguments - should financial advantages of a household type be
compensated?
implementation - financial consequences
arguments - privacy versus sensitivity to fraud
- effectiveness
side-effects - labor supply
- income distribution
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The first policy choice is about tax exemption levels: should singles and
single parents have higher exemptions than married couples or unmarried
cohabitators? Of course, a higher exemption level results in higher net
income for the same gross income.
The second choice concerns the tax treatment of partners in a household. In
the Netherlands, the discussion is mainly about the double exemption level
for one-earner families.  In  a pure system of joint taxation, for instance  the
French 'quotient familial', total household income is divided among the
partners, who are then taxed as if they were singles for their part of house-
hold income. This means that the tax unit is the household, not the individ-
ual. The issue ofjoint taxation has recently been brought up: one of the tasks
of the Committee-Stevens  (1991) was to give an opinion about the advisabil-
ity of introducing joint taxation in the Netherlands. But, as has been shown
before, the trend in the Netherlands is away from joint taxation in the
direction of individualization. Although  the only element of joint taxation  in
the present Dutch system is the double exemption level for one-earner
families, in the following discussion the term 'joint taxation' will refer to a
tax system where the household is the tax unit.
The discussion about joint or separate taxation is irrelevant under a system of
proportional taxation: if the marginal tax rate is independent of income,
adding up incomes  does  not  make a difference. After  the tax reform  of  1990,
the Dutch system has become less progressive, and therefore the sting is out
of the discussion about joint taxation 9
From the viewpoint of female labor supply, however, the issue is still
relevant, because separate taxation  is the one of the three policy issues  that is
seen as an instrument to acquire a more equal division of labor within
families.   But  this   is  only  true   if  the tax system is progressive. Figure   1.2
shows the effect of separate and joint taxation on the net wage rates of two
partners in a household, when the tax system is progressive. On the horizon-
tal axis the gross incomes are given. For convenience, income from other
sources than labor is ignored; gross incomes are equal to gross hourly
wage x hours worked. The figure can be viewed in two ways: as a budget
constraint for the choice between leisure and consumption, or as a specifica-
tion of the relation between gross and net incomes. The solid lines indicate
the situation under proportional taxation and the dotted lines show the effect
of a progressive tax system, under separate taxation. There is always one
' In CPB (1989b: 55-56) it is shown that the number of tax brackets has
decreased, and the effective rates in tax brackets became more equal after the
tax  reform  of  1990. A comparison   of marginal tax rates before and after   1990  is
not useful, because after 1990 social security contributions were incorporated   in
the tax system.
13
partner whose gross wage rate is the highest. This partner is indicated as the
'first' partner, and the other is the 'second' partner.
Under separate taxation, it is
possible that the second part-
ner' s      net      marginal      wage      rate W"99'3,3/'·
becomes higher than the first N 11<
partner's. This is the case if the      .8
first partner's gross income, and     N
thus his/her labor supply, is /4         ---X-
much higher than the second 6-*'t54*--    -«--partner's. It is then rational for t.1/
the second partner to supply gross income = gross wage X hours worked
more  labor.  In a system of joint Figure 1.2 Effect of the tax system on
taxation however, both partners the relative wages of two partners within a
face the same marginal tax rate, household
independent of their labor sup-
pty, and therefore the first partner's   net   wage is always the highest,   no
matter how many hours of labor he or she supplies.
Thus, if the tax system is progressive, separate taxation stimulates a more
equal division of labor supply within the family, whereas joint taxation
stimulates an unequal distribution. Under proportional taxation, however, the
ratio of the gross wage rates is always equal to that of net wage rates, and
therefore the second partner's net wage rate is always lower than the first
partner's. For the distribution of labor within the family, this has the same
effect as joint taxation. Therefore the choice between joint and separate
taxation is only relevant for female labor supply when the tax system is
progressive.
The   third   and last policy choice in table   1.3 is about minimum welfare
benefits: in the Dutch system, a family receives 100% of the social mini-
mum, single parents 90%, singles 70%, and so-called 'voordeurdelers'
60%': Individualization would reduce the number of categories to one.
Effectively, this means that singles and single parents receive the same
amount, and couples get twice the amount of singles. Naturally, in the latter
case both partners must meet the conditions for a benefit. In the following,
the term 'joint benefits' means a benefit system based upon the household
situation, and 'individualization of benefits' refers to the transition to a
system where benefits depend only on characteristics  of the individual.
w Dutch term, which means literally 'front-door-sharer'. The term applies to
people who share a house without having an affective relationship, for instance a
group of students or a parent and adult child.
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As  table 1.3 indicated, standpoints on these three policy issues are influenced
by three factors: (1) principled arguments about household types, (2) prag-
matic considerations about effectiveness and implementation of the tax and
benefit system, and last but not least (3) the effects of taxes and benefits on
other important issues, such as labor supply and income distribution.
In the following, only the first category, the principled arguments (1) from
table   1.3  will be taken into account. These two principled arguments   are
independent, in the sense that people may well agree on one while dis-
agreeing on the other. This justifies a somewhat deeper analysis of the two
principled arguments, as it allows many possible positions about principles.
About the first question, superiority of household types, there was broad
consensus in the fifties. The one-earner family, in which the mother takes
care of the children, was considered the superior household type. This was
demonstrated by the design of the tax system, by the fact that female
employees were expected to resign upon marriage, and also by the discussion
about minimum wages (SER, 1953, and WRR, 1990: 139). However, over
the years the share of one-earner families in the total number of households
has declined steadily   (see   e.g.   WRR, 1990: 101-105) ",   and the number   of
two-earner families, singles, and single parents has increased. Interest groups
have questioned the principle that the one-earner family is superior. Current-
ly, there are four mainstream opinions:
1.a All household types are equally valuable.
1.b One-eamer family is superior. Women should stay at home to care
for their children and husband. Incomes and possessions are shared.
Therefore, the family is also the tax unit.
1.c Two-earner family is superior. Individuals should remain economi-
cally independent.  Only the presence of young children  in the house-
hold can be a reason to decrease total household labor supply. By
definition, this is temporary and the tax and benefit system should
recognize this. The individual is the tax unit, except for income parts
and possessions that are difficult to split.
1.d Single is superior. As the household type often changes during the
life cycle, the tax and benefit system should take the independent
individual as its reference. All incomes and possessions must be
treated as if they belong to one single individual,  even if the individ-
ual lives together with others.
" The WRR shows that the share of families with children in the total number of
households dropped  from  57%  in  1960  to  37%  in  1987.  The WRR estimates  that
in 1987, 35% of the population lived in a one-earner family. In that year, 48%
of childless couples and 39% of couples with children received more than one
labor income.
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The second principal question in table 1.3 refers to financial advantages of
household types. Cohabitators are able to share the costs of durable con-
sumption goods, such as housing, cars, and washing machines; therefore they
are better off than if each person lived alone. How should the tax and benefit
system treat these financial advantages? There are three possible standpoints:
2.a Decisions about the household type must not be affected by financial
considerations. Therefore, the tax and benefit system should com-
pensate financial advantages. In this case, utility should be indepen-
dent of the one household type at any given level of gross personal
income.
2.b The tax and benefit system must provide an incentive to choose the
'superior' household type.
2.c Financial advantages must be left in the household, and should not be
taxed away. This is the best way to ensure an optimal allocation of
durable consumption goods.
Of course, the choice for (2.b) is only possible if a certain household type is
considered superior to others. This choice, and to a lesser extent (2.a), is
subject to a 'moral hazard' problem: by representing their household type in
a certain way, individuals may try to evade taxes or get higher benefits,2
Simply because there is a wide variety in household types, it is relatively
easy for individuals to present their own situation in such a way that taxes
are minimized or benefits and subsidies maximized.
In the individualization debate, both the (2.a) and (2.c) parties claim the term
'neutrality'. The choice for (2.a) is motivated by the idea that financial
considerations should not hinder people to leave a household in which they
are unhappy, or to form a household when they wish to live with a partner.
The fact that, ideally, utility does not change when the household type
changes,   is the reason   that this system is called 'neutral'.   On the other  hand,
the preference  for (2.c) is motivated by the idea that the plurality of house-
hold types in modern society indicates that household type has become a
consumption decision. Financial considerations must be weighed against
others, as is the case for other consumption decisions. It is economically
efficient, and therefore 'neutral', to leave the financial consequences  of the
choice for a certain household type in the household itself The basis for
calling both (2.a) and (2.c) 'neutral' is the shared viewpoint that the house-
hold type is a strictly personal choice in which the government should not
interfere. The difference resides in the treatment of price signals.
I 2 In the existing system, for instance, unmarried parents may present their house-
hold type in such a way that one of them is officially a single parent, so that the
'family' is eligible for higher tax allowances.
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Of course, in the (2.b) philosophy the government should not remain neutral
with respect to the choice of household type; it should stimulate people to
choose one particular kind.
To sum up, there are four mainstream viewpoints about superiority of house-
hold types, and three about financial advantages. This allows for 12 possible
combinations of positions with respect to the arguments concerning prin-
ciples. People often get quite emotional about principles, and the fact that
there are so many possible positions makes it difficult to reach agreement.
The analysis in the next section shows that the various combinations lead to
different policy choices. Moreover, sometimes the policy choices undermine
the underlying principles.
1.1.3.2   Confrontation   of principles   and  policy   issues
In  table   1.4  the two arguments on principles are confronted  with each other.
Viewpoints on the first principal question define the rows, and the answers
to the second principal question define the columns. Each cell in the table
then contains the answer on the three policy issues that follows logically
from the choices on principles. Of course, table  1.4  is  only a simplification.
From  table  1.3  it has already become clear that choices on principles  are  not
the only factors that determine policy standpoints. Pragmatic arguments and
other considerations may well cause a person's standpoint to differ from the
ones given in the table in 'his/her principled cell'B.
For     instance,     the cell 'one-earner/incentives' contains      a    tax and benefit
system that is designed to induce people to choose to live in a one-earner
family:
-   singles get no tax compensation for their more expensive way of life;
-  the incomes of both spouses are treated as one, which is an incentive for
an unequal division of labor within the family;
- the minimum benefit for singles is half the amount a couple receives,
which induces people to share durable consumption goods.
In practice, however, this system does not get much support in the Nether-
lands. Even those political parties that belong in this cell oppose a switch to
separate minimum benefits, because of its consequences for the income
distribution. Poverty among singles and single parents would increase 14.
13 In   table    1.4 the standpoints on single' s allowance and joint benefits are always
equal. These two policy issues are, in principle, the same. But their practical
consequences differ substantially in size. Therefore, many people make different
choices about these issues, e.g. giving priority to financial considerations in the
case of joint benefits,  and to principles  in the case of single's allowances.
I4 In   the   18th century, however, when poverty relief was organized by private
charities and churches, the system was consistent with the principles of this cell.
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Table 1.4 Principles and policy choices in the individualization debate
what to do with
financial advantages of household types
superior
household type provide leave thern
compensate financial where they are
incentives
pro s.a. con s.a.
none pro j.t. INCONSISTENT con  j.t.
pro j.b. con j.b.
pro s.a. con s.a. con s.a.
one-earner family pro j.t. pro j.t.
pro j.b. con j.b. con j.b.
pro s.a. Con s.a. con s.a.
two-earner family con j.t. con  j.t.
pro j.b. con j.b. con j.b.
pro s.a. pro s.a. con s.a.
single individual con  j.t.




As  table 1.4 shows,   the four choices   on the first principal question   and  the
three choices on the second, result in eleven possible positions. Only one
combination is inconsistent (all household types are equally valuable, and the
tax and benefit system must provide an incentive to choose the superior one).
In the fifties, the tax and benefit system were based on the choice for (1)
one-earner family, and (2) compensation, the cell in the second row and first
column. The associated policy choices are: single's allowance, joint taxation,
joint benefits. The tax and benefit system in the fifties indeed agreed with
this description.
Nowadays, the Dutch system has moved one row down, to the cell 'two-
earner family, compensate'. The official government view is that women
should be economically independent, even if they live in a family (SZW,
1985). The tax system has moved from joint to separate taxation. The 'com-
pensation' principle is firmly visible in the system: single parents get a tax
allowance, singles and single parents get higher benefits than half a couple.
Only the abolition  in  1990 of the single's tax allowance  is a slight indication
that the 'compensation' principle is not as strong as before. But, as was
Income support for single mothers was seen as an incentive for poor men to
leave their families, and consequently income support was refused to families
which were abandoned by the father (Van der Veen, 1992).
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indicated in the previous section, this was not motivated by principles, but by
practical considerations:   for  the tax authorities   it was almost impossible   to
verify if two unmarried persons living at the same address form two house-
holds (in which case both are eligible for a single's allowance) or one (in
which case they are not eligible).
Table 1.4 shows that proposals for separate  tax and benefits  do not necess-
arily originate from the idea that the one-earner family is an inferior house-
hold type. A choice for separate taxation and benefits may also follow from
the viewpoint 'leave financial advantages where they are'. An extreme
consequence of this choice is that also at the minimum income level, benefits
must be independent of the presence of a partner. The result is that every
non-working housewife will become eligible for a minimum benefit if she
declares to be looking for work. As this latter condition is very difficult to
verify, a choice for 'leave them where they are' is, when taken to the
extreme, a choice for an individual negative income tax.
An important conclusion from table 1.4 comes  up  when we reverse  the  re-
lationship between principal choices and policy issues: from a person's
position on the policy issues, his/her choices on principles cannot be
deduced. For instance, the 'one-eamer/compensation' cell contains the same
policy choices as the 'individual/incentives' cell: pro single's allowance, and
pro joint benefits 15.  In the first  case, the argument for single's allowances  is
that singles are deprived, and in the latter case that they are superior. It is
not probable that a coalition will be formed between people belonging in
those two cells: even though they agree on policy issues, their underlying
ideas on principles are irreconcilable. But the incentives that the tax system
contains remain the same, whether or not they have been introduced into the
system on purpose. Thus, even if the argument for a single's allowance is
that singles are deprived, the existence of a single's allowance stimulates
people to live alone, which is not the aim of persons who think singles are
deprived.
One-issue coalitions are very plausible, for instance, against joint taxation.
This   appears    in all cells   in the 'leave them where   they are' column,    but   also
in all cells wherever the individual is seen as the tax unit. The members of
such coalitions do not necessarily agree on the other policy issues, however.
This is visible in the Dutch debate: coalitions tend to change, and it is
virtually impossible to reach broad agreement.
15 It is assumed that the proponents of 'individual superior/incentives' are indiffe-
rent with respect to joint taxation.  It is not clear if joint, or separate, taxation
affects the decision to cohabitate, although it does influence labor supply.
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The last interesting point about table 1.4 comes   up   when the historical
development is compared with the incentives that the system contains. The
tax and benefit system of the fifties had incentives that undermined the
underlying principles. In fact, this system belongs also to the cell 'individual/
incentives', a tax and benefit system designed to stimulate people to remain
single. There are indications that the tax and benefit system affects people's
preferences about their household type. For example, Gustafsson and Bruyn-
Hundt (1991) have compared the implicit incentives of the tax systems in
Sweden, Germany and Holland. The Swedish system contains incentives to
form two-earner households, and the German system stimulates the formation
of one-earner households. Indeed, the percentage of two-earner households
has grown much faster in Sweden than in Germany after the introduction of
incentives to form two-earner households.
It may be concluded that the tax and benefit system of the fifties is 'unsta-
ble',in the sense that it contains incentives to choose another household type
than the one that is considered superior. But if many people choose a
specific household type, they might question its inferiority, and propose to
choose a tax and benefit system that belongs in another row. Therefore, the
tax system easily moves  away  from that particular  cell of table   1.4.  In  the
next section the idea of stability is discussed further.
1.1.3.3   Stable   systems
We  may ask which cells in table 1.4 contain stable systems,  in the sense  that
the incentives do not induce a move to another row or column. Of course, all
cells in the 'incentives' column have stable systems by definition: the system
in these cells is designed to confirm the underlying principles. But elsewhere
there are unstable combinations.     This is illustrated in table 1.5 where    the
arrows indicate the direction of a possible move.
As an example, let us view the cell consistent with the present Dutch system
('two-earner/compensate').   This  cell is unstable. As table 1.4 showed,  the  tax
and benefit system in this cell occurs also in 'individual/incentives'. Thus the
system induces a change of viewpoint about the superiority of household
types. This change will not necessarily be to the 'individual' row, but might
also be to the first row, 'equally valuable'. Those two cells are stable, and
their tax and benefit systems contain strong incentives for people to live
alone.
The first row, where all household types are seen as equally valuable, is
'above stability': as there is no household type considered superior, financial
incentives are irrelevant. But the systems in those two cells do contain
opposite incentives: the compensation principle will induce people to live
alone, and the 'leave them where they are' principle induces them to live
together with others, albeit not necessarily in a traditional family.
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Table 1.5 Stable and unstable cells in table  1.4
what to do with
financial advantages of household types
superior




1-                -
one-earner family
two-earner family
-1           T
single individual
double-lined cells contain stable cells
arrows indicate into which direction the tax system in unstable cells moves
The principle that all household types are equally valuable, may therefore
produce very different societies, depending on the choice on how to treat
financial advantages.
In the column 'leave them where they are' the only unstable cell is 'indi-
vidual/leave them where  they  are':   a tax system without single's allowance,
and with separate taxation and separate benefits is consistent with the idea
that singles are superior, but it induces people to live together with others,
albeit not necessarily in a traditional family. The other cells in that column
are stable, because they do not induce a change of viewpoint about the
superiority of households.
The  conclusion from table   1.5   is  that the cells where most people   are  to  be
found, 'one-earner/compensate', 'two-earner/compensate' and 'individual/
leave them where they are', all contain unstable systems. The incentives that
follow from the tax system consistent with the choices on principles, under-
mine those principles. An individualized tax and benefit system may not be
the most effective way to stimulate people to form one-earner families, but it
does make it relatively difficult to be a single. The present Dutch system
('two-earner/compensate') makes it relatively attractive to form one-person
households.
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1.1.4 Conclusion: central question of the thesis
Without choosing sides in the discussion about individualization of benefits,
economists may point to economic advantages of individualization  of the tax
system. Under the present system the net wage a woman receives does not
only depend on her productivity, but also on other factors, in particular her
spouse's income. This means that the price signals that women receive are
distorted. In view of the progressive tax system, and the fact that husbands
generally have higher wages and work more hours, married or cohabitating
women face lower net wages than their single colleagues.
There are two mechanisms that cause such price distortions: first the double
exemption level for breadwinners, and secondly the means test for benefits,
which extends to partner's income. For the U.K. means tests have been
analyzed by Jordan et. al. (1992) and for the Netherlands by Kersten et. al.
(1994). Both the double exemption level and the means tests provide married
or cohabitating women with a lower marginal net wage, and a higher
nonlabor income, than single women receive for the same job. This proposi-
tion is interesting enough to analyze further. In this thesis, therefore, the
question is how female labor supply is affected if the tax system is such that
the price signals that women receive for their labor do not depend on their
household type. In terms  of tables   1.4  and   1.5  this  means  an  analysis   of a
change towards the 'leave them where they are' column.
The method to answer this question must be based on micro-economic re-
lations. Individual income positions and household situations differ widely,
and therefore the effects of tax measures are almost impossible to estimate
by macro methods. As microsimulation is still fairly new in the Netherlands,
the next section is devoted to this technique.
1.2 MICROSIMULATION AND INCOMES POLICY
Microsimulation is a fairly new technique in analyzing incomes policy
effects. In this section the possibilities for application are discussed. Section
1.2.1  describes the origin of microsimulation. Sections   1.2.2,1.2.3,  and  1.2.4
discuss different types of microsimulation models and their different applica-
tion possibilities. Section 1.2.5 concludes.
1.2.1 The origin of microsimulation
The first advocate of the use of microsimulation models was G. Orcutt. In
Orcutt  (1957) he notes  that the availability of powerful computers allows  the
use of large micro data sets in economic modelling. As an example, he
describes a simple model of demographic transitions, which resembles the
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demographic model that will be used in chapter 2, and which is described in
more detail in Appendix C. Such demographic models are relatively simple,
and they possess all basic characteristics of a dynamic microsimulation
model.
Orcutt's model uses three kinds of inputs. First, a large data set of, e.g.,
10,000 individuals, of whom certain characteristics are known, such as sex,
age, and marital status. Second, demographic probabilities, such as mortality,
marriage, and birth rates. The third kind of input is a set of hypotheses about
demographic behavior. These hypotheses can be expressed as relationships
between the probabilities and the individual characteristics included in the
model. For instance, the probability to marry in year t can be expressed as a
function of age, sex, and marital status in year t-1. Demographic processes
such as mortality, marriage, and birth are then simulated as follows. For each
person and for each appropriate transition, a pseudo-random number between
zero and one is drawn by the computer, and compared with the appropriate
transition probability.  If the random number is smaller than that probability,
a transition does occur, and otherwise not. If the data set is large enough,
then the total numbers of deaths, births, marriages, divorces, etc. in the data
set will be close to their expectations.
Orcutt mentions a number of advantages that such a dynamic microsimula-
tion model can have over macro-orientd demographic models. The micro-
simulation model allows for separate analyses of subgroups. These subgroups
can be defined flexibly. At the micro level the model is very easy to under-
stand. Macro quantities are obtained by simply adding up individual vari-
ables, and therefore the model contains few behavioral equations at the
macro level. Thus, errors resulting from aggregation of nonlinear relations
are avoided. Orcutt supposes that for prediction purposes, a microsimulation
model of the economy, almost by definition, performs better than macro
models.
In practice it has been very difficult to build and estimate micro models of
the economy. The model that most resembles Orcutt's original idea is Berg-
mann's transactions model, which took 12 years to complete (Bennett and
Bergman, 1980). This model describes decisions of individual households
and firms over one-week time periods. It contains consumption, investment,
labor market supply and demand, etc. But even though it is a very complete
model, its prediction performance is no better than that of other, macro-
oriented, models.
In so far as microsimulation models have been used for economic policy,
they were often partial models, describing one particular sector of the
economy. It is especially for incomes policy that microsimulation has been
applied, not only in the United States but also in the Federal Republic of
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Germany and elsewhere. For an overview of applications of microsimulation
models see Orcutt, Merz and Quinke (1986), and more recently Nelissen
(1993) and Merz (1991). Nelissen, following Merz (1988), distinguishes
three types of microsimulation models: static, dynamic, and longitudinal.
They differ in the way dynamic effects are modelled.  For the purpose  of this
thesis, there is a second, more economic, dimension which deserves atten-
tion. That is the kind of behavioral effects that the model describes. In the
following sections, these three kinds of models are discussed.
1.2.2 Income effects: static models in the Netherlands
Interest in micro-analytic simulation in the Netherlands and the US have
different origins. In the Netherlands, distributional issues traditionally play an
important role in economic policy. The Central Planning Bureau has pub-
lished so-called income charts since 1969. These decompose the change   in
purchasing power of a 'standard' person into different components, such as
wage change, tax and premium change, and change in child support. Income
charts show the static income effects of policy measures: the net income
changes that are valid under the assumption that all other circumstances
remain equal. Not only socio-economic characteristics, but also the house-
hold situation, and the number and age of the children are kept constant to
calculate static income effects. These effects, therefore, show the pure effect
of incomes policy measures. They are also indicated by the term 'first-order
effects', because they are valid before any behavioral reactions have
occurred.
Currently, income charts show purchasing power changes for public sector
workers, private sector workers, and unemployed persons, at various wage
levels, and in different family situations. In CPB (1987) and CPB (1990) a
description is given of the income chart and its development in the period
1969-1990. The importance of income charts is demonstrated by the fact that
the persons who occur in these charts are often spoken about as if they were
alive; yet they are imaginary and do not necessarily have a counterpart in the
real world (e.g. De Kam, 1988: 141-143 and De Kam (1993)).
However, there are many questions about incomes policy for which income
charts cannot provide an adequate answer, for instance the consequences for
the government budget, or the income effects in real-world situations.
Incomes policy can have widely different effects for individuals in different
circumstances. For instance, a decrease of the unemployment benefit is partly
offset for those individuals who receive an income-dependent rent subsidy
(Van Fulpen, Van Herwaarden et. al., 1985). Therefore, to answer this kind
of questions, a further step must be taken. Incomes policy regulations must
be combined with a large (representative) data set of existing individuals or
households. This data set allows the researcher to account for interaction of
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various incomes policy measures, and to estimate in which way persons or
households are affected by a certain policy measure.
Thus, microsimulation is especially useful in fields such as incomes policy,
because policy measures have widely different effects, depending on individ-
ual circumstances. The earliest applications of microsimulation for this
purpose in the Netherlands were done by the Social and Cultural Planning
Bureau (SCP, 1981). More recent applications come from two committees on
tax reform (Committee-Oort, 1986, and Committee-Stevens, 1991). Applica-
tion of microsimulation enabled them not only to estimate the effect of
proposed tax reforms on government finance, but also to decompose their
proposals into partial effects for different population groups, e.g. workers
versus non-workers, one-earner families versus two-earner families. Another
project worth mentioning is Bosch et. al. (1994).
In all these applications, a static microsimulation model was used, that is, a
model which focuses on the static income changes, keeping constant all other
variables, such as socio-economic characteristics, age, and household
situation. A static microsimulation model may be viewed as a representative
collection of income charts.
Static microsimulation techniques allowed the tax reform committees to
include tables comparing the effects of different proposals. Some proposals
had a negative effect on the government budget, others a positive effect. As
the committees's aim was to present a policy package that would be budget-
ary neutral, the use of microsimulation was essential for fine-tuning their
total package of proposals.
The static microsimulation models used by the two tax reform committees
have some important advantages over other existing microsimulation models.
As the tax reform committees had access to confidential data sets and
individual tax records, the sample sizes were large and the quality of the data
was very good'6. Nevertheless, there are reasons to suppose that the commit-
tees'  estimates of the effects of their proposals have systematic errors, even
if behavioral reactions are ignored.
First, in both cases, there were no recent data available, so the models were
based on a data set of about five years old. These data sets were then
updated with respect to demographic characteristics (sex, age and marital
status), but not with respect to socio-economic characteristics.
16 The model in committee-Stevens (1991) used a representative data set for the
year   1985. For those persons   in the sample obliged   to   file  a tax return, the exact
fiscal data were known. For the other group (mostly persons with low income
and standard situation) income and tax data could be estimated fairly accurately.
25
Secondly, it is almost impossible to exactly replicate the tax and benefit
system in a microsimulation model. A rigorous test by the Department of
Social Affairs has shown that even a very detailed and precise model of
welfare benefits (the Dutch ABW) cannot predict the exact size of benefits in
individual cases (SZW, 1993). The department has used a computerized
expert system to trace the consequences of changes in welfare regulations.
The quality of the computerized system was tested by a comparison between
the outcomes  of the expert system  and the actual benefits awarded to a group
of 100 applicants.    In 18 cases a difference did exist, which could   not   be
traced back to errors in the computer program. According to the department,
these differences are caused by interpretation of the welfare rules, and
therefore cannot be avoided. On a standard data set, a simplified version of
the expert system made slightly larger errors than the original expert system,
but differences were not large. Thus, it is no wonder that the microsimulation
model that was used by the 'Stevens' tax reform committee (committee-
Stevens, 1991) could not capture all proposed measures. The financial effects
of those measures that were not included in the model, were estimated to be
around  f 700 million  to the government's advantage. The total amount
redistributed   in the proposals was around  f 10 billion 17. This means  that  7%
of the financial consequences  of the proposals was not traced in the micro-
simulation model, and hence did not show up in the tables that give the
income effects per category. Thus, all income effects for subgroups of the
population were overestimated, resulting in a (slightly) too optimistic picture
from the viewpoint  of the taxpayer.
The third and most important problem is that the breakdown of the data set
into subgroups might suggest that the outcomes are more exact than they are,
given the inherent inaccuracy of survey data. In a recent article, Pudney and
Sutherland (1994) investigate the statistical reliability of the outcomes of a
static microsimulation model. Although their baseline simulations are
reasonably accurate, their estimates of the effects of policy measures have
wide confidence intervals. Not only the breakdown over subgroups, but also
the estimate of total costs and revenues are inaccurate. They show that
imposing revenue-neutrality increases the confidence interval widths even
further. Typically the relative sizes of the confidence intervals were more
than  one-third, and sometimes   even  more  than   100%  of the policy effect.
The two Dutch tax reform committees recognize that survey data are inaccur-
ate when they state that it is not efficient to try to minimize the estimated
static income effects at all cost. However, the availability of microsimulation
models makes it attractive for policy-makers to spend a lot of time and
money on fine-tuning their proposals, even though the benefit of this is
questionable.
17 a billion is a thousand times a million.
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Apart from inaccuracies in the simulation outcomes, there is a second reason
why the emphasis placed on the static income effects is questionable. The
abundance of tables presenting static income effects from various viewpoints
invite the reader to criticize only the static income effects. Incentive effects
are ignored. Even though the Stevens committee motivates some of its
proposals by the incentive effects (e. g. increase of the worker's exemp-
tioni; or decrease of marginal rates) which stimulate participation on the
labor market, the committee does not try to quantify the effect of its propos-
als on labor supply,  and its report does not invite discussion  of the behavior-
al reactions.
When tax measures explicitly aim at changing individuals' behavior, it is not
enough to estimate only the first-order effect on the income distribution.
Estimates of the behavioral effects (the second-order effects) can alter the
conclusions dramatically, as the next section will show.
1.2.3 Behavioral effects and dynamic models
Recently, the relative importance of static and dynamic income changes has
been receiving more attention. It is felt that policy-makers spend too much
energy on fine-tuning static income effects. The Department of Social Affairs
has shown that incomes policy has only a limited effect on the realized
changes in incomes (SZW, 1990, see also: Van de Stadt et. al., 1986, and
CPB, 1987). Changes in socio-economic positions have a larger impact than
tax   measures. For instance, between    1986    and    1987 the median income
change of households  was +3.1%, but the variation was large: a quarter of all
households experienced a decrease in income of more than 3.1%, and a
quarter an income  rise  of more  than   11.5%.   Over  the same period  the  net
income change as calculated by the income charts, of which tax policy
measures are only a part, varied between +1% and +2.5% for almost the
whole population. Moreover, the Oort-tax reform   in   1990 has limited   the
possibilities for policy-makers to influence the income distribution (SZW,
1990), so the relative importance of changes in socio-economic position is
likely to increase even further. Therefore, it is not sufficient to focus on the
static first-order effects of incomes policy, ignoring effects on economic
behavior.
When tax policy measures specifically aim at changing economic behavior,
there is an extra argument not to give the static income effects much weight:
static income effects are not meant to last for long. For this thesis this is
especially relevant, as female labor supply is relatively elastic, and one of the
18 Translation of the Dutch term 'arbeidskostenforfait'.  This is an addition to the
normal exemption level, valid only for taxpayers with labor income.
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goals of individualizing the tax system is to influence labor market behavior
of females.
Thus, in this thesis the *namic €#ects of tax policy measures will be
analyzed. Whereas static income effects are calculated under the assumption
that all other circumstances remain equal, in calculating dynamic effects this
assumption is relaxed. Dynamic effects may be more than just income
effects: the term can also refer to effects on labor supply or household
formation. In dynamic microsimulation models, changes in the individual
characteristics are modelled explicitly.
Of course, changes in circumstances do not have to originate from policy
measures. Behavioral reactions must be distinguished from exogenous
developments,  if we wish to analyze the effects of tax policy on economic
behavior. Not every dynamic model is designed for this purpose. The
following two examples may illustrate this: the first example is of a dynamic
model without economic behavior, the second model contains economic
behavior but is not dynamic.
First, in so-called longitudinal models, time is introduced but not economic
behavior. Such models are often applied to simulate the effects of pension
reforms (see e.g. WRR (1993), or Galler and Wagner (1986)). The amount of
pension a worker receives, depends on his or her personal labor market
history. Labor market histories vary widely over the population, and this
variation affects pensions stronglyl'. Thus, microsimulation is a logical
technique to analyze the effects of a change in the pension system, because
in a microsimulation model it is not necessary to define certain groups of
labor market histories and then try to estimate how many people are in each
group.
Longitudinal models simulate life cycles and the associated labor market
histories for each individual separately. Thus, transition probabilities on the
labor market may depend on individual characteristics, but it is difficult to
model dependence on the actions of other individuals (e.g. a spouse) or
macro quantities (e.g. the price of labor, or the unemployment rate). Macro
quantities for a given year can be calculated only after all individuals for that
year have been processed by the model. This makes it near to impossible to
include economic behavior in the model: in longitudinal models, the simula-
tion run is finished when macro quantitities can be calculated, so the macro
19 The so-called 'pensioenbreuk' (translated pension-break) originates from the rule
that the pension rights of a worker are only updated as long as he or she works
for the same employer. Therefore, persons who have often switched jobs have
lower pension rights than others. Hence is not easy to make a useful categoriza-
tion of workers with respect to their pension rights.
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quantities for year t cannot be used as input in year t+1. That is why Galler
and Wagner (1986) have made a longitudinal and a cross-sectional version of
their microsimulation model  of the German labor market.
The second example is about models that are not dynamic, but contain a
behavioral block. Examples for the Netherlands are Bekkering, Grift and
Siegers (1986), Van Soest (1988), Kapteyn, Woittiez and Ten Hacken
(1989), and Grift et. al. (1991). All these authors append a static labor supply
module to a static microsimulation modeFO. Such models have been used to
estimate the effects that tax reforms have on female labor supply. As the
labor supply module is static, the conclusions concern long-term effects only.
Demographic developments,  such as ageing of the population, are ignored,  or
are approximated by changing the weights of individuals in different age
classes.
There are very few models that are not longitudinal, but are dynamic in the
sense that they contain transition probabilities between labor market states.
The only example for the Netherlands is Nelissen's NEDYMAS model.
However, the transition probabilities in NEDYMAS do not reflect economic
behavior: although the probabilities do vary with individual characteristics
such as age and sex, they are not a function of institutional variables, such as
the wage rate.
Hopefully the discussion above has made it clear that a dynamic model is
more than just a static model with an extra behavioral module. Both kinds of
models have their own advantages and disadvantages. For instance, the
module describing the tax and premium system has to meet other require-
ments in dynamic than in static models. In static models, meant for replicat-
ing the static income effects for small subgroups in the population, the tax
and premium system must be represented in as detailed a fashion as possible.
This is what both tax reform committees have done. But in models with
economic behavior,  a very detailed income block could be more of a liability
than an asset. The above-mentioned analysis of the Department of Social
Affairs (SZW, 1993) has shown that applying a very detailed algorithm to a
data set with only a few variables, does not improve the accuracy of the
results. The drawbacks of a detailed algorithm are increased computer
capacity requirements and inflexibility because of the complexity of the
program. These drawbacks are larger than the advantages of a precise
estimate  of the tax and benefit system.  The data sets used in dynamic models
20 In the model devised by Kapteyn, Woittiez and ten Hacken (1989) labor supply
in a certain year depends, among others, on labor supply in the year before.
Nevertheless, their model is essentially static: the characteristics of individuals
do not change. Moreover, their data set describes a very short period: two years.
See also Merz (1991: 79-81).
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are not detailed enough to warrant a more detailed income block. Such a
block will only add to the size of the model, without improving the quality
of the outcomes. Moreover,  if the behavioral parameters have been estimated
from a micro data set, it makes no sense to build a more complex income
block than the original data set allows.
1.2.4 Cyclical effects: general equilibrium models
Static income effects and behavioral effects are indicated as first-order and
second-order effects of incomes policy. There is also a third kind of effect,
namely cyclical effects. For instance, assume that a certain tax measure
induces more labor supply. This, in turn, will cause a wage decrease, which
stimulates demand for labor and decreases supply. The latter effects cannot
be traced by a partial labor supply model, but can be analyzed by the kind of
general equilibrium microsimulation model Orcutt originally devised. Such
models have not been applied in practice, however, because of their com-
plexity. Nelissen (1993: chapter 2) gives an overview    of the practical
problems.
At the meso and macro level, however, cyclical effects are easy to analyze.
As Orcutt already indicated in 1957, macro models are unable to cope with
individual variation, and therefore are not fit for the purpose of this thesis.
However, it is possible to extend a macro model with a module describing
individual labor supply. This has been done by Kapteyn, ten Hacken and
Woittiez (1989) using a macro-model and a static labor supply module. The
focus of their study is predominantly on the long term. They analyze the
effect of habit formation and the influence of so-called 'reference groups'.
They apply their model to a simulation of individualization  of the tax system,
and find very small effects on female labor supply. The reason is that their
estimated wage elasticities are low: under 0.50 (Kapteyn, Woittiez and ten
Hacken (1989: 157), whereas the model version without preferences obtained
elasticities larger than 1. According to Theeuwes  (1988:  129) most empirical
studies find elasticities larger than 1 for Dutch females. Apparently, introduc-
ing habit formation and reference groups into the model reduces the estimat-
ed effects of income variables.
Thus, the reason that the results of Kapteyn, ten Hacken and Woittiez (1989)
differ from those of other authors is not the fact that their model contains
cyclical effects, but the inclusion of preferences in their model, combined
with the notion that habit formation and copying of reference groups provide
a better explanation for female labor market behavior than incomes policy. In
the long term, however, this notion is questionable: in the period 1961-1990
female labor market participation increased    from    17%   to   over   40%.    It   is
hardly imaginable that such a large increase is due to habit formation and
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copying of reference groups. When the majority of women does not partici-
pate, these two factors induce a decrease in participation, not an increase.
At the meso level, it is possible to analyze the effects of tax measures for
different household types. In the Netherlands, two meso models have been
applied to estimate and compare the effects of income tax measures. The
first model applies the General Equilibrium model that was built at the
Central Bureau of Statistics to study the tax reform proposals by the Oort
committee (Van de Stadt, Huigen and Zeelenberg, 1989). The authors distin-
guish 'direct' and 'indirect' effects of the tax reform. Indirect effects com-
prise both behavioral reactions and cyclical effects. Their conclusions are,
that direct and indirect effects mostly have opposite signs, and indirect
effects are relatively large in absolute value: between 0 and 50% of the
direct effect's absolute value. However, the labor market block of this model
is essentially static. It does not allow individuals to change their labor supply
behavior from non-supplier to supplier or vice versa. Extra labor supply can
originate only from workers who decide to supply more hours of labor than
they did before the tax reform.
A more elaborate description of the labor market is to be found in the
Central Planning Bureau's General Equilibrium model MIMIC (Gelauff
(1992) and Gelauff and Graafland (1994)). This model distinguishes 16
household types. MIMIC has simulated individualization of the tax system
and of benefits. Its results are plausible: individualization of the tax system
stimulates labor market participation of married women. Because the income
effects of individualization are especially strong when income is low21, the
extra labor supply is concentrated in part-time jobs (mostly not more than
one day a week).
With respect to individualization  of the benefit system, the results of MIMIC
depend strongly on the assumptions on 'improper use' of welfare and unem-
ployment benefits. This term describes the problem that has been mentioned
earlier in section   1.2.:   in an individualized benefit system, all non-working
housewives become eligible for a benefit if they claim to be actively looking
for work. This condition is difficult to verify, especially when unemployment
is high. The simulations with MIMIC analyze two extreme positions with
respect to improper use: (1) improper use does not occur, and (2) improper
use is high. These two positions lead to very different conclusions. Of
course, high improper use is economically inefficient, because effective labor
supply is low and the cost of benefits is high. Individualization of benefits
has economic advantages, because the abolition of means tests on the
2/ Individualization boils down to a decrease of the tax exemptions of married
men, and an increase of those of married women. Thus, individualization is
relatively most important for couples where the wife has no job, or a small one.
31
partner's income stimulates labor supply. The important conclusion is that, if
at least one in six persons who have the possibility, makes improper use of
the individualized benefit system, the disadvantages of individualization
outweigh the advantages.
The conclusion of this section is, that the aims of General Equilibrium
models differ from those expressed in section 1, namely to estimate   the
behavioral reactions on individualization of the tax system, and leave as
much room as possible for individual variation. The General Equilibrium
models have to make use of meso data, and therefore it is difficult to allow
for all relevant characteristics that play a role when the tax system is individ-
ualized. For instance, the CBS model does not allow individuals to change
their labor market state.
1.2.5 Conclusion: requirements for the model developed in this thesis
The discussion above has shown that there are two dimensions on which
models can be characterized. The first dimension is the kind of behavioral
effects  that are modeled,  and the second  one  is the dynamics. In table  1.6  an
overview is given. As there are three levels of behavioral effects, and two
levels of dynamics, there are six possible types of microsimulation models.
Each type is useful for a special kind of problem, and each has its own
technical properties.
Table 1.6 Typology of microsimulation models
static dynamic
section 1.2.2 longitudinal models
model, used by tax re- Galler and Wagnerincome effects form committees; models  (1986), WRR (1993)
used by govt. ministries
section 1.2.3 This thesis
Grift et. al. (1991), Nelissen (1993)behavioral effects
Kapteyn, Woittiez and
ten Hacken (1989)
section 1.2.4 Bennett and Bergmann
Gelauff and Graafland (1980)
cyclical effects (1994), Van de Stadt
et.al. (1989)
In the case of tax individualization, there are some specific requirements  for
the model to be used. First, the aggregation level should be as low as
possible, to allow the variation in income effects to stand out. Secondly, the
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model should contain a module describing economic behavior, as tax
individualization seeks to influence exactly that. Third, dynamics should be
introduced in the model, as comparisons of long-term equilibria do not tell us
much time it will take to reach the new equilibrium.
For our purpose therefore, a model must be developed that belongs in the
middle  row and right column in table  1.6. A drawback  of such a model  is
that it ignores cyclical effects of tax policy. On the other hand, the size of
such cyclical effects is likely to be small, relative to first-order and second-
order effects.
2. A Sorting Method for Variance Reduction in
Microsimulation Models
This chapter is devoted to variance reduction in microsimulation models.
Section 2.1 is about the reasons why variance reduction is important. Section
2.2 discusses several variance reduction techniques and their applicability    to
microsimulation. In section 2.3, a sorting method is derived for grouped data
sets (data sets that consist of a number of groups with identical individuals)
for models with two states. It is shown that the sorting method results in
smaller variances than traditional simulation methods based on pseudo-
random numbers. Section 2.4 gives a generalization  of the sorting method to
ungrouped data sets, i.e., data sets where individuals may be unique. Section
2.5 illustrates the performance of the sorting method on a simple demo-
graphic microsimulation model. Section 2.6 shows how to apply the sorting
method in models with more than two states. Section 2.7 discusses the
relevance of the sorting method for goodness-of-fit tests in probabilistic
choice models. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIANCE REDUCTION
A microsimulation model typically makes use of a large data set of individ-
uals, for whom all kinds of characteristics are registered. Dynamic micro-
simulation models describe changes in these individual characteristics, such
as transitions between demographic states or between labor market states '.
Transition probabilities, e.g. the probability to marry or to supply labor,
usually vary among individuals. Generally,  simulation of transition processes
is done by Monte Carlo techniques: a pseudo-random number is drawn from
the uniform (0,1) distribution for each individual in the data set. If this
random number is smaller than the individual's specific transition probability
the individual makes a transition. In the following, the term 'random num-
bers'   will   be   used for computer-generated pseudo-random numbers   with
uniform (0,1) distribution, assuming the latter approximates the former well
enough  for the purpose of simulation.
The fact that random numbers are used means that a random element is
introduced  into the simulation outcomes: the number of transitions within the
data set depends on the specification and the seed of the random number
generator.  Thus, the simulated number of transitions has a positive variance.
This variance has nothing to do with uncertainty about future values of
' In static microsimulation models, changes in characteristics are represented by
changes in the individual weight factors.
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exogenous variables, or with errors in model specification. The latter two
factors are, in general, more important reasons for a difference between
reality and prediction, than the population variance that results from the
random process, and they are important for policy makers. Their effects can
be analyzed by comparing several versions of the model, which differ in the
values of the exogenous variables or the model specification.
But, application of microsimulation  may well create the false impression that
the random process is an important source of variation. This can be illus-
trated in an example, based on the demographic model to be used in section
2.5. The data set in section 2.5 is a 1:1000 sample of the Dutch population
under 65 years of age in the year 1985. According to table 2.4, the micro-
simulation model predicts   that   in the four-year period 1986-1989 there  will
be 399 marriages in the data set. The estimated standard deviation of the
number of marriages in the data set is 10.74. This is an estimate of
1{E Pi x (1 - Pi)},  with Pi the marriage probability for individual  i  in  the
period 1986-1989.    Thus   the 95% confidence interval    for the number    of
marriages in the data set is [377.52,420.48]. This interval has a width of
more than  10% of the number of marriages. This confidence interval  is what
the model builder must present to policy makers. But such a presentation
may cause confusion, because a correct estimate of the standard deviation  of
the  number of marriages  in the total  population  is  10.74 x 1/1000 = 3402,
which must be compared to the estimated total number of marriages 399,000.
Thus, in the total population, the width of the confidence interval is only
0.34% of the total number of marriages, whereas it is 10% in the data set
used for simulation.
The example shows that the variance caused by the random process is, in
general, not a variable of interest for policy makers, but is only relevant for
the model builder, because the policy makers and the model builder work
with different populations.  If the  data set  is  a 1:N sample  of the real popula-
tion, the confidence intervals that follow from the microsimulation model are
a factor v'N too wide. Because the variance in the number of marriages
caused by the random process has no relevance for policy purposes, it is
advisable to use techniques that reduce the variance as much as possible.
There is a second reason why the random element of microsimulation
outcomes can seriously hinder the applicability of microsimulation models
for policy purposes. The effect of a change in economic policy is calculated
by comparing two runs of the model: the first is called the Central Path and
makes use of standard transition probabilities. In the second run, the Policy
Variant, a change in the transition probabilities causes a different outcome.
The difference between Central Path and Policy Variant is the simulated
'    The factor 41000 occurs in this formula because the sample is 1.1000.
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policy effect. Now, if the outcome of the Central Path is denoted by x and
that of the Policy Variant by y, the respective variances  are:
Central   Path:   Var(x) ; Policy Variant:   Var(y) ; (2.1)
Policy effect: Var(x) + Var(y) - 2xCov(x,y).
Often, the policy effect x-y is not large, for instance, around  5% of x.
Therefore, even if Var(x) and Var(y) are small, relative to x and y, the
variance of the policy effect may be large, relative to x - y. The variance of
the policy effect may be decreased by increasing Cov(x,y)1. But even then,
the variance of the policy effect may be large, relative to its size. This can
have irritating effects in practice: even a model that uses exactly the right
transition probabilities may well produce unreliable simulation outcomes.
Because the variance of simulation outcomes in microsimulation models has
no relevance for economic policy, and causes imprecise results, it is advis-
able to reduce simulation variance as much as possible. In this chapter an
alternative to the Random Number method is developed for simulating transi-
tions in a micro data set. The method starts by sorting the data set, with
respect to the characteristics that determine the transition probabilities, and is
therefore referred to as the sorting method. Under the sorting method, a
considerable reduction of simulation variance can be reached.
2.2 STANDARD VARIANCE-REDUCTION TECHNIQUES FOR MICRO-
SIMULATION
In microsimulation, two standard variance reduction techniques are often
applied, each with its own drawbacks: the techniques of Common Random
Numbers (CRN) and Alignment (AT). In sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. these two
techniques are discussed, and then section 2.2.3 mentions a number of other
standard techniques in dynamic simulation. It turns out that these latter
techniques are useful only in a special kind of data set, namely, data sets
which consist of a small number of groups in which all individuals are
identical. Section 2.2.4 discusses one of these variance-reduction techniques,
namely systematic sampling, as this is a useful introduction to the sorting
method which will be developed in section 2.3.
'  A large covariance between x and y can be effected by the technique of Com-
mon Random Numbers. See section 2.2.1.
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2.2.1 Common Random Numbers (CRN)
Under CRN, the covariance in (2.1) is maximized. In both the Central Path
and the Policy Variant the random generator is fed with the same seed, so
the same sequence of random numbers is used. More precisely: for each
individual in the data set, for every transition, the same random number is
drawn in Central Path and Policy Variant, to determine if a transition does
occur. This technique is very easy to apply and may cause a considerable
reduction  in the variance  of the policy effect, as will be seen later. Moreover,
it is intuitively attractive, because it is now possible to separately analyze the
group of individuals that make different transitions in the Central Path and
the Policy Variant. However, there are some problems.
First, in many models the choices that an individual faces in period t, depend
on the choices made in t - 1. For instance, an individual faces the possibility
to divorce in period t only if he/she has married before. To ensure, that for
each possible transition, in each period, the same random number is drawn, it
is necessary to 'reserve' random numbers for all individuals, for all imagin-
able transitions in each year. Random numbers that are not used, are then
simply ignored; for example, in the case of an unmarried individual no
transition into the state 'divorced' occurs. Naturally, the longer the projection
period, the more often it will occur that a random number is used for Central
Path, but ignored for Policy Variant or vice versa. Thus, the covariance
between Central Path and Policy Variant decreases when the model is used
for long-term projections.
Secondly, in practice CRN is often applied by giving each individual its own
stream of random numbers by using (a function of) the individual's rank
number as the seed for the random number generator. See e.g. Orcutt,
Caldwell and Wertheimer (1976: 15-17). But this may introduce dependency
between the random numbers. Such effects are very difficult to detect, but
they can affect the simulation outcomes. This is illustrated in appendix B.
A third drawback of the CRN method is that, although the variance of the
policy effect may be reduced considerably, the forecasting quality of the
model has not improved, as the underlying variance of the total simulation
outcome may still be large. It is still worthwhile to look for ways to decrease
the underlying variance. For that, alignment techniques may be applied.
2.2.2 Alignment techniques (AT)
Sometimes the total number of transitions in a microsimulation model is
given exogenously, for instance, by a corresponding macro model or by
known macro statistics. Alignment techniques (AT) ensure that the total
number of transitions is equal to an exogenously given quantity, by adapting
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the individual transition probabilities. Examples can be found in Orcutt,
Caldwell and Wertheimer (1976: 15-17), and in Van Galen (1990). Also see
Kleijnen (1974: 133-137).
Suppose, the exogenously given total number of transitions is c, and x the
simulated number of transitions. Essentially, alignment boils down to
changing all original individual transition probabilities Pi' as follows:
P, - P'. X S (2.2)
X
with obvious corrections to prevent Pi from becoming larger  than  1.  As  c  is
always positive, a correction to prevent p from becoming smaller than 0 is
not necessary.
In practice, the difference between c and x is so small that probabilities
rarely  have  to be reduced  to  1. If, however, there are individuals  in the  data
set  for  whom the probability   is  set  to   1, this causes  a  bias  in the simulation
outcomes: (1) because, originally, there was a positive probability that the
event would not happen, and (2) the expected total number of transitions
increases by a factor less than c/x. Kleijnen (1974: 135) also mentions this
kind of bias.
The simulation run is repeated with the original random number sequence
and corrected individual probabilities. Of course, this second run does not
necessarily produce exactly c transitions. The correction step is repeated,
until the difference between x and c is small enough.
Alignment is an effective technique to ensure that the simulated total number
of transitions is equal to some exogenously given number. However,  the fact
that an aligned model produces the right total numbers of transitions does not
say much about the quality of the model. For instance, a mortality model in
which all individuals have been assigned the same mortality rate of 0.005 is
clearly a bad model. But it will produce exactly the right number of deaths
after alignment with the number of deaths in a population in a given year.
However, the distribution of deaths over age groups is bound to be wrong, as
all individuals still have the same mortality rate after alignment.
Alignment of the number of transitions, with an exogenously given total,
may be useful when a micro data set has to be updated, and recent macro
totals are known from other sources. For instance, the total number of
marriages c in a given year might be known from municipal statistics.
Marriage is simulated on the data set, using marriage probabilities from CBS
statistics. If there is a difference between the simulated total number of
marriages x and the exogenously given c, alignment may be applied to
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eliminate the difference between x and c. Naturally, this presupposes that the
difference between x and c is caused either by random factors, or by the
marriage probabilities having changed in reality, according to (2.2). But, if
there is a structural explanation for a difference between x and c, application
of AT might well have adverse effects. Suppose, for instance, that compul-
sory military service has been abolished for married men. Then marriage
probabilities would only increase for certain age groups, namely, the groups
aged   1 8  - 20 years. Under alignment, however, marriage probabilities   for  all
age groups would be increased or decreased by the same factor c/x. Thus,
application of alignment will actually make the simulation result worse, even
though the total number of marriages agrees with the exogenously given
totals. Underestimation of marriages  in the age groups  18-20 is compensated
by overestimation in the older age groups. This overestimation did not exist
in the original simulation run. The example illustrates that before alignment
is applied, we must make sure that the transition probabilities in the model
are the best estimate available.
Orcutt, Caldwell and Wertheimer  (1976),  set c equal to the expectation  of x,
which is easy to calculate by adding up all individual transition probabilities.
In this case, the underlying assumption is that the difference between c and x
is due only to random factors. However, there is again no reason to suppose
that alignment will really improve the simulation result. Alignment affects
those observations where the random number drawn is near the transition
probability; namely, between pi' and p,' x c/x. If the random number
sequence that was actually used, contained fewer than expected numbers
smaller than, say, 0.10, there is no reason to suppose that this problem is
remedied by multiplying all probabilities   with  the same factor.   I f there  is
something wrong with the random number series, this will not be detected,
due to the application  of AT.
Another drawback of alignment is that it is not easily applicable in models
with more than two states. There is no straightforward generalization  of (2.2)
to models where individuals can switch between, for instance, four states. A
related problem is that the formulation of the model matters: if the model
were reformulated in terms of qi =1- Pi, and fed with the complements  of
the original random numbers, alignment probably results in different correc-
tions than in the original version. This is intuitively unattractive: a 'mirror
model', for instance, a model describing 'staying alive' instead of 'dying'
should give the same results as the original model, if fed with the comple-
ments of the same random number sequence.
The conclusion is that AT must be applied with caution. They are useful for
adapting model results to exogenously given quantities, but only if this
serves to eliminate small stochastic errors and, thereby, to increase compati-
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bility with other statistics. If the model error is large, AT will only produce a
false feeling of accuracy, as it does not repair serious errors in a model.
2.2.3 Other variance reduction techniques in dynamic simulation
The two variance reduction techniques discussed in the preceding section are
the ones most often applied in microsimulation models. As they are not
really satisfactory, it is worthwhile to investigate whether variance reduction
techniques from dynamic simulation could offer a better alternative
(Kleijnen, 1974 and Wilson, 1984). This section will show that many
standard techniques for discrete event dynamic simulation are not easily
applicable in microsimulation models4.
In microsimulation models, the distribution function of the outcomes is not
the main thing the model builder is interested in. As has been illustrated in
section   2.1,  typically total populations   are very large (millions of people),   so
the outcome of the stochastic process has a very small variance. There are
several possible sources of prediction errors:
(1) incorrect representation  of the relationship between exogenous variables
(individual characteristics and other variables) and individual transition
probabilities;
(2)    errors  in the prediction  of the values of exogenous variables;
(3)    the variance of the stochastic process itself.
As illustrated in section 2.1, it is reasonable to suppose that (3) is relatively
unimportant, compared with (1) and (2). Therefore, the model builder is only
interested in point estimates of several quantities (e.g. both unemployment
and labor supply), or their distribution over the data set (e.g. the income
distribution). Moreover, policy makers are interested in the breakdown of the
results for several groups within the data set. An ideal variance reduction
technique for microsimulation should also reduce variances within groups, as
noted by Van Galen (1990).
Many standard variance reduction techniques for discrete event dynamic
simulation are not meant for this kind of problem. For instance, antithetic
random numbers are often used in the simulation of queuing systems. In the
first run of the model, a sequence of random numbers (rl, r2, ·•· , rn) is used.
Then the results are compared with a second run, based on the sequence
' Kleijnen (1974: 14) defines stochastic simulation as 'experimenting with a
model over time, this experimentation involving the sampling of values of
stochastic variables from their distributions'. The term 'Monte Carlo in a narrow
sense' is reserved for those applications of Monte Carlo which are not stochastic
simulation. As dynamic microsimulation models study the behavior of a group
of individuals over time, they are a form of stochastic simulation. Nevertheless,
they resemble Monte Carlo models, as the stochastic process is very simple.
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(1 - rt, 1-r2, ···,1-r )• If, in the first run, long waiting times are under-
represented, they are overrepresented in the second. Because of the negative
correlation between the results of the two simulation runs, the average of
both runs is a more accurate estimate of queue length than the outcome of
one single run.
In a microsimulation model, however, an individual's state in year t is not a
continuous function of the random number, but of the interval in which the
random number falls. That is why the negative correlation between the out-
come of two antithetic runs is not very large. For instance, suppose that in a
certain model,  individuals  make a transition if their random number falls in
the interval [0,0.05]. Then suppose that a sequence of random numbers is
drawn, in which 10% is smaller than 0.05, resulting in a number of transi-
tions that is twice as large as its expectation. Now 90% of the random
numbers is in the interval (0.05,1]. In the antithetic run, the only individuals
who make a transition are those for whom the original random number is in
the interval [0.95,1]. Therefore, the expected number of transitions in the
antithetic run is 90/95 times its expectation. The negative correlation between
the two antithetic model runs is now much smaller than in the case of queue
length, or any other variable which is a continuous function of the random
numbers.
There is an extensive literature on variance reduction techniques in dynamic
stochastic simulation. For an overview of variance reduction techniques,  see
Kleijnen (1974) or Wilson (1984). However, application of such techniques
in microsimulation is often only practical in special cases, namely, data sets
consisting of a small number of groups, with all individuals having the same
transition probabilities.  In fact, in the special case of a grouped data set, the
effects of many different variance reduction techniques are comparable,
because they all boil down to setting the number of transitions  in each group
close to its expectation. Nevertheless, for later purposes, it is instructive to
delve into one of these techniques a little further, as it resembles the sorting
method that will be developed in section 2.3.
2.2.4 Systematic Sampling
Wilson (1984:302) mentions a family of variance reduction techniques
indicated by terms like 'systematic sampling' or 'rotation sampling', which
are related to 'stratified sampling' in Kleijnen (1974: 110-133). In the case of
microsimulation, these techniques are effectively the same. If the data set
consists of a small number of groups in which all individuals have the same
characteristics, the simulation is carried out for each subset separately. The
number of transitions is set equal to its expectation over the subset, and
within each subset the individuals that make a transition are chosen random-
ly, by drawing a random number without replacement (see Kleijnen, 1974:
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133). As all individuals in each subset are observationally equivalent, the
choice of individuals does not affect the results.
At first sight, this technique does not seem relevant for microsimulation.
Most microsimulation models do not use a grouped data set, because micro-
simulation is not necessary in that case. But often, models contain a module
in which systematic sampling is easily applicable. In this thesis, a demo-
graphic module is used to update a data set before the labor market module
is run. Systematic sampling may be applied to reduce the variance in the
demographic module. After this updating, the labor market model is run on
the updated data set. The part of the variance of the simulation outcomes that
is caused by the demographic module is then reduced.
In the case of a labor market model, transition probabilities depend on
demographic characteristics such as age and marital status, so it seems useful
to apply systematic sampling in the demographic module. However, there is
no reason to use the same groups one would when making a demographic
prediction. For instance, if labor market transition probabilities vary with
education, it might be useful to define groups according to education in the
demographic module, even if the demographic transition probabilities do not
vary with education. The number of deaths, marriages, etc. in each educa-
tional category is then set close to its expectation (by the method mentioned
above of drawing random numbers without replacement), and this will
reduce the variance of the outcomes  of the labor market module.
However, groups must not become too small. Systematic sampling is clearly
impossible to apply in ungrouped data sets, with all individuals having
unique transition probabilities. Moreover, the smaller the groups are, the less
there is to be gained by systematic sampling. In small groups, rounding
errors between the expected number of transitions (a real number) and the
simulated number (an integer) become important. These rounding errors may
cause systematic differences between the simulation outcomes and their
expectations. For instance, the expected number of transitions in each group
is smaller than 1/2 if all groups contain 40 individuals, and the transition
probabilities are smaller than 1/(2 x 40) = 1.25%. The simulated number of
transitions will then be set to 0. The total simulated number of transitions  is
now much smaller than its expectation. In section 2.4 an example is given of
a demographic microsimulation model. The probability to marry depends on
age. For the older age groups, the expected number of marriages in each
group is smaller than 1/2, and, therefore, systematic sampling would result in
too few marriages.
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In a grouped data set, it is also possible to simulate by the Random Number
methods. How should one choose between these two techniques, for a given
grouped data set? An intuitively attractive criterion  is to check if the expect-
ed number of transitions in all groups is larger than a certain threshold w6,
but smaller than nj - w, with nj the number of observations in group j. If that
is the case, we may suppose that rounding errors are spread evenly over the
groups of the data set, so the rounding errors do not cause a systematic
difference between the simulated number of transitions and its expectation.
The expectation  of the simulated number of transitions under both techniques
is then equal, but, as will be shown, in most cases the variance is smaller
under systematic sampling. In the following, we will say that a technique
which results in the same expectation as an other technique, but smaller
variances, is a dominant technique.
To compare the expectations and variances under the two methods, note that
in the case of systematic sampling, the rounding errors may be seen as an
additional source of randomness of the simulation outcomes. Suppose that
rounding errors have a uniform distribution over the interval [-1/2, +1/2) (this
distribution is denoted by U[-1/2, +42)), and that they are stochastically
independent between groups. It is then easy to derive the distribution of the
simulated total number of transitions and to calculate its expectation and its
variance. If the number of groups is N, then the simulated total number of
transitions, minus its expectation, is distributed  as the sum of N independent
u[-th, +1/2) stochastic variables. Its variance is equal to N112 (Mood, Graybill
and Boes, 1974: 178, 541).
It may seem strange to interpret the existence of rounding errors as a source
of randomness.  In a given data set, neither the number of individuals nj in
group j, nor their transition probability PJ is a random variable. So, there is
nothing random in the rounding error, as it is a function of nj and pj. How-
ever, if we know neither nj nor pj, we can not predict the rounding error.
Therefore, we may say the rounding error is a random variable, just as the
number of eyes on a dice is still random when a dice has been tossed but is
covered by a beaker.
Thus, there is an intuitive criterion for deciding if systematic sampling
dominates the Random Number method in a given data set and model. If:
' As we are now concentrating on variance reduction of the total simulation
outcome, it is not relevant whether Common Random Numbers is applied or not.
CRN is only useful to reduce the variance of policy effects.
'  The size of this threshold is probably around 1 or 2. The larger the threshold,
the more confident we can be that the rounding errors are spread evenly over the
groups in the dataset.
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-  the data set consists of N groups of individuals  with all individuals within
the same group having identical characteristics and, therefore, identical
transition probabilities;
-  the expected number of transitions within each group j is larger than the
threshold w and smaller than nj - w so rounding errors may be supposed to
have a uniform distribution over the interval [-1 2, + 2);
N N- -< ) n,xp x(1 -p,);
12    7 1  1
then the variance of the total number of transitions is smaller under system-
atic sampling than under the Random Number method, whereas the expecta-
tions are equal. So systematic sampling is dominant for this kind of prob-
lems. This is also, essentially, the intuition behind the sorting method that
will be developed in the next section.
2.3 A SORTING METHOD FOR GROUPED DATA SETS IN MODELS WITH
TWO STATES
The sorting method, that is developed in this section, has a number of advan-
tages over systematic sampling. It is also applicable to small groups and
even in ungrouped data sets. The sorting method is, therefore, more generally
applicable than systematic sampling. Moreover, it can be shown to have
smaller variances than systematic sampling, if the latter is applicable.  In this
section the sorting method is developed for grouped data sets. Section 2.4
gives a generalization to ungrouped data sets.
In section 2.2.4, it has become clear that if the data set is grouped, we can
make use of this grouping when simulating transitions.  Let us suppose that a
data set could be grouped with respect to K characteristics. Such a data set
could be seen as a grid in ]R' , where every group of identical individuals is
located at a gridpoint. For instance, in a demographic model mortality rates
may depend on age and sex. So, for the process 'mortality', the data set is
sufficiently characterized by a two-dimensional table giving the numbers of
observations in each age-sex group. Each point in the grid contains a number
of individuals, who, being observationally equivalent, have the same transi-
tion probabilities. Under systematic sampling, the number of transitions at
each gridpoint is as close to its expectation as possible. The deviation
between the total simulated number of transitions over all groups (in the
following denoted by the symbol A), and its expectation (denoted by A), is
the sum of all rounding errors at the gridpointsi.
'   X and k are scalars, not vectors.
44
The expected number of transitions Example 2.0 data set, ordered as a grid
in group/gridpoint j is represented in R2





shows a data set, grouped with  * 4
respect to two characteristics.     i.
There are three possible values for  1 3
1.35
, 62-63-        7   i.28-         1
the first characteristic (e.g. educa-  ,
tion)  and four possible values   for         2       4.25the second characteristic (e.g. age
..............................
groups).   So  the  data  set  has   12  - 6.40            ;    §  §3          :   1.90
groups. The expected numbers of 11
transitions X (e.g. into marriage)
on every point of the grid are , 1  i213XX
given in example  2.0  in the upper      i.. .4..................    ...............   .......    ....i..............................
left corner of each cell.
The sorting method starts by viewing X as a real-valued function from the
grid to R. The simulated number of transitions  in j is indicated  by xj. This is
an integer-valued function from the grid to R. The problem of finding a
criterion to decide  if x is  'near'  to X is analogous  to the well-known problem
of comparing analytical and empirical distribution functions. To test the
hypothesis that a sample comes from a given distribution, the analytical and
empirical cumulative distribution functions are compared. The sorting
method, too, makes use of the cumulative functions of x and X, which are
denoted by 4 and lI respectively.
Such cumulative functions are defined as follows. In a certain grid point a
the value of the vector of characteristics  is (a 1, a2, ··· , aK)'. Now, analogous
to the definition of cumulative distribution functions:
al   al      a.
t„ E E E ···Exj" Ji i
11=1 j:.1 4.=1 (2.3)
«,    4        0,
't, f E E ···I 1.1, J.  
1444       h "1
The sorting method chooses the x in such a way that the maximum differ-
ence between 2& and :r over all gridpoints is as small as possible. This has an
important advantage. On all K-dimensional intervals of the form (-co, a] the
difference between 4 and Tr is in [-1/2, +1/2). Thus, because every subset of the
' Whenever possible without causing confusion, subscripts of variables will be
omitted. Sometimes it will be convenient to subscript variables like k by several
indices. It is assumed that in such cases the meaning of the subscripts is
obvious.
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dataset can be described as a sum or difference of a countable number of
such intervals, the variance of the simulation result over a subset has an
upper bound that does not depend on the number of observations in that
subset. Most subsets that the researcher is interested in, have many observa-
tions, and are made up of a few intervals of the kind (-co, a]. Thus, it is
likely that under the sorting method the variance of the simulation result has
an upper bound that is smaller than under the Random Number method.
The algorithm ensures that if in a certain point the simulation error X-x i s
positive, this is corrected for by a negative simulation error in another
gridpoint near by. Starting from an extreme point in the grid, in each step
one gridpoint is added and the simulated number of transitions in that point
is chosen such, that the cumulative simulation error TI - Zj is minimized. In
appendix  A a formal proof is given  of the validity  of the results.
In example 2.1, step 1 of the Example 2.1 data set, ordered as a grid
algorithm is shown. The algorithm in R: step  1: cell (1,  1)
starts   in  cell  (1,1), for which   the iB  -             """240-            irid-values of the exogenous character-      1  4
istics are lowest. The number   of      b
transitions   in this point,  xi t,  is  set      1   3 1.35           ,  0.05         T   1.40  -
to 6, the integer closest to X11, 1.......
6.40. Throughout the example, the  | 2   4.25
x in each cell will be shown in the
upper right corner.  Within cell  2     6.40 |  6   8.35      1.90
(1,1) the individuals making the  1 1
transition are chosen randomly.
This does not affect the results, as  i        1         2         3Ax
all  individuals   in  the  cell  are  ob-      1.3..4.............................
servationally equivalent. The
example does not tell us how
many observations each cell contains. Later, it will become clear that this is
an important variable. But at this stage of the exposition it is better to min-
imize the information given in the examples.
In step 2, shown in example 2.2, the group (1,2) is simulated. Now x12 is
not based on X12 alone, but on the accumulated expectation over the cells
(1,1) and (1,2) together. This total expectation is denoted by the symbol ur.
Its value, given in the lower left corner of the cell, is 6.40 + 4.25 = 10.65.
Therefore, the total number of transitions  in both cells, indicated  by the sym-
bol  A,  must  be  set  to  11, the integer closest  to   10.65. The number of transi-
tions x12  is  then  set  to  1 1-  6  (2&12  - xi 1).  In the same manner,  x13  will  be  set to
1613 minus (x12 + xii), and so on.
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In the following, simulation errors Example 2.2 step 2: cell (1,2)per cell will be indicated by the
   -   -  „i.6............... ....i.,10............ symbol  u= 1-x, whereas  the   , 4symbol   cp . will indicate the total     i.......... ...............................................................i.............................:J
simulation error over the subset of  1 3 1.35 0.05 , 1.40
the grid bounded by the origin and   I
cell (i, j).
Note     that     u,2 =     1 2     4.25 |   5     3.20        :  2.10         4.25 -5= -0.75, whic is larger  10.65 11
than 1/2 in absolute value. But 912
is  equal  to   12  -  2&12  =  10.65  -  11  -      ,   1        6.40       6       8.35           i   1.90            
-0.35, which is in the interval I
[-13, +th). Application of the algo-    Xx       1           2          3
rithm   to the first column   of  the      1.3.4....................         ....................i...............     ..1
data set ensures that the total simu-
lation error over each interval
[(1, h +  1), (1, j)] within the first column  is in (-1, +1):
j                                         J
7[u = Ext, ;   <u -Ext,
/=1 ,=1
(2.4)* 5  - 4  -  (4-XI,)
j                                j
= 9lj-9'h = 011-<U)-(irth-<th) = E (XIi-Xii) = E Ul,
1=h+1 j=h+1
So the total simulation error over  [(1,  h +  1), (1, j)]  can be expressed  as the
difference between two cp's. As all q) are under 1/2 in absolute value, the sum
of the u-terms in (2.4) is under 1 in absolute value. If systematic sampling is
applied, no such result holds. The deviation between the expected number of
transitions and its expectation, 1 - x, is minimized for each individual cell,
but its sum over a group of N cells might be as large as N/2. The sorting
method ensures all (p are in the interval [-1/2, +1/2).
The algorithm completes all cells in the first column, and then moves on to
the second column. Cell (2,1) is treated as the mirror image of cell (1,2)9.
The treatment of cell (2,2) is shown in example 2.3. To calculate TI and 4,
the four cells with exogenous values under 3 are taken into account. In the
cells (1,2) and (2,1) the simulation errors are negative: x > X. This is com-
pensated by a positive error in (1,1) and (2,2), so that the total simulation
error over the four cells is in [-1/2, +1/2). First, 7[22 is calculated:   22 -
41 + 112 + 121 + 122 = 6.40 + 4.25 + 8.35 + 3.20 - 22.20. Now 2&22 is set to
22, the integer closest   to   %22·   This   determines   x22;   2%22 - x1 a  - x12  - X21  =22-6-5-9=2.
'  7121 = 8.35+6.40 = 14.75. So 421 is set to 15. Now x21 - 421-xn = 15-6 = 9.
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The simulation error   u22   is 1.20, Example 2.3 step 6: cell (2,2)
which is outside the bounds  that ./         1.       -I          -I     -I         I.2.45 2, 2.40 , 3.10are valid for the cells in the first  i 4
row  and the first column  of the    ..............1.4.45...........14
grid. In appendix A it will be  1 3 1.35 1,  0.05           1.40
shown that the simulation error in 12.00    12 1
each cell is in the interval (-2, +2). 4.25       5    3.20| 22 2.10
This     is also valid for groups     of        1    2        10.65             11:22.20         22
cells which   form a 2-dimensional ---     -8.WIS  -    - -d-1  -i.li -   4-    i.45  -       1
interval. Suppose a 2-dimensional   1
interval is bounded by (h, 0 and  
14.75   15
(k, j),  with  h  <kandi<j.Then:           :X x             1                      2                     3
IA<
k J k     J
1[%  =  E I X    ;       <Al  =  S E X"„                                                                                   „„
i-/1 „:=l ,=1 mil
k    J
4   A      -  <11   -   E E (X,n,-X.)4                                       1.1
/.1  .A
4   cp* -cp4 -Pu +Pht   =   Tr*-44 -1rt, +44, -Trkt +4kt +1Tht -26w    =
k                        k                       k j k      J




As all (p are under 1/2 in absolute value, the absolute value of the simulation
errors u over 2-dimensional intervals is always under 2. In 3-dimensional
grids, the u over intervals can be expressed as the sum of at most 8 9's, so
the simulation errors over intervals are smaller than 4 in absolute value'o.
Apparently, the total simulation error over any interval has an upper bound
that is independent  of the number of observations  in that interval.
In appendix A it is shown that, if the data set is a grid in ]R' (under certain
conditions specified below in (2.6)) simulation by the sorting method guaran-
tees that the simulation error in each K-dimensional interval is distributed as
the sum of 2K independent, u[-1/2, +1/2) random variables. Hence its variance
is 21912. This result allows us to choose between systematic sampling and
the sorting method. In section 2.2.4 it was shown that the total simulation
error (A - X) under systematic sampling has a variance of N/12, with N the
number of groups  in the data set.  So, if N > 2K, the sorting method  domi-
10 The value of u becomes higher over subsets that are more complex than
intervals. It is even possible to construct an example of a subset of a data set
where the variance of u is higher under the sorting method than under the
Random Number method. Such a subset must contain few observations and it
must be written as the sum or difference of many intervals of the form (-co,a]. In
general this kind of subset is not very interesting.
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nates systematic sampling, because the total simulation error has the same
expectation but smaller variance. This condition holds when every point in
the grid contains at least one observation, as in each dimension there are at
least two values. For the grid in the example, we have K = 2, so the variance
under the sorting method is equal to 22/12 - 4/12 = 1/3, whereas under syste-
matic sampling the variance is N/12 =4 x 3/12 =1. The latter variance
increases when the grid is increased by adding age groups or educational
categories, whereas the variance under the sorting method remains at 1/3.
According to appendix A, the two conditions that a data set must satisfy to
derive this result are:
1.       the rounding errors   [X] -1  have  a  u[ -1/2, +0)  distribution
and are independent;
2.         in each gridpoint   A:   AA    E    [2KH_ h,   nA-2K-1 + 1/21 (2.6)
with  nA the number of observations   in  A.
where [X] = the integer nearest to X
The reason for these conditions is as follows. The first condition is necessary
to ensure that the variance of X satisfies the formulas given above. The
second condition is necessary to ensure that the algorithm can be applied in
each cell. If the expected number of transitions within cell A is outside the
bounds given, there is no guarantee that xA can be set such that
(PA € [-1/5, +1/5).
In the example, X must be above Example 2.4 step 6 from the upper right
1.5. Its upper bound   is not known, corner: cell (2,3)
as the nA are not given, but may  E    i "#d-F9O*
i.1....835...................62.40..............1differ among cells. The cells   1 8.50  9
(1,3), (2,3) and (3,3) do not sat-
isfy  part  2  of (2.6).  This  does  not      1  2       2.10       2   : 3.20 4.25
cause problems, as xis set to lin   2      6.60    7 O                      i
these cells. If, however,  the  1 3  1.40  2 : 0.05 -1  1.35
exogenous variables had been  4.50 5 1 6.95 7
coded differently, the algorithm  3.10      3      2.40    3     5245  -
would start not in the origin but,   4
1 5.50 6
for  example,  in  cell  (3,4).  This  is       
AXshown in example 2.4, where, for I 3 3 2 1
convenience, cell (3,4) has been    .. .3..             
placed in the origin. It is now im-
possible to Choose X23 such that ([ 23
is in [-1/2, +1/2). 7[23 - 6.95, so 423 is set to 7. But x34 + X24 + x33 =3+3+2=
8. Thus, even if x 3 is set to 0, the total number of transitions in the cells
(3,4), (3,3), (2,4) and (2,3) is larger than  23 + 1.
49
This example illustrates two points. First, the result of the sorting method
depends on the coding of the exogenous variables. This, however, is not a
problem. Under the random method, not the coding of the characteristics,  but
the order of the observations can be seen as a factor that affects the sim-
ulation outcome: if the order of observations is changed but the same
sequence of random numbers is used, the simulation outcome will be
different. But it will be just as random as the first. The same kind of logic
applies to the sorting method and coding. Over each K-dimensional interval
in the grid, the variance of the number of transitions  is 21912, which is below
the variance under the random number method or systematic sampling. This
result holds, no matter from which extreme of the grid the algorithm has
started. The path that the algorithm follows, has no effect on the variance of
the simulation outcome. It makes no difference whether the algorithm uses
rows or columns.
The second point relates to the necessity of having a grouped data set. The
condition  for the applicability  of the sorting method  is XA = PA x nA E
[2K.1 - 1/5, nA - 2K-1 + 1/6], as shown in (2.6). So it depends on the number of
observations whether the sorting method can be applied. The data set in the
example does not satisfy the condition: the minimum value of X is 0.05 in
cell (2,3), whereas  it  must  be at least  1.50.  Thus,  if we increase the number
of observations  by a factor 1.50/0.05,  then  each  cell does satisfy the condi-
tion. In appendix A it is shown that for each data set, given the distribution
of exogenous characteristics, we can define a minimum number of observa-
tions Af above which the sorting method dominates systematic sampling,
because it is then certain that all nA are large enough to ensure condi-
tion (2.6) is met.
But this strong condition is unsatisfactory. If in example 2.4, the number of
transitions in cell (2,3) is set to 0, and the sorting algorithm is applied to the
rest of the grid, then the overall variance of the simulation result is still
smaller than under systematic sampling:  1/6 as opposed  to 1. Moreover,  all  (p
except 923 lie in [-1/2, +42), and thus over all 2-dimensional intervals, except
those bounded by (2.3), formula (2.5) applies: the total simulation error is
certain to be in (-2, +2). Apparently, the sorting method may also be prefer-
able if the second part of (2.6) is not met in each point on the data grid. This
is the starting point  for the generalization  of the sorting method to ungrouped
data sets in section 2.4.
Before that, it is instructive to dwell on this problem a little longer, to show
the kind of consequences  that may appear when X is too small  or too large in
many gridpoints. For the sake of argument, suppose that k is too small,
which means that the microsimulation model describes 'rare transitions' (e.g.
mortality or disability), and the data set does not have enough observations
to ensure that X is large enough in each gridpoint to apply the sorting
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Example 2.5 Transitions generated by the sorting method when 1-0.01 in every
gridpoint


























5                       10                      15                      20
algorithm. For instance, suppose K = 2, and in each gridpoint X = 0.01. The
pattern of transitions that will result when the sorting method is applied, is
shown in example 2.5. In the first column, a transition occurs in row 50,
when Tr = 0.50. This is not shown in the example. In the second column, A =
0.50 in row 25, so in cell (2,25) a transition is indicated by the symbol X.
The other transitions are on those gridpoints that are close to the hyperbole
X1 X X  = 50 (because there   = 0.50), with xt and x2 the exogenous variables.
The result is that on the grid segment presented in example 2.5, not all cp are
in [-th, + 1/6): in the point (20, 25) Tr = 20 x 25 x 0.01 =5 and 4 = 11, and in
(10,10) x = 1 and 4 - 6. The dotted rectangle in example 2.5 indicates a
two-dimensional interval (bounded by (4,4) and (10, 10)) where 6 transitions
take place. The simulation error u in that interval is
(10 -4)x (10 -4)x 0.01 -6= 0.36 -6= -5.64.
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Most microsimulation models do not have such an even distribution of
transition probabilities: microsimulation is meant to analyze data sets where
transition probabilities vary strongly with the exogenous characteristics. But
for processes such as mortality or disability, there are areas in the data set
where the probabilities are very small (the younger age groups), and other
areas where the probabilities are larger (the older age groups). For such a
data set, the sorting method may lead to erroneous results. If the grid
segment of the younger age groups contains many points with small 1, there
will be too many transitions in that grid segment, as example 2.5 illustrates.
This will be compensated by too few transitions in the grid segments where
the older age groups are located. The total number of transitions  will be near
its expectation, but the distribution over the grid will be wrong: too many
young individuals, and too few old ones, will make a transition.
This is the kind of problem that can come up when the rounding errors are
not u[-42,+1/2) distributed and independent. The problem is fairly easy to
detect: there will be a number of gridpoints where it is impossible to choose
a non-negative x such that cp is in [-1/2, +1/2), as in (10, 10) in example 2.5.
Another check may be provided by a comparison of expected and simulated
numbers of transitions on subsets of the data set. In section 2.5, figures 2.1-
2.4 will show such a comparison for a demographic microsimulation model.
If the rounding errors are not independent and not u[-1/2, +lh) distributed,  it
is to be expected that too many transitions are made for which the probabil-
ity is very small,  or too few for probabilities  near  1.
It seems worthwhile to find a remedy for these technical problems, because
the decrease of the variance of the simulation outcomes under the sorting
method is substantial. To find such a remedy, we turn to ungrouped data
sets, in which all individuals are unique. In such data sets, it is clear that the
conditions for the sorting method are not satisfied: in each gridpoint, the
rounding error is equal  to p or  1 - p, which  is a function  of the charac-
teristics  and  thus not independent  of p in nearby grid points,  and  all  X are
below  1.
2.4 GENERALIZATION OF THE SORTING METHOD TO UNGROUPED DATA
SETS
The difference between grouped and ungrouped data sets is not as large as it
seems. Some exogenous variables, such as 'the number of cars in a house-
hold' are integers, but others may have an underlying continuous characteris-
tic, such as age and income, or it is possible to refine the classification, for
instance, for variables such as professional or educational categories.
52
To illustrate this we turn again to Example 2.6 an ungrouped version of the
the example presented in the previ- example in section 2.3
ous section. Suppose,  that the two   i
exogenous variables represented o
age and income bracket, so it is  1 4
possible to measure both X .E . X.XE
exogenous variables more accu- 1 . .X. . . . . . . . .
rately,   e.g.   age   in   days,   and    :       771 .77.77 
income in cents. The data set then          .  .  .  .1.  x
becomes a scatter in IR2. If each    3   .  .  x  .1.  .  .  .1.  .  x  . cell in example 2.0 contained    1 6        
observations, the situation could   i··········             :            :
become like example 2.6. The 'x' ,
X
.1.  X 'X
.
.1
in example 2.6 indicate an obser-  1 2
X E
vation  that  does  make a transition,                      '     x     . .1   .      .     x     .      .     x     .     x
the   '.' an observation   that   does     s         x   .    .   x:
not. Note that it is quite possible
 X.                      X1     X.X        "1       ...1that the situation of example 2.6 is  X.X  .X.X
1a result of application of the sort-   1 N..1.X.X: N..1ing method: the numbers of transi-
: X .:X . X i·        . :
tions in each cell are equal to the               :
numbers in example  2.3.  For i.......... 1 2   3
example, in cell (1,1) there are 6 .:  no  transition
transitions, just as in example 2.3.
x: transition
The conditions given in (2.6) would now have a counter-intuitive consequen-
ce. From the proof in appendix A it can be deduced that, for a grouped data
set where each group contains exactly one observation, the RN method
dominates the sorting method. So, the Random Number method should now
be applied. However, as the individual transition probabilities have not
changed, essentially nothing has changed in the simulation model. It is
unsatisfactory that the dominant simulation techniques differ in two models
that are essentially equal.
To find an analogon of the sorting method for an ungrouped data set, first
the definitions of the cumulative functions Tr, A and g are extended. Their
domain is now not the set of data points, but the whole space R: Gener-
alization to the K-dimensional situation is straightforward.
a h
Tr(a,b) -E E %(a,11)
a = -ao  B= -°°
a h
4(a,b) =E E x(a,11)
a=-00 B=-00
(p(a,b)   =  Tr(a,b)-4(a,b)
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Now call the set of gridpoints in the original example, 7. The set W contains
the 20 points where dotted lines in example 2.6 cross one another or one of
the axes. As the example shows, it is still possible to choose the x such that
9 on each point in W is in [-1/2, +1/2). This clearly is an algorithm that domi-
nates the Random Number method: again, within each K-dimensional
interval that is bounded by points of 7, the variance of the simulation error
is 21912. It is shown in appendix A that, under the Random Number method,
total variance over the data set is only smaller than 2K/12 in the very special
cases where  all p are either very close to 0 or very close to  1.
Apparently, a generalization of the sorting method to ungrouped data sets
boils down to finding a suitable  set of points 9 on which the (p can be made
to  lie   in   [-1/2,  +1/2).   On data points outside   W. the observations   that   make   a
transition, may be chosen 'randomly', under the restriction that
9  E  [-1/2,+'/2). The elements  of T must be spread over the data set in such a
way, that the areas between them contain enough mass to ensure
F   E   I- 1/  ,   + 1/  ).
A straightforward way to find a suitable subset W in an ungrouped data set,
is the following. First, define a grid in RK which is generated by all values of
the exogenous variables in the data set. This implies that there will be
'empty' points    in    the grid, containing no observations". Then start   at   an
extreme point of the grid. If X satisfies part 2 of (2.6) in that point 12, apply
the sorting method. Otherwise, try to find a K-dimensional interval in which
the sum of X's does satisfy (2.6). Determine the total number of transitions
in that interval according to the sorting method, and then choose the observa-
tions randomly. Because X satisfies part 2 of (2.6), the rounding errors on the
points of W may be supposed to be independent and have a u[-1/2, +1/2)
distribution.
It will be clear that for each data set, there are many possible options to
choose 9 such that on all intervals that are bounded by points of W, X
satisfies both parts of (2.6). The question which then comes up is if there
actually is an 'optimal' 9, for which the variance of the simulation outcome
is minimized. This question is not easy to answer. Finding an optimal W is
probably very time-consuming. Moreover, the decrease in the variance for a
satisfying W when compared with the variance under the Random Number
method is substantial: 2K/12 is in general much smaller than the sum of
p, X (1 - Pi)· The optimal  9,  if it exists, will probably depend  on the total
" For instance, in the labor market model of chapter 4, there are no students over
30 years of age, so all grid points combining 'student' with 'age over 30' are
empty.
/2 This will almost never be the case, as the extreme points of the grid are often
'empty'.
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number of observations in the data set, and the variance of the simulation
result will not be much lower than those generated by other possible 4"s.
That is why, in the next section, where the sorting method is illustrated by a
simple demographic model, some pragmatic choices have been made about
the algorithm to find a suitable T.
2.5 ILLUSTRATION: PERFORMANCE OF THE SORTING METHOD IN A
DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL
The sorting method for microsimulation that was developed in sections 2.3
and 2.4, dominates the Random Number method, in the sense that under
certain conditions the expected total number of transitions  is the same but its
variance is lower. This gives rise to a number of questions. How is the
performance against the method of Common Random Numbers, which
reduces the variances of policy ejfects instead of the total number of transi-
tions? Does the algorithm require substantial computer time?
To find out if the sorting method works in practice, in this section it will be
applied to an existing model and its performance will be tested against the
Random Number method for totals and the Common Random Number
method for policy effects. Section 2.5.1 shows how the sorting algorithm
detects suitable intervals    in   a   data    set, and section 2.5.2 compares    the
outcomes  of the three methods (sorting,  RN, CRN).
2.5.1   The data grid
A description of the demographic model used in this section is found in
appendix   C. The model describes four demographic processes: mortality,
marriage, divorce, and birth. Each process is simulated separately, but, of
course, there are certain dependencies: people who die in a certain year,
cannot marry in the next year, etc.
The   data set contains 12,852 observations   that   form a representative sample
of about 1:1000  of the Dutch population  aged  0-64  in the year  1985.  Demo-
graphic transition probabilities have been taken from publications of the
Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. These probabilities vary with age
and sex. To analyze the working of the algorithm, education (measured in
eight categories) has been added as a third characteristic.
Thus, the data set is located on 8 6 5 x 2 x g g r i d in ]R: There are 'empty'
cells in the grid, because not all educational categories are filled for all ages.
For each specific demographic process, the areas where X is low differ.
Mortality is low for the younger age groups and for females. Nuptiality is
low for the very young and for the elderly. Divorce probabilities are spread
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rather evenly over the middle and older age groups, but are small. The
probability to become a mother is set to 0 for men and unmarried women,
and it is low for young and old married women.
The data set thus created is representative of the kind used in microsimula-
tion models. Such data sets contain 'holes', either because in some areas
probabilities are very low, or because certain combinations of characteristics
are rare or impossible.
All demographic transition probabilities are below 0.50. Therefore, only the
'smaller' part of the second condition in (2.6) is relevant for this section.
Grid points where X is smaller than 22 - 1/2 - 3.5 must be combined with
other grid points.
The algorithm for identifying areas with low X operates as follows. Suppose
that    in the gridpoint    (ai, ai, a3), X < 3.5. The algorithm then calculates the
sum  of X's on the 3-dimensional interval bounded  by (ai, ai, al)  and
(ai + 1, a2 + 1, al + 1). This interval contains 8 gridpoints.  If the sum of X's
is still under 3.5, the algorithm will continue to increase the interval in all
three directions. All three indices are increased together, until the sum of X's
is larger than 3.5. Within the interval thus identified, the total number of
transitions is chosen such that (p is in [_th, +th), and the observations that
make a transition are chosen randomly.
If the sum of X's is larger than 3.5 on the smallest possible 3-dimensional
interval, and smaller than 3.5 in (ai, a2, al), the algorithm turns to 2-dimen-
sional intervals. Of the three intervals bounded by (a 1, a2, 03) and respective-
ly   (ai + 1, ai + 1, a3),   (ai + 1, a2, al + 1)  and   (at, a2 + 1, a) + 1),   the
interval is chosen where X is lowest. If that k is under 3.5, that interval is
increased until X > 3.5, etc. If X > 3.5 on each 2-dimensional interval, the
algorithm looks for the 1-dimensional interval where X is lowest, and applies
the method to that interval.
This algorithm for identifying a suitable set T may be compared to 'packing'
a rugby-ball in a box. The rugby-ball represents the data set. The empty
spaces in the box are filled first with 3-dimensional boxes. Then, the spaces
left over, are filled with plates, and after that with bars. This algorithm does
not need more computer time than the algorithm  of the RN method.
In table 2.1 the choice of 9 is given for the demographic process 'marriage'.
This is the most interesting process, because 'birth' and 'divorce' are only
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relevant   for   one   sex 13 (females and males, respectively), and mortality   has
very small probabilities, and, therefore, needs large subsets to obtain X > 3.5.
As K = 3, the bound  in part 2 of (2.6) is equal  to 3.5. The variable  'sex'  has
been coded as 0 for women and 1 for men. The data set, therefore, may be
imagined in 3-dimensional space as if the 'MALES' part is the upper layer
and the 'FEMALES' part is the lower layer. Some of the intervals that the
algorithm finds, contain two sexes. These intervals are indicated by a dotted
right and upper border, and a small letter. Intervals with capital letter and
solid lines as right and upper border contain only one sex. The letters
indicate the order in which the algorithm finds the intervals.
Table 2.1 Choice of 4'-points for 'marriage'
FEMALES M A L E S
27 |   ;    27         27
26                   E           Z       26                   i                    26
25 Y w                 25             w i         X      25
24           : T          24           I v          24
23            SIU             23    L    M      N     ' '   "':                                    23
22          1 3      P      22          j  Q     R    22
21             I                     i                  K                21                                                     0                21
20          E                                20                                          20
-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         -19 .    .f.'    G     D 1 9  f      H     E 19
18                                        18                                        18
17 17 17
16          a         E B 1 6         a         :C 1 6
15                                    : 15 15
0|1|2|3|4|5|6 7 0|1|2|3|4|5|6 7 
·,ertical: age; horizontal: education category  (O=low, 6-iigh, 7=student)
Cells are found in the order of the letters of the alphabet. Cells with capital letters and solid lines are
two-dimensional, cells with small letters and dotted borders are three-dimensional.
The first interval (a) starts in (0,15,0) and ends in (6,18,1). The value of
A., is 3.66 (not shown in the table). The starting point for finding the next
interval is (7, 15, 0). Here, the first characteristic (education) is at its upper
bound. So the highest-dimensional interval that the algorithm can find, is 2-
dimensional. First the algorithm calculates the sum of k's over the 2-dimen-
sional interval bounded by (7, 15, 0) and (7,16, 1). This is equal to 9.35 (not
shown in the table), which is larger than 3.5. Therefore, the algorithm
decides to construct   a   1 -dimensional interval. Because    X   in   (7,16,0)   is
smaller than in (7, 15, 1) the age dimension is chosen. In (7,17,0) the value
of X exceeds 3.5, so the algorithm stops and interval B is finished.
" The probability of birth depends only on the wife's age, and for technical
reasons the divorce process has been modelled for the male partner, although the
divorce probabilities depend on the ages of both partners. See the description of
the demographic block in appendix C.
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Another interesting interval is G, bounded by (2, 19, 0) and (6, 20, 0). The
value of kG is 2.96 (not shown in the table), which is below 3.5. But if the
interval had been extended to (6,21,0) the value of X would have been 7.13
(not shown in the table), because the ages 21  and over contain a lot of mass.
The mass increase for the group aged 21 is larger than 3.5, so this group
might be an interval of itself. Therefore, the algorithm has been adapted, so
that if in one step X increases by more than 3.5, the algorithm goes back one
step and stops'4. This pragmatic choice results in more and smaller inter-
vals, and, therefore, a better agreement between the functions A and 4
From table 2.1 the structure of marriage probabilities becomes clear. For
very young males and females, the cells contain no mass, because prob-
abilities are low. The educational categories 5 and 6 are empty for the age
groups under 19 and 21 respectively. The code 7 stands for students, and
thus contains a lot of mass for the lower ages, and none for the ages above
30. In the areas where much mass is found, the cells are small.
To check the working of the algorithm, tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the values
of A, x, X and & in each interval. As in the examples in section 2.3, 1 is
given in the upper left corner of the cell, x in the upper right corner, 7[ in the
lower left corner and &4 in the lower right corner. If the cell is too small, only
A  and  4 are given.
It now becomes clear that in some of the intervals determined by the
algorithm, 1 is under 3.5. There are two reasons for this. First, the pragmatic
adaptation described above for interval G. Secondly, sometimes it is not
possible to extend the interval, e.8 because it has reached a boundary of the
data set. This is the case for the interval between (5, 32, 1) and (7,64, 1).
Another interval that cannot be extended, is the interval between (1, 40, 0)
and  (3,  64, 0). Males  in age groups above  40 and education   1 -4, and females
aged over 40 and education group 4, have been assigned to an interval
already. In intervals where X < 3.5, it is not always possible to choose x such
that 9 € [-1/2, +52). In such cases x has been set to the value that minimizes
9.
Inspection of tables 2.2 and 2.3 shows that there are intervals where cp is not
in [-1/2, +1/2). The reason is that the order in which intervals are assigned
depends on the lower left corners, whereas the (p are calculated in the upper
right corners. As can be seen in table 2.1, it is possible that x is chosen in a
certain interval before 4 is known. In tables 2.2 and 2.3 the values of X and 4
have been set in italics in those intervals where the observations are assigned
before 26 is known. For instance, intervals D and E in table 2.1 are assigned
before f G, and H, and (p is outside [-1/2, +th) in those two intervals.
'*     In K-dimensional problems this bound   is  2K-1- 1/2.
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Table 2.2 Choice of 99-points for 'marriage', women
M 2.69 3 199 1 3.22 3 2.97            3
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34                                                          4.07      4
33            58.49 58      4.33 4
32                                                                              84.84   85
31
30                              4.45      2
29                              26.10    26
28                                                                                       472         4
27            47.86 50      5.98 7
26                                              5.14 5 67.22    66
25                                        20.12 20 8.47          7
24                          5.37 5 36.80 36      3.28 4
23                                    14.98      15 48.55    50
22                              6.16 8 31.46   31
21                                         9.61       10                                                                           22.71      23
20                            : 2.96
5     455          5
19                            i 5.32
5  15.29   16
18                                                                                  :
17                                                                             i 5.42    6
16                                                       1 5.7815
XI
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
*4
· ertical: age; horizontal: education category (O=low, 6=high, 7=student)
dotted cells have been combined with the group of males, sce table 2.3
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Table 2.3 Choice of 4'-points for 'marriage',  men
64         3.95 1 195 5 0.23 2   2.09 2 2.51       1



























36                               4.28      5
35                              57.30    56
34
33
32                                                                                                   4.23          4
31 106.20 106 4.37          4
30 409-'7 165.58 166
29         61.19 60
28
27
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There is no easy remedy for this problem. It is easy, for K > 2, to construct a
set of intervals a, b, and c where all observations from interval a must be
assigned before those from c, but those from b before a, and those from c
before bls. An interval-seeking algorithm that excludes such sets, and also
ensures that all information is known before the observations in an interval
are assigned, is probably very time-consuming. Thus, the comparison
between the sorting method and the Random Number method in the next
section is biased against the sorting method, in the sense that the variances
of the simulation results produced by the sorting method are larger than
necessary.
As has been indicated above, there is no easy criterion to decide if a certain
choice of W is 'better' than others, although it is clear that the 'optimal' 9,
if  it   exists,   must not contain cells   with   X  <  3.5.   As the simulation outcome
depends on the choice of 9, it is advisable to repeat the simulation with
other W's. If the simulation results differ strongly, there must be some
peculiarity in the data set. In the next section, such replications are done. As
the data set is placed in 3-dimensional space, there are 8 possible starting
points for the algorithm. The simulations are repeated 8 times, corresponding
with different starting points. The results are compared with 25 runs of the
random version of the same model. As is to be expected, variances are much
lower under the sorting method.
2.5.2   Comparison with the Random Number method
Because the demographic microsimulation model is very simple and all
probabilities are known, it is possible to test the performance of the model
by comparing the simulation results with the true expectations. Next, certain
probabilities can be changed, to simulate a policy measure. By comparing the
true expectations with the model simulation outcomes, the performance of
the model in predicting the effect of policy changes  can be tested. Of course,
if it is easy to calculate the true expectations, microsimulation is not necess-
ary. Microsimulation models are typically used in situations when the true
expectations are difficult to calculate. But, as a check on the validity of the
sorting method and a comparison with the RN method, the true expectations
provide useful information and, therefore, a simple demographic model has
been chosen.
The first times the demographic model was run with the RN method, some
results differed extremely from the true expectations (namely more than
twice their standard deviations), whereas the sorting method produced results
nearer to the true expectations. This is counter-intuitive: if repeated often
is In a 3-dimensional grid, let a be the plane bounded by (0,0,2) and (1,2,2); b the
plane bounded by (0,2,0) and (2,2,1); c the plane bounded by (2,0,0,) and
(2,1,2)
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enough, the RN method is expected to produce accurate results. However, as
it turned out, the RN method produced a systematic error. So, to ensure that
the RN method produces unbiased results, a technical adaptation is necess-
ary. This is explained in appendix B. The tables in this section compare the
adapted RN method with the sorting method.
With the Random Number method, the model is run 25 times. As has been
indicated in the previous section, the sorting method can be run only 8 times.
The outcomes are given in table 2.4 and compared with the true expecta-
tions': The simulation period is 1986-1999, so there    are 14 simulation
years. For simplicity, table 2.4 does not present the yearly results, but totals
over three subperiods of respectively  four,  five, and five years.  If the number
of marriages in a subperiod is denoted by x, table 2.4 presents the mean
values x and the standard deviations  sx of x for the Random Number method
and the sorting method (Mood, Graybill and Boes, 1974: 229). Note that the
standard deviations  in the table are those of x and not of x. So, the standard
deviations for the Random Number method are estimates of the root of the
variance Epi x (1 - p,) over each of the three subperiods,  as was also men-
tioned    in the example in section    2.117.    It is clear   that the sorting method
produces more accurate results. The averages under the sorting method are
closer to their true expectations, and the estimated standard deviations are
smaller.
Note that the standard deviations found for the sorting method are larger than
expected,8 Apparently, the algorithm that finds intervals with X < 3.5 is not
optimal.  This has been noted in the discussion of tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Not only are the simulation totals more accurate when the sorting method is
used. The sorting method is also more accurate in simulating the distribution
16 The true expectations do not depend solely on the probabilities in a given
period. The dependencies between the transitions in different years have been
taken into account. For instance,   the true expectation of marriages in 1990-1994
depends on mortality in 1986-1994, the number of marriages in 1986-1993, and
the  number of divorces in 1986-1993.
17 The true standard deviations have not been calculated, because to do this is
rather troublesome, and anyway it is only possible for the Random Number
column. True standard deviations must be calculated with the implicit four- and
five-year demographic transition probabilities.
" In appendix A it is shown that the variance of the total simulated number of
transitions is 2K/12, with K the number of characteristics taken into account.
Here, K equals 3, so the simulations under the sorting method should have a
variance of 8/12 for one year. We may suppose that the outcomes in successive
years are independent, so the standard deviation in the four-year period must be
4(4x8/12) = 1.6, and in the five-year periods 4(5x8/12) = 1.8.
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Table 2.4 Means and standard deviations of simulated transitions calculated by the
Random Number method and the sorting method
TrueRandom numbers Sorting Expectation
1986-1989 156 ( 7.66) 157 (1.89) 155.84Mortality
 1990-1994 277 (14.06) 276 (3.15) 274.34
1995-1999 397 (14.78) 391 (3.66) 389.96
, 1986-1989 399 (10.74) 412 (3.96) 406.60Marriages I
1
1990-1994 418 (11.31) 409 (3.14) 407.91
1995-1999 400 (11.29) 390 (5.77) 387.16
<
1986-1989 715 (20.22) 726 (3.60) 723.97Birth
1
1990-1994 1023 (29.40) 1023 (7.32) 1022.53
1995-1999 1007 (23.87) 1001 (5.95) 996.56
standard deviations in parentheses
of other characteristics, such as age, which are related to the transition
probabilities. In table 2.5 we see that the distribution of marriage candidates
over age is more stable under the sorting method. For instance, the number
of male candidates   aged   15-24   has a standard deviation   of 6.50 under   the
Random Number method, as opposed to 2.19 under the sorting method. This
is the second reason why under the sorting method the number of births is
closer to its expectation: the age distribution of potential mothers is more
accurate'.
Table 2.5 Number of marriage candidates in 4 age groups in the first simulation




15-24 50.1 (6.50) 47.8 (2.19) 62.7 (5.61) 64.5 (2.07)
25-29 27.5 (4.28) 28.0 (3.42) 17.0 (3.26) 15.9 (3.94)
30-39 15.3 (3.74) 15.4 (2.33) 10.1 (4.23) 12.0 (2.83)
40+ 7.6 (2.37) 9.0 (2.39) 4.2 (1.90) 5.8 (1.58)
Total 100.5 (6.50) 100.1 (1.81) 94.0 (5.80) 98.1 (3.04)
standard deviations in parentheses
The aim of most dynamic microsimulation models is estimation of distribu-
tional effects of policy measures, which affect transition probabilities. For
policy effects, a powerful variance reduction technique exists, namely
Common Random Numbers (CRN). Therefore, the fact that the sorting
19 As mentioned in section 2.5.1, the probability for unmarried women to becaome
a mother has been set to 0 in the model.
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method is more accurate for totals does not mean it is also more accurate for
policy effects. To compare the performance of both methods in predicting
policy effects, the marriage probabilities in the period 1990-1994 have been
multiplied    by a factor    1.10,   and all other probabilities    have   been   kept
equal20. We expect the following effects:
-  The number of marriages in the second period (1990-1994) increases by a
factor smaller  than  1.10. The factor is smaller, because,  over a five-year
period, the pool of singles decreases when marriage probabilities increase.
-  In the third period (1995-1999), the number of transitions into marriage
decreases, because the pool of singles has decreased while marriage prob-
abilities do not change in this period.
The number of births increases, because  of the model assumption  that only
married women can have children.
Table 2.6 Comparison   of the simulated effect  o f 10% higher marriage probabilities
in 1990-1994 under the Random Number method and the sorting
method




Central Path 418 (11.31) 409 (3.14) 407.91
Mar. Prob. +10% 455 (11.07) 444 (5.49) 443.33
Difference +38 ( 7.22) +35 (5.70) +35.42
1995-1999
Central Path 400 (11.29) 390 (5.77) 387.16
Mar. Prob. +10% 391 (11.80) 383 (5.21) 379.02
Difference -8 ( 3.42) -7 (7.32) -8.14
NUMBER OF BIRTHS
1990-1994
Central Path 1023 (29.40) 1023 (7.32) 1022.53
Mar. Prob. +10% 1037 (28.21) 1039 (8.60) 1035.81
Difference +14 ( 3.87) +16 (3.28) +13.28
1995-1999
Central Path 1007 (23.87) 1001 (5.95) 996.56
Mar. Prob. +10% 1035 (26.77) 1026 (9.13) 1025.62
Difference +29 ( 6.73) +25 (9.57) +29.06
standard deviations in parentheses
The results are given in table 2.6. The true expectations confirm the state-
ments above: the expected number of marriages increases by 8.7% (35.42
20 As marriage probabilities never exceed 0.15, the probabilities are always less
than 1 after this operation.
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with respect to 407.91) in the second period, and decreases in the third
period; births increase in both periods.
Under the Common Random Number method, for each individual the same
random number was drawn in the Central Path and the variant. This explains
why, for both marriages and births, the standard deviations of the policy
effects are much smaller than those of the totals under the Common Random
Number method. For marriages and births, the sorting method yields better
results in the second period, but not in the third.
There   is   one more criterion   for           8 -
assessing the quality   of a simu-           6 -
lation result, namely, the num- 4 -<
ber of transitions within subsets
with transition probabilities   near            +th-,a-.
to one another. For instance, -2  2,   FREZi:„„   *within the group of observations            *
4with transition probabilities near
-6 -1%, the number of transitions
should    be    close    to     1%    of   the           -0-00          0.05           0.10          0.15          0.20          0.25
total number of observations in + Sorting Method  x Random Numbers
that group. This is not only an
indication of the quality of the Figure 2.1 discrepancy between expected
and simulated number of deathssimulation, but also a check on
the distribution of rounding
errors over the data set: is it
8-really u[- 2, +1/2)? If not, the    6-
sorting method will show the 4- +X
bias that was illustrated in         11
example   5:   too many transitions 2 -     ':  A  5   4         * 4 X +
for observations with very low 9X d X        *-2 -                                                           +probabilities, and too few for X X* . +   +++
others. -4- X*i
-6-
The performance of the sorting -8 -,0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
method and the Random Num-
+ Sorting Method  x Random Numbersber method according to this
criterion is illustrated in figures Figure 2.2 discrepancy between expected
2.1-2.4. The figures compare the and simulated number of marriages
discrepancy between expected
and simulated numbers of transitions for one run chosen from the 25 runs
with the random method and for one run chosen from the 8 runs with the
sorting method. On the X-axis, the values of the transition probabilities are
shown, in the interval [0,0.25]. This interval has been divided in 100 sub-
intervals, and for each of these intervals the discrepancy between expected
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and simulated number of transh             8-
tions has been calculated. 6-
4- x
The   figures   show that under  the           2-    *
sorting method, for this data set O -123 1 , 1...... 6
and model, there is no reason to *X-2 -
suspect that the kind of problem           +4-
that is illustrated in example 2.5
-6 -has come up: in that case, the
-8 -.
figures would show a systematic O.00 O.05 O.10 O.15 0.20 0.25
bias for the sorting method, + Sorting Method x Random Numbers
namely, too many transitions
with low probabilities. Further- Figure 2.3 discrepancy between expected
more, the figures show that the and simulated number of divorces
differences grow larger when
the  probabilities   in  the  data  set          8 -
are  spread more evenly   over  the           6 -
interval [0,0.25]. For processes     4-
+ X
such as mortality and divorce, 2- + :*  »*
the probabilities are small. Thus,        0 44*x      ..  + ....11'Ul...1..............1........111111.,
+                                              X              +
the expected numbers of transi-    -2-      x+      +++Xtions are small, and, therefore, 4_ x X
the simulated numbers cannot           -6 -
differ      much      from      them.      For           -8,
marriages and births, the devi- 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
ations can be larger because the + Sorting Method  x Random Numbers
expected numbers of transitions Figure 2.4 discrepancy between expected
are large. and simulated number of births
An intuitively attractive measure
to see which of the two methods is more accurate, is the sum of squared
differences from the figures 2.1-2.4. Table 2.7 shows the average values of
sums of suqared differences for the 25 runs under the RandomNumber
method and the 8 runs under the sorting method. It now becomes clear that
the sorting method produces more accurate results, as the sums of squared
differences are smaller under the sorting method than under the Random
Number method. The table illustrates again that the deviations become larger
for process such as marriage and births, where the probabilities are larger,
than for processes with very small probabilities, such as mortality and
divorce.
It turns out that the sorting method has exactly the effect it was meant to
have: the distribution of the transition probabilities is reflected more accu-
rately in the simulation outcomes. The sorting algorithm induces a negative
correlation between the simulation errors u in data points that are near one
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Table 2.7 Average sums of squared differences calculated from 25 runs under the






another. Thus, the sums of simulation errors over groups of the data set are
kept small in absolute value.
2.6     MODELS WITH MORE THAN TWO STATES
When the microsimulation model describes transitions between more than
two states, (e.g. students moving into one of several educational categories,
or transitions into one of four labor market states), the low-mass areas in the
data set differ between states. For instance, in a model of the labor market,
the low-mass area for the state 'disabled' occurs in the younger age groups.
But for the state 'part-time labor supply', low mass is related to males and
young females. Thus, the algorithm does not allow to determine individuals'
states in one run: the set W (of grid points bounding intervals with X < 3.5)
differs for each state.
Under the RN method, it is just as easy to model the choice between more
states, as it is to model the choice between two states.  If the random number
is  between  0  and p1, the individual moves into state   1,  if the random number
is  between p,  and Pl + A the individual moves into state  2, etc. However,
the variance reduction of policy
effects reached by the Common random number-I-I
Random Number (CRN) technique
is now smaller than it can be in
Central Path state 1 state 2 state 3models with two states. As figure
2.5 shows, an individual that moves p lita
into state 1 in the Central Path (CP)
and state 2 in the Policy Variant Policy Variant state 1 state 2 state 3
(PV) is not guaranteed to have
larger P2 in PV than in CP: in this Fl    Plt Ib
0                                1figure, P2 has not changed, but p, is
smaller in the PV than in the CP. probability
Because p, has become smaller than Figure 2.5 Possible effects of Common
the random number,  but pi + P2 is Random Numbers in a model with three
still larger, the individual moves to states
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a different state in the PV than in the CP. The idea behind CRN is, that
using the same stream of random numbers guarantees that those individuals
who make different choices in CP and PV move to those states for which the
transition probabilities have increased. This is not true when the model
contains more states.
The sorting method requires a number of adaptations for models with more
than two states:
-  the transitions are determined in S-1  runs of the model, where S denotes
the number of states;
-   in the first  run, the choice is between 'state  1' with probability  p,  or  'not
state  1 ' with probability  (1  - pi). For individuals  that  do  not  move  into
state   1, the transition probabilities   into the other states are multiplied  by  a
factor 1/(1 - p,). So, in the next run, the model works with the conditional
probabilities, given that the individual  does  not move into state  1.
- To determine areas with low or high mass, it is possible to use either the
conditional probabilities, or the original unconditional probabilities. In the
latter case, the X in each cell of the data set must be lowered by the
number of transitions  into that state that have been assigned already. This
is the technique that will be used in the simulations for chapter 4. The
reason is that the unconditional probabilities do not change with the order
of the states,  and that this technique is computationally more efficient.
Table 2.8 Means and standard deviations of simulated transitions calculated by the
Random Number method and the sorting method for a model with four
states
Random numbers Sorting
full-time 4836 (16.87) 4836 (5.98)
part-time 1082 (17.96) 1078 (6.22)
disabled 781 (11.17) 782 (4.48)
out of labor market 2159 (15.13) 2162 (4.65)
standard deviations in parentheses
Table 2.8 shows that in models with more than two states, the sorting
method also results in a considerable variance reduction. The table is based
on 32 runs for each method with the labor market model that will be used in
chapter 4. The data set has essentially five characteristics, and that is why
there are 25 = 32 runs under the sorting method. These are compared with 32
runs under the Random Number method. The standard deviations, and thus,
the confidence intervals of the simulation outcomes, are three times as large
under the Random Number method than under the sorting method.
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2.7 GOODNESS-OF-FIT
The algorithm developed in this chapter aims at minimizing the difference
between an analytical and an empirical distribution function, describing
choices between states. The same kind of problem occurs in the context of
finding a goodness-of-fit statistic for probabilistic choice models. We are
given a space of exogenous characteristics X and each observation is
characterized as a point in X. The dependent variable, the choice of states by
individuals, is an integer variable or vector. The model describes a real
function  from X to RS, with S the number of states. The question whether the
fitted function is 'near' the actual observations is similar to the question
whether the outcome of a microsimulation model represents the underlying
probabilities well enough. Both problems concern essentially the question
whether a certain sample comes from a given distribution.
There are two easily applicable statistical tests for the hypothesis that two
distribution functions are equal. The well-known Pearson chi-square test
compares observed and expected numbers of individuals in certain cells
(Mood, Graybill and Boes, 1974: 444). It is a test for the multinomial
distribution. It might also be applied for multinomial choice models. Cramer
(1991: 100) states that the Pearson chi-square test statistic may be applied as
a goodness-of-fit statistic in discrete choice models with a grouped data set.
The chi-square test statistic is zero when in all groups the observed and
expected numbers of observations are equal. The number of degrees of
freedom is equal to J x (S - 1) - k, with J the number of groups in X and k
the number of parameters estimated. But for ungrouped data sets, it is not
clear how to generalize this statistic.
Andrews (1988) solves this problem by dividing the total data set (seen as
points in the combination of the space of exogenous variables X and the
space of endogenous variables Y) into groups, that must contain at least 5
observations. This means that the choice of groups depends on characteristics
of the data set. It is difficult to find a good grouping of the data set. If the
grouping areas are large, the statistic might  well  'miss' a specification error
within a group.  But if the areas are too small, the test may become too strict
because it ignores 'compensating errors': if, in one group, the observed
number of observations is too large, and in another one too small, the
statistic does not depend on the distance in the XxY space between these two
groups.
Another grouping method is provided by Hosmer and Lemeshow (1991) for
the binomial choice model. They count the observed and expected number of
observations for which the expected probability  is in each of the ten intervals
[0,0.1), [0.1,0.2),..., [0.9,1] and apply the Pearson test statistic to these
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data. Their statistic is, therefore, a special  case of Andrews' goodness-of-fit
statistic.
Better suited for ungrouped data sets is the well-known Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of two one-dimensional distribution functions
(Mood, Graybill and Boes, 1974: 508-510). The test is based on the maxi-
mum difference between a discrete empirical distribution and a continuous
analytical one. The sorting algorithm developed in this chapter, too, com-
pares two cumulative distribution functions. And, for a discrete choice
model, it is also possible to calculate an analytical cumulative distribution
function and an empirical one, and to calculate the maximum absolute
difference between them.
However, this approach is not applicable for a statistical test, because the
analytical and empirical distribution functions are not independent. The
parameters of the analytical distribution are estimated from the data that
underlay the empirical distribution. An easy correction of degrees of free-
dom, analogous to the correction for the Pearson statistic, does not exist.
Also, there is no easy generalization of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
statistic to multidimensional distribution functions (Mood, Graybill and Boes,
1974: 510). Lastly, the analytical distribution function is not continuous,
although the discontinuity points are the same as those of the empirical
distribution function.
Moreover, the value of such a test statistic is dependent on the definitions of
the dependent and independent variables. In this chapter the starting point in
the data set has been shown to make a difference. For simulation purposes,
this is not a problem: the sorting method decreases the variance of the
simulation results, both the totals and the results in groups of the data set.
The fact that another definition of the variables would have resulted in
another simulation outcome, is no problem, as both outcomes dominate the
outcomes  of the Random Number method.
But, when estimating a discrete choice model, a measure for the goodness-
of-fit should not change when the coding of a variable is changed; for
instance, when age is measured as the years still to go until 65, instead of
the years of age. Therefore, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov type of goodness-of-fit
statistic is not applicable.
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2.8 CONCLUSION
The comparison between the sorting method and the Random Number (RN)
method can be summed up as follows:
1.  The sorting method is much more accurate in simulating total transi-
tions.
2.  There is even a bigger improvement when simulating 'composite'
transitions, for which more than one random number is drawn.
3.        The sorting method performs better with respect to distributional
aspects.
4. When simulating policy effects, there is an effective variance reduction
technique for the Random Number method as well, namely, the Com-
mon Random Number (CRN) technique. Therefore, the sorting method
does not necessarily dominate the RN method for this aspect. However,
the effectiveness of CRN is likely to be lower, the more states the
model contains, and the longer the projection period.
However, to decide if the sorting method should be applied, a number of
other criteria are important, apart from variance reduction. First, the sorting
method is complex, and may produce subtle errors, as shown in example 2.5.
Appendix B shows that the Random Number method is not foolproof either.
The possible errors that the sorting method may produce are easy to detect,
by analyzing the numbers of transitions for cases where the probabilities  are
very small or very large.
Secondly, the sorting method is not easy to implement in a computer
program. The version presented here, although complex, does not produce
the lowest possible variances. But it is an improvement on the Random
Number Method, and does not require more computer time. An even more
simplified version of the sorting method (which  is not universally  applicable)
has been applied by Jansweijer (1996, section 4.2.2). In a demographic
model, he first sorts the individals in the data set according to probability,
and then applies the one-dimensional version of the sorting method. Thus,
the part of the total variance that is caused by the demographic block is
reduced.
The sorting method or a simplified version of it might prove a useful tool to
reduce the variance of microsimulation model outcomes.
3. Incomes and transitions within the labor
force
In this chapter, a model is estimated that explains labor market behavior of
individuals. The explanatory variables are individual characteristics, such as
age and sex. The model describes transitions between labor market states.
One of the explanatory variables is the after-tax income that an individual
receives in each state. Of course, this net income depends on the tax system.
This will allow us, in the next chapter, to simulate the effects of changes in
net income, induced by changes in the tax system. The chapter is organized
as follows. Section 3.1 describes the model, and section 3.2 the data. Section
3.3 presents the estimation results, and section 3.4 concludes.
3.1        MODEL
The explanatory model that will be estimated in this chapter is a Markov-
type model. It describes transition probabilities between labor market states.
Section 3.1.1 discusses the reasons to choose this kind of model, instead of
the more traditional static labor supply models. There are practical reasons
too: the microsimulation model in chapter 4 is formulated as a Markov
model. In section  3.1.2 the mathematical formulation   of the model is given.
3.1.1 Theoretical background
In the Netherlands, empirical research into the effects of incomes policy on
the labor market is not new. For instance, Bekkering, Grift and Siegers
(1986), Van Soest (1988), and Kapteyn, Woittiez and ten Hacken (1989),
have all estimated the effects of incomes policy on the supply of labor. All
these authors use a method developed by Hausman (1980) and Blomquist
(1983), who used a version of the neoclassical labor supply model in which
the tax system was included explicitly. Under a progressive tax regime the
budget constraint in the model consists of several linear segments. As the
budget set is convex, there is one unique utility maximum. If social security
benefits are introduced into the model, or fixed labor costs are accounted for,
the budget set becomes nonconvex, which opens the possibility of multiple
(local) utility maxima.
To estimate the coefficients of the individual indifference curves, one needs
to have access to a data set of individuals, of whom all relevant charac-
teristics, in particular, labor supply and the budget constraint at a certain
moment in time, must be known. Incomes policy measures can be expressed
as changes in the individual budget constraints. The simulated change in
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labor supply follows  from a confrontation  of the new budget constraints  with
the estimated indifference curves.
This method has several disadvantages. First, estimation  of the model causes
technical problems. As shown by Blomquist (1988), the labor supply func-
tion that corresponds to a segmented, nonconvex budget set is not continu-
OUS. Therefore, the likelihood function is not continuous. This can cause
practical problems in estimation, since most maximization algorithms in
computer packages use derivatives. A more fundamental problem is that
most convenient properties of Maximum Likelihood (MI=) estimators are
valid only under the assumption that the likelihood function is continuous.
However, as the space of discontinuity points has measure zero, it might be
argued that ML estimation is, nevertheless, possible. The practical problems
are described in Bekkering c.s. (1987) and Blomquist (1988).
The second disadvantage of the model is caused by the implicit assumptions
that underlie the neoclassical model. The most important ones are as follows:
1.  The model is static. The outcome of a policy simulation is a new
equilibrium point. This does not give information about the time path
by which the new equilibrium is reached. Furthermore, in simulations
conclusions are drawn about changes in behavior over time, but the
estimates are based on differences between persons at one moment in
time. The error is similar to the following: "people with low incomes
watch football matches more often than people with high incomes.
Therefore, an increase in unemployment benefits will lower the number
of football watchers". It is just as plausible that when low-income
groups have more money available for their hobby, they will watch
more matches, not fewer.
2.  The static model explains 12% -                                            -
taste variation between
individuals from character- 10% -
istics such as age, marital 8% -
status, education, and so
6%-on. But in reality, even
within homogeneous 4% J
groups, there is a substan-
# dil di„,IIAwIHJLtial variation in the labormarket situation. This is il- 090 -„11,0 4 8  12  16  20  24  28  32  36 40+
lustrated in figure 3.1, working hours per week
which is based on the SEP
dataset which is used later Figure 3.1 Labor supply in hours per week
on in this chapter. The fre- for women aged 30-39, with children be-
quency distribution of
tween 0 and 6 years, low education, married.
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working hours has many peaks. The static model, however, assumes
that each woman with given characteristics prefers the same number of
working hours, apart from a normally distributed error term. It will be
clear that a normal distribution is unable to give an accurate approxima-
tion   o f the distribution in figure   3.1. This leads   to  very high values   for
the standard deviation of the error terms in the hours equations: in
Bekkering (1988) and in Woittiez (1990) standard deviations are about
20 hours per week. Hence, tobit-like models that accurately predict the
number of working hours, often make large prediction errors when it
comes to the participation rate, and vice versa.
Woittiez (1990) and Van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990) show that the
prediction performance of the static model can be improved substantially  by
making explicit assumptions about hours restrictions stemming from the
demand side of the labor market. But there is no theoretical reason to
suppose that this is the sole source of the diversity of working hours. In the
past decades, employers have become more flexible in the number of
working hours laid down in labor contracts, after unions expressed a need for
more flexibility. It is just as plausible that the variation in working hours is
caused primarily by the preferences on the supply side of the labor market.
The only way to test the question if the variation in figure 3.1 is caused by
differences in taste or by restrictions from the demand side is to include
empirical information about the demand side of the labor market.
Figure 3.1 shows that the distribution of working hours has roughly two
peaks: one around 40 hours per week and one around 20 hours. This sug-
gests that full-time jobs and part-time jobs are not just points on a continuum
of possibilities, but really different categories  of work, for which submarkets
of the labor market may exist. Therefore, a model which allows explicitly  for
individual choice between these various labor market states, seems more
appropriate for our purpose. In fact, the figure suggests that there are three
distinct labor market states: small part-time jobs of about 8-12 hours per
week, larger part-time jobs of about 20-24 hours per week, and full-time jobs
of about 35-40 hours per week. In the model estimated in this chapter, only
two categories are distinguished, because the data do not contain much infor-
mation about women working in, or looking for, very small jobs.
For these reasons, in this thesis, a dynamic Markov model is applied in
chapter 4, and estimated in this chapter. Thisd type of model explains
changes in the individual labor market situation over time. It possesses two
properties that are essential for this study: first, time explicitly enters the
model, and second the "choice" of a labor market situation is described as
one between several distinct categories, not as a choice of a point on a line.
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There are two kinds of dynamic Markov models, partial and general. Partial
models explain e.g. the length of time spells that individuals spend in one of
several labor market states, such as "unemployed" (Van Opstal and
Theeuwes (1985), Van den Berg (1990), Ridder and Gorter (1986), Linde-
boom, (1992)). General models describe all possible states, and explain the
transitions between them. Of the latter kind, two examples  in the Netherlands
are: Ridder (1987) and Teulings c.s. (1987). Ridder's model is a Continuous
Time Markov Model. It explains both the durations of time spells in each
state, and the factors that affect the transitions between the states. Teulings'
model uses discrete time periods of one year. His model is designed to be
connected to a macro model of the Dutch economy. Neither Ridder's nor
Teulings' data, however, contain income variables. The model developed in
section 3.1.2 can be seen as an extension of their models with income
variables.
3.1.2 Mathematical formulation
The model describes transitions between labor market states (such as 'wor-
king full-time', 'working part-time', or 'disabled') as a heterogeneous
Markov process. The following notation is used:
M      = the number of labor market states
m,          =  a person' s labor market state  at time  t
p.(t+1) = P{mfl/+1 = jim,  = i3
(3.1)
p (,t)         -P  !11,  =  j 
P       = the matrix of transition probabilities p1
p       = the vector of static probabilities p
Note that random variables are underlined. The endogenous variable in the
model is Pij(t+1), the conditional probability that a person who is in state i at
time  t, is in state j one period later.
The model uses two kinds of explanatory variables:
1.   Characteristics of individuals, such as age and education. These vari-
ables are elements of a vector x. They are indicated as 'observation-
dependent' or 'individual-specific' explanatory variables.
2.  Characteristics of labor market states, such as the income that the
individual can earn in each category. These variables are elements of
vectors wj, the index j indicating the labor market category. They are
indicated as 'state-dependent' variables, although their values differ also
between individuals.
Strictly speaking, the model should be extended with a third kind of variable
which varies with time, to capture, e.g., a trend term, an economic indicator,
or duration dependence. Unfortunately, the data set does not contain enough
variation over time to allow inclusion of time-dependent variables.
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Assume, that utility in labor market states i and j is respectively
11, = w; a, + x'B, + fli (3.2)
uj   =  w; al  +  x'IN    +   <
where the 8 are random disturbance terms which denote differences in taste
between individuals. Note that the utility contribution of both individual
characteristics and state characteristics depend on the state the individual is
in. This means that state characteristics, such as income, can be valued
differently in different states, for instance, because income in one state (e.g.
a benefit in 'disabled') is not as secure as in other states (e.g. a salary in
'employed'). The utility difference between categories  i and j is
14- 14- u, = wj'a, - wita, + x'11 + 15




In the second part of (3.3), for convenience the index i of the reference
category has been omitted from B and z.
It is well-known (Ridder (1987: 40)) that if
-  individuals move to the category with maximum utility;
-    the error terms   in   (3.2)   have an Extreme Value   Type  I   distribution'   and
are independent;
-   at most, one transition occurs during one period of time,
then the probability that an individual moves from category  i to j between
times t and t+1 is





This is the well-known logit expression with norm category i. It differs from
most standard applications of logit models in two respects. First, it combines
state-dependent (w) and observation-dependent (x) variables, as shown in
(3.3). Second, the parameters aj vary with the states, whereas in traditional
conditional logit models they are restricted to one value for all states. The
argument for this restriction is that utility of such variables does not change
with the state (e.g. Maddala  (1983:   59-61)).   In a model  of the labor market,
however, this is not plausible: income in one state is more secure than in
' The density of this distribution is f(a) =e a exp{-e"},   -co <a< 00.
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others, and thus provides more utility. Nevertheless, the non-standard aspects
in (3.4) are not fundamental (Cramer, 1991: 77-79).
To  estimate   (3.4) one needs   M  data  sets, each containing individuals   who  are
in the same state of origin at time t, and in different states of destination at
time t+1. The model must be estimated on all these data sets simultaneously,
to account for the symmetry restrictions that follow from (3.3), or, more
precisely, from the fact that Xii = -AJi. These restrictions are twofold: first the
a-parameters must be equal across the data sets, and secondly
97  -  BT  =  P;   -  B;   -  (B; -11'. )  = 11]i} (3.5)
where the superscript indexes the data set.
On inspection, there seems no reason to impose these restrictions on the
constant term in the vector x. Transitions between labor market states might
not depend on the utility difference alone. It is possible that a transition is
connected with certain costs (monetary or time), such as the costs involved
in finding a paid job. Furthermore, some transitions involve more risk than
others. Finally, individuals' perceptions about the attractiveness of other
labor market states are not necessarily correct. Thus (3.3) is extended with an
extra, transition-specific, parameter:
1,   =  UJ  -  u,  -  505  -  w,a,  +  x '11  + 7 (3.6)
In this formulation, the model is not identified (see e.g. Cramer (1991),
section 4.4)). Thus, the normalization restriction 74 -O is imposed. After
some rewriting, the model becomes:
ed






k  =w)'a,+x '11  + Edy„   ;       j  = 2....,M
;2
. 1       ifm     =i
O  if m #i
The dependent variable PJ(t+1) is the probability to find the individual in
state j at time t+1. Unfortunately.  it is not possible to impose the symmetry
restrictions when estimating the model, because peculiarities of the data set
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require that each subset of the data is estimated separately.  This is explained
in more detail in appendix E.
Note, that the model (3.7) does not contain a term for unobserved
heterogeneity or duration dependence. The reasons for this omission are
purely practical:   the  data set describes   only two transitions, and there   are
individuals for whom only one transition was observed. Implicitly, it is
assumed that transitions in one year are independent of transitions in other
years. This assumption is questionable. Thus, the model is not fit to simulate
individual labor market histories. Repeated simulations of transitions  must be
interpreted with more than the usual caution.
3.2 DATA
The data used are from the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), which contains
data on incomes, labor market status, and expenditures. It is conducted by
the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. We make use of three waves
(namely, October 1985, 1986 and 1987) which give information about
transitions in the labor market over two consecutive years. Originally, the
data   sets   for the three years contained 11,881, 14,055 and 13,878 observa-
tions respectively. These include irrelevant cases, e.g. pensioners. After
deleting irrelevant observations, incomplete observations, observations with
impossible variable combinations and observations which did not appear in
two consecutive years, 9221 remained.
The various labor market states distinguished in the model are as follows:
STATE OF ORIGIN STATE OF DESTINATION
Working full-time Full-time labor supply
Looking for full-time job
Working part-time
Looking for part-time job
Part-time labor supply
Out of labor market 1 Out of labor market
1Disabled
Student
Part-time jobs are those jobs with less than 30 hours per week. For individu-
als looking for a job, their preferred number of working hours has been used.
Out of the labor market are those individuals who have no job and are not
looking for a job. The category 'disabled' contains not only individuals with
a disability benefit, but also all individuals above age 55 who are pensioners.
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The reason for this is that disability benefits were often used as an alterna-
tive to early exit in the period under consideration (WRR, 1991: 236).
Table 3.1 Numbers of transitions between labor market states in the data set used
for  estimation   of the model   (3.7)
t                                                      MA L E S
Full-time Part-time Out of laborDisabled TOTAL
t-1 supply supply nnarket
Working 3,902 19 79 4 4,004full-time
Looking for 139           5           6           23        173
full-time job
Working            42          54            0             1         97
part-time
Looking for 5          4          5           5        19
part-time job
Out of labor
22          3          17          54        96market
Student                        64                    15                     0                       1                 80
TOTAL 4,174 100 107                  88          4,469
t                                             F E M A L E S
Full-time Part-time Out of laborDisabled TOTAL
1-1 supply supply market
Working                                                                            46                                 13                                   70                     1,113984full-time
Looking for 32         11          0          17        60
full-time job
Working            59         756            8           51        874
part-time
Looking for 10         38          1          37        86
part-time job
Out of labor 46              105                18 2,356 2,525market
Student                      76                  15                   0                     3               94
TOTAL 1,207 971                40 2,534 4,752
The numbers of transitions between the various labor market states are speci-
fied in table 3.1. Note, that the definitions of labor market states of origin
differ from the states of destination in various respects:
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Since 'disabled' was, in effect, an absorbing state in the period under
consideration,  it is not included in the states of origin.
-  The states of origin 'working' and 'searching for work' are combined into
a single state of destination: 'labor supply'. The reason is that the model
describes labor supply only. In the distinction between the categories
'working' and 'searching for work' the demand side of the labor market
plays an important role. As this is not included in the model, the model
cannot explain the "choice" between those two categories. On the other
hand, the decision between leaving the labor market or staying is probably
affected by the state the person is in. That is why the difference between
working and searching is made in the states of origin, but not in the states
of destination. This distinction does not hinder estimation.
- In the microsimulation model developed later on, the decision to leave
school and enter the labor market is treated as exogenous. Therefore, there
is no reason to explain the transition from 'student' to the labor market.
The state 'student' is not included among the states of destination. The
model does, however, discriminate between the labor market states
students can move into, conditional on their leaving school.
Although the SEP itself is a representative sample of the Dutch population,
the estimation  data set is not. The number of unemployed,  as a percentage  of
the working population, was about   10%   in the sample period, whereas   it   is
5% for males and 7% for females in the sample. Apparently, for the unem-
ployed, the probability of being included  in two consecutive samples is lower
than for employed persons.
Table 3.2 shows the values    of  the most important model variables    in   the
estimation data set. They are not compared with the characteristics of the
Dutch population, because the estimation data set is not meant to be repre-
sentative: special groups, such as disabled and students, are excluded.
Most exogenous variables vary over time. This raises the question whether
the values at the beginning or at the end of the time period should be
included as exogenous variables. Table 3.2 shows the values at the end of
the year. These were used in estimation as well. Implicitly, it is assumed that
people anticipate changes in their characteristics. For the characteristics given
in the table, this assumption seems reasonable: most people know the age of
their children, their marital status etc., one year in advance.
Gross hourly wages were estimated using the subset of respondents  of whom
income and number of working hours were known. The outcome of the
regression equations, and further details, are given in appendix D. Next, for
each respondent, the potential income in each labor market state was calcu-
lated, using the estimated gross wage and the average number of working
hours in each state. Note, that this reduces heterogeneity in the number of
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Table 3.2 Average values of variables in the data set used for model (3.7)
Variable MALES FEMALES
N total 4469 4752









(youngest child aged 0-6)                  -'34
DCHL0712
(youngest  child  aged  7-12)                                  -                  
                           .14
DCHL1318
(youngest  child  aged  13-18)                                                      
                 .14
INCPRT
5,927 28,966(partner's    income)
INCOWN-ft
35,947 19,904(Own  income  in   'full-time')
INCOWN-pt 9,09322,999(Own  income   in  'part-time')
INCOWN-da
25,758 6,556(Own income in 'disabled'
number of working hours:
- in 'full-time' 40.9 39.5
- in 'part-time' 22.4 15.1
Incomes are net guilder amounts per year (see also section 3.3.3)
working hours and in labor incomes. The reasons for using this procedure are
as follows. First, for all individuals there was at least one labor market state
for which the exact number of hours is unknown. For instance, for full-time
workers the distribution of hours in the 'part-time' state, does not have to
resemble the hours distribution observed for part-timers. Second, the numbers
of working hours often contain errors as these variables are difficult to
measure in surveys. Third, as hourly wages are calculated by dividing yearly
incomes by hours, errors in the denominator affect the measured wage. The
use of estimated wages can correct such errors.
The income variables    are net yearly amounts in guilders. In table   3.2   they
are given for three of the four labor market states of destination. Income in
the 'out of the labor market' state did not show enough variation to be
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included in the estimations. This variable is either zero, or equal to the value
of the welfare benefit, which depends on the family situation, age and
partner's income. Thus income in this state is a linear combination of other
explanatory variables. Therefore, unfortunately, it had to be excluded from
the estimations. If it had been possible to include means-tested subsidies in
the calculations, this would have provided another source of variation.
3.3    ESTIMATION RESULTS
The model described in section 3.1.2 is estimated by the method of Maxi-
mum  Likelihood 2. This section presents the estimation results. The effects  of
income variables are treated more elaborately than the effects of the control
variables, as the former are the quantities of interest in the microsimulation
model developed later. Section 3.3.2 gives the estimation results for the
control variables, and section 3.3.3 the income effects. Section 3.3.4 presents
some typical life histories that follow from the estimations. Before the
estimation results are presented, it is useful to discuss their presentation, as
the tables in this chapter do not show the estimated coefficients but some
functions  of the coefficients  which are much easier to interpret.
3.3.1    Presentation and interpretation of the estimation results
The estimated coefficients in (3.6) are given in appendix E. Some of the
coefficients  had to be restricted, because of the properties  of the data set.  For
instance, the data set does not contain students who move into the 'disabled'
state. This probability had to be restricted to zero. This matter is dealt with,
in more detail, in Appendix E.
Since logit coefficients are difficult to interpret, this section gives instead the
partial derivatives  of the transition probabilities  for the explanatory variables:
ap   apj  ap1 apj (3.8)
-a'        &4       -aw.'       33
Partial derivatives indicate the change in the static probabilities caused by a
one-unit change in the explanatory variable. They vary with the explanatory
variables. Unless stated otherwise, the partial derivatives are evaluated at the
sample means of the explanatory variables. For dummy variables, the partial
derivative  is an estimate of the difference in probabilities between the groups
with dummy value  0  and with dummy value  1.
'  The computer program used is HLOGIT, written by A. Boersch-Supan.
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Partial derivatives provide information about the one-year effect of a change
in the explanatory variables. The long-term effect may differ from this one-
year effect. A better indication  of the effects of explanatory variables can be
acquired by analyzing the Markov matrix of transition probabilities.  If P is a
Markov matrix applied indefinitely to an initial distribution po, a vector p
exists to which the distribution converges (Amemiya, 1985: 416):
plp. = p. '  p. * 0
lim   (P' ) '   .  p    =  p
* Vip:p20  A  EP, =1 (3.9)
AD                                                                                                                            ./
So the vector p' indicates the distribution over the categories, that would
result if the same transition matrix were valid for an infinite time. It is,
therefore, called the 'stationary state' or 'steady state'.
For application  of (3.9) in this model, a number of problems  must be kept in
mind. First, the transition matrices are not Markov matrices, because the
states of origin differ from the states of destination. Moreover, 'disabled' is
an absorbing state. This has been solved by deleting the two states of origin
'looking for work', and the state of destination 'disabled'. Secondly, the
model developed in section 3.1.2 describes a heterogeneous Markov process:
the transition matrix P is not constant over time. Steady states give the
limiting distribution, assuming that the individual keeps the same age over
time, and also all other characteristics remain the same. Furthermore, the
matrix of transition probabilities differs for every individual at each moment
in   time. In particular, the stationary state    for an 'average individual'     is   not
equal to the average stationary state. For all these reasons, the stationary
states have only limited value for interpretation. In particular, as the sample
was drawn in a period when participation in the Netherlands was increasing,
there is no reason to assume that the observed distribution over labor market
states resembles the stationary states.
Nevertheless, steady states form a useful tool to analyze in which direction
the system is moving. Moreover, a comparison between stationary states
before and after a policy measure can give an indication of the long-term
effects of incomes policy. It is not possible to derive income elasticities from
the model estimated in this chapter, and the differences in steady states may
be seen as an alternative to income elasticities. Steady states will be present-
ed in sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4.
3.3.2 Control variables
The explanatory variables   that are included   in the model   (3.6)   are  the   same
as those given in table 3.2. The dummies for the situation in year t are coded
as follows:
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DUFT Unemployed, looking for full-time job
DWPT Working part-time
DUPT Unemployed, looking for part-time job
DOLM Out of the labor market
DSTD Student
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 give the partial derivatives of the transition probabilities
for males and females respectively. Note, that the derivatives sum to zero
over states: a decrease in the probability to move into one state, must result
in an increase in the probability for at least one of the other states. The age
effect is treated separately in section 3.3.4, because the relation between age
and probabilities is quadratic, and thus partial derivatives are not meaningful.
A common feature of the estimation results for males and females is the
large effects of the dummies  for the state in year t. For instance, according to
table 3.4 females "out of the labor market" in year t are 89.8 percentage
point likelier to be "out of the labor market"  in t+1 than "full-time working"
females3. Appendix E shows that, if the lagged endogenous variables are
excluded from the estimation, the effects of the other variables increase and
become more significant. The model has become purely static then.
Table 3.3 Effects of control variables on the static probabilities, males
full-time part-time out of labor disabled
market
proba- 93.4% 2.2% 2.0% 2.4%
bility
DEDU2 1.5 (1.18) -0.6 (0.72) -1.2 (1.63) 0.3 (0.44)
DEDU3 -2.7 (1.40) 2.2' (2.43) -0.1 (0.11) 0.7 (0.66)
DPART 1.1 (0.80) 0.0 (0.02) -0.5 (0.64) -0.6 (0.77)
DUFT -16.9" (7.92) 5.1- (4.24) 9.3" (7.93) 2.6' (1.89)
DWPT -23.7" (8.31) 11.8'-(14.97) 6.5' (2.88) 5.4" (3.47)
DUPT -26.7" (9.53) 9.3- (6.37) 12.1" (7.64) 5.3" (3.49)
DOLM -27.5" (10.57) 7.3" (4.91) 13.4"(11.28) 6.8" (5.07)
DSTD -13.9- (5.43) 8.9" (7.82) 4.9' (2.07) 6.8' (5.07)
N        4469
logL -741.14
entries are partial derivatives as defined   in  (3.8), in percentage points
t-values in parentheses
significant at 5% level
'-significant   at  l % level
'  Of course, with effects of such large sizes in a nonlinear model, the partial
derivatives only give approximations of the actual effects. Adding-up the effects
presented in table  3.4  can  lead to nonsensical results.
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Most results for males are plausible. Unemployed males are more likely to
withdraw from the labor market than employed males: the probability to
move into 'out of the labor market' is 9.3 percentage points higher for
unemployed than for employed males. Students tend to start their career in a
part-time job. Married males  have  a 1.1 percentage points higher chance  of
working full-time than singles. Given the high participation rate among
males, these effects are considerable.  Some of the results are less plausible:
males with a high education participate less, and more often move into
'disabled'.  This is contrary to the results of Aarts and De Jong (1990).
Table 3.4 Effects of control variables on the static probabilities, females
full-time part-time out of labor mar- disabled
ket
proba- 25.4% 20.4% 53.3% 0.8%
bility
DEDU2 -1.7 (0.55) 9.0" (3.14) -7.5' (1.55) 0.2 (0.52)
DEDU3 -20.0" (3.43) 17.8" (3.19) 2.6 (0.29) -0.4 (1.19)
DPART -20.1- (3.99) 22.9- (3.49) -3.0 (0.20) 0.3 (0.45)
DCHL0006   -50.0" (11.53) 4.5 (1.08) 47.1-' (6.19) -1.6' (2.23)
DCHL0712 -15.5- (3.13) 5.8 (1.28) 10.1 (1.26) -0.4 (0.60)
DCHL1318 -4.1 (0.85) 0.0 (0.00) 4.8 (0.37) -0.7 (1.04)
DUFT -36.6' (5.43) 7.5 (1.00) 29.8' (2.24) -0.7 (0.75)
DWPT -53.6"(12.88) 63.1"(15.98) -9.9 (1.31) 0.5 (0.84)
DUPT -54.7" (7.23) 21.6" (3.30) 34.4" (3.03) -1.3 (1.40)
DOLM -76.9" (18.76) -12.8" (2.93) 89.8-(11.54) -0.1 (0.12)
DSTD -7.2 (0.73) 34.6" (3.68) -27.4 (1.50) -0.1 (0.12)
N        4752
logL -1642.94
see table 3.3
As    shown in table    3.4, for females, the effects    are much larger    than    for
males. The results for women are plausible: highly educated women often
have part-time jobs, as do married women and women with young children.
The influence of children on their mother's labor market behavior decreases
with the children's age. Unemployed women (searching for either full-time
or part-time jobs) often withdraw from the labor market, whereas working
women (full-time or part-time) are apt to stay in their labor market state.
Apparently, the discouraged worker effect is fairly strong for women.
Students often start their working career as part-timers.
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3.3.3    Effects of changes in incomes
Income consists of two parts: non-labor income and earnings/benefits.  The
first part consists of, inter alia, capital income and the partner's income. In
this study we take only the partner's income into account, because income
from other sources was very difficult to measure in the data set. We will
denote the earnings or benefits that an individual may receive in a certain
state as the "own income" in that state. Table 3.5 shows the effects of an
increase in the partner's income. All effects in this section are given with
respect  to  a net income increase  of f 1,000, unless stated otherwise.
Table 3.5 Effects  of an f 1,000 increase in partner's net yearly income, males  and
females
full-time part-time disabled
out of labor mar-
ket
MALES 0.12 (1.46) 0.0 (1.19) -0.1' (2.03) -0.0 (1.00)
FEMALES -0.0 (0.10) -0.8" (6.22) 0.8" (3.77) -0.0 (1.00)
see table 3.3
It is not clear in advance which sign has to be expected for the effects of
partner's income. Of course, a high non-labor income decreases the financial
attractivity of participating in the labor market. On the other hand, it is
possible that the labor market behavior of one partner is affected by the
status of the other partner. In that case, the effects in table 3.5 represent the
combined effects of partner's labor market state and partner's income. To
distinguish between the two, we should formulate a simultaneous model.
Such a model is beyond the scope of this thesis, although it is reasonable to
suppose that labor market behavior of partners within a household is not
independent.
Husbands of rich wives participate slightly more. Wives of rich husbands
participate less, but only part-time participation decreases. The effect of a
partner's income on full-time participation is negligible.
The effects of increases in own income in the various states are more
complex. Own income affects only the utility of the state it is associated
with, but this implies a change in all transition probabilities. Thus tables 3.6
and 3.7 show the effects of own incomes, in each state, on the probability of
moving into each of the four states. Since for each income variable only one
coefficient is estimated (the a's from 3.7), there is only one t-value in each
row of the tables.
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As indicated before, unfortunately it was impossible to estimate the effect of
income in the state 'out of the labor market', on labor market behavior, as
this variable does not show much variation over individuals.
Table 3.6 Effects  of an f 1,000 increase  in own net yearly income, males
income in out of laborfull-time part-time disabled t-value
state nnarket
full-time 0.4" -0.1- -0.1- -0.1" (3.85)
part-time -0.2" 0.2- -0.0.. -0.0- (2.84)
disabled 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.56)
see table 3.3
Of course, we expect that a high own income associated with a particular
state increases the probability of moving into that state. This expectation is
confirmed in tables   3.6   and   3.7. For males,   f 1,000 extra full-time income
decreases the flow into 'disabled' by 0.1 percentage points, whereas full-time
participation increases by 0.4 percentage points. Given the high participation
rates of males, these effects are considerable.
Table 3.7 Effects  of an f 1,000 increase  in own net yearly income, females
income in out of laborfull-time part-time disabled t-value
state market
full-time 6.0" -1.7' -4.3" -0.1" (8.99)
part-time -0.9- 2.8' -1.9.0 -0.0- (2.78)
disabled 0.0" 0.0" 0.0- 0.0" (2.80)
see table 3.3
For females, the effect of financial incentives on labor market behavior is
larger than for men, although disability benefits have almost no effect. Anf 1,000 increase in full-time income will cause female full-time labor market
participation to rise by 6.0 percentage points in one year. This is a very
considerable effect.
If full-time participation increases so much in one year, what will the effect
in the long run be? To answer this question, consider table 3.8 which shows
the effects of wage increases on the stationary distribution over the states.
This is the distribution that would occur, if the same transition matrix were
valid indefinitely. See section 3.3.1  for a discussion of the interpretation of
the steady states.
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Table 3.8 Effect   of   1 % net increase in earnings   in the states
'
full-time'    and   'part-
time' on stationary states, males
full-time part-time household/ out of
labor supply labor supply the labor force
t- 1
age: 20
P=97.6% P= 2.4% P= 0.0%
single 0.0 -0.1 0.0




P=97.9% P= 2.0% P=  0.1%
single 0.0 0.0 0.0




P=97.2% P= 2.7% P= 0.1%
single 0.0 0.0 0.0
P=97.1% P= 2.9% P- 0.10%
married
0.0 0.0 0.0
assumptions about other characteristics:
education: high
partner's net income: f 5,927 per year
own net full-time income: f 35,947 per year
own net part-time income: f 22,999 per year
To calculate the stationary states, some simplifying assumptions were made:
-  As 'disabled' is an absorbing state in the data set, it has been deleted from
the transition matrix. Otherwise, all stationary states would be equal:
100% probability of being disabled.
-   'Student' has been deleted from the states of origin, as a person can leave
this state only once in a lifetime.
- The state 'unemployed' has been deleted to make the transition matrices
square4. Thus, implicitly we assume that in the long term, people who
supply labor find a job immediately, and unemployment is non-existent.
- Incomes policy   has been expressed   by   a   1% net increase   in both full-time
and part-time earningss.
*      Table   3.1,   and the preceding text about the definition   of the labor market states,
shows that the two 'unemployed' states are not states of destination.
5 Benefits, however, do not increase. Such an effect might be the result of an
increase in the worker's exemption (Dutch: arbeidskostenforfait).
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Table 3.9 Effect of 1% net increase in earnings in the states 'full-time' and 'part-
time' on stationary states, females
t full-time part-time household/ out of
labor supply labor supply the labor forcet-1
age: 20
P=95.0% P= 4.3% P= 0.7%
single +0.4 -0.3 -0.1
P=80.8% P=16.7% P= 2.4%
married, no child +1.4 -1.2 -0.1
married, with child P= 6.0% P=83.2% P=10.8%
(aged 0-6) +0.5 -0.3 -0.2
age: 30
P=39.4% P=58.5% P= 2.1%
single +2.2 -2.1 -0.1
P=12.6% P=84.0% P= 3.5%
married, no child +1.0 -1.0 -0.1
married, with child P= 0.4% P=92.9% P= 6.7%
(aged 0-6) +0.1 +0.1 -0.2
age: 40
P= 6.6% P=90.9% P= 2.5%
single +0.6 -0.5 -0.1
P= 1.8% P=94.4% P= 3.8%
married, no child +0.2 -0.1 -0.1
married, with child P= 0.5% P=96.3% P= 3.1%
(aged 7-12) +0.1 0.0 0.0
assumptions about other characteristics:
education: high
partner's net income: f 28,966 per year
own net full-time income: f 19,904 per year
own net part-time income: f 9,093 per year
The resulting transition matrix is a three-by-three matrix describing transi-
tions from and into the states 'working full-time', 'working part-time', and
'out of the labor market'.
Table 3.8 shows the stationary states for males with different characteristics.
As expected, male labor market behavior is very stable. Of course, if the
state 'disabled' had been included in the table, male participation would have
varied with age. Incomes policy does not affect male behavior very strongly;
most effects are zero.
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For females, however, the steady states do differ widely with the household
situation, as table 3.9 shows. As mentioned before, there is no reason why
the steady states should reflect actual participation figures. For instance, in
1990 actual participation among women aged 30-34 was 42% in full-time
jobs, and 20% in part-time jobs (CBS, 1991). In table 3.9 part-time participa-
tion is much higher. This can be explained partly by the method of calcula-
tion. The 'unemployed' states have been deleted, and the estimates show that
unemployed have a relatively high probability of withdrawing from the labor
market. Thus, omission of the unemployed eliminates a possible discouraged
worker effect. A second possible explanation is that in the sample period
female labor market participation was increasing, i.e. the labor market may
be moving to an equilibrium with a higher female participation rate.
From table 3.9 it is clear that the sensitivity of females to incomes policy
varies strongly. The highest reaction to an increase in net labor income
occurs in the groups of married women without children. As the percentual
income increase was 1% in both the 'full-time' and 'part-time' states, the
absolute increase is highest in 'full-time'. This kind of incomes policy,
therefore, leads to an increase in 'full-time' participation, sometimes at the
expense of 'part-time' participation.
3.3.4 Life histories
In this section the age effects are analyzed by a simulation of the expected
distribution over the four possible labor market states, during an individual's
life cycle. To make the distributions more realistic, the other exogenous
variables (e.g. number of children) are allowed to vary over the life cycle.
The life cycle starts  when the individual leaves school  at  the  age  of  18,  and
ends when the person reaches the age of 65. The initial distribution is given
by the transition probabilities from the state 'student'. The assumption about
the initial distribution does not have a large effect on the distribution over
the life cycle. The distribution in later years is computed by multiplication
with the transition matrix. In each year a proportion of labor supply is
assumed to be unemployed. The proportion of unemployed is equal to the
difference between supply in year t-1 and t-2, with a minimum of 5% for
full-time  and   10% for part-time supply. The exogenous incomes are calculat-
ed by the algorithm given in appendix D.
Figure 3.2 gives the life cycle distribution of a male with the following
characteristics:
- education level 2;
-  single in period  18-24;
- married in period 25-65;
- partner works part-time.
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The figure shows that males household
mostly choose between two part-time 1
states: full-time participation v-- disabledand disabled. Only young males 0.8 -
supply part-time labor, but this
is clearly not a permanent 0.6 -
state6. In the second half of the
0.4 - full-time
198Os, part-time work among
males increased strongly. Ap- 0.2 -
parently, school-leavers try to
leave this state and move into     0
'full-time'  in a fairly short  time. 15      25      35      45      55      65
age
Figure 3.3 shows the life cycle Figure 3.2 Labor market states over the life
distribution of a female with the cycle, male
following characteristics:
- education level   2; married child
-  single in period 18-21; 1 /' 1
- married in period 22-65; 7 household




full-time.                      l--» /'
0.6 - I.-5< .... . I.
The figure shows the familiar disabled0.4 -
'children's dip' in participation, part-time
which is characteristic of Dutch 0.2 -
females. The age of her children                       \full-time ,
has a very considerable effect   o
on a female's labor market be- 15      25      35     45     55      65
havior. Many women re-enter age
the labor market when the Figure 3.3 Labor market states over the life
children go to primary school. cycle, female
Part-time labor is a permanent
state for these women.
For both males and females, the proportion of disabled persons increases
strongly after the age of 45. This is a familiar characteristic of the Dutch
labor market. As 'disabled' is an absorbing state in the model, the proportion
of disabled increases monotonously  with age.
The age pattern of participation in the figures 3.2 and 3.3 resembles the
actual age pattern in the Netherlands. Unfortunately, because the model is
estimated on data over a short time period, it is not possible to distinguish
'  For highly educated males, part-time participation is higher among the younger
age groups, but it decreases as fast as for the males in figure 3.2.
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between a pure age effect and a cohort effect in participation. Historical data
indicate that there is a large cohort effect in female participation in the
Netherlands. Figure 3.3, therefore, does not provide any indications about
future labor market behavior of Dutch females.
3.4        CONCLUSION
In this chapter, a labor supply model has been estimated describing transi-
tions between labor market states and the effects of income variables on
these transitions. The analysis shows that individual reactions to incomes
policy differ widely among women. Men, however, are almost immune to
financial incentives. Most important for the participation of women is the
number (and age) of their children, and their marital status. Financial
incentives seem to be most effective for married women without children.
The model formulated in this chapter is designed for the application in the
next chapter. That is why a number of labor market states is described,
representing submarkets of the labor market. The model describes transitions
between all these states.
Labor market behavior is modeled as a choice between four states: full-time
and part-time supply, disabled, and out of the labor market. So the labor
market is split in two submarkets. This is based partly on the specific
application in chapter 4: we expect that individualization of the tax and
benefit system has different effects for women working full-time than for
women working part-time. The other reason is found in empirical data about
the actual numbers of hours that women work. There is no reason to suppose
that these follow a pattern consistent with the traditional static labor supply
model. Because, in the estimation period, reintegration of disabled workers
was very low, 'disabled' has been modeled as an absorbing state.
Of course, the model might be extended in a number of ways. First, the
number of categories may be increased: it is interesting to split the state
'part-time' into small and large part-time jobs. This is especially interesting
with respect to individualization of the tax system. For an analysis of
pensions, it might be interesting to split 'disabled' into 'early exit' and
'disabled'. Joining these two categories is reasonable for the labor market of
the middle 1980s,   but  not  for the labor market  of the 1990s.
Even though the model is not perfect, it is a useful tool with which to
analyze the effects of incomes policy on labor supply, as it explains the
probabilities to move from one labor market state to another and one of the
explanatory variables  is the after-tax income in each of the states.
4. The effects of income tax individualization on
labor supply
This chapter combines the estimation results of chapter 3 and the micro-
simulation techniques of chapter 2 into a microsimulation model of labor
supply. This model is then used to answer the questions stated in chapter 1,
concerning the effects of individualization of income tax on the labor market.
Section 4.1 describes the model structure, section 4.2 the policy variants, and
section 4.3 the effects of tax individualization. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.1 THE LABOR SUPPLY MODEL
This section is organized as follows. Section 4.1.1 discusses the scope of the
model. Section 4.1.2 describes the algorithm to calculate net incomes.
Section 4.1.3 gives statistics  of the simulation  data  set  in  1985.
4.1.1     Scope of the model
In  chapter 1, table  1.6, a typology was presented for microsimulation models
of the labor market. The model in this chapter is dynamic, and describes
supply reactions to tax policy measures. These reactions are broken down
into the effects for various subgroups  of the population.
The model does not contain so-called third-order or cyclical effects, that is,
effects that follow from the supply reactions. For instance, higher labor
supply induces a decrease in wages, which leads to higher labor demand and
thus more employment. The absence of cyclical effects has consequences  for
the time horizon. To simulate the effects of tax individualization over a
period of time in a realistic way, processes on the demand side of the labor
market must be included in the model, and so must the matching process
between demand and supply, as in Gelauff and Graafland (1994). For that,
the supply model presented here should be incorporated into a macro-type
model.  Such an operation, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Thus, in this chapter the partial effects of tax individualization on labor
supply are presented only for the first year, namely 1985, as the data set is a
sample from that year. Moreover, the steady states will be presented. These
have been introduced in chapter 3. Steady states represent the distribution
that will occur if the individual transition matrices were valid indefinitely.
Thus, although they do not provide a forecast of dynamic changes, the steady
states give an idea of the direction in which the system is moving.
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The model contains three modules: one for demography, one for education,
and one for the labor market. The first two modules determine those individ-
ual characteristics that change over time and that are exogenous to the third
one, the labor supply module. The demographic module describes transitions
between demographic states, such as mortality, marriage, divorce, and birth.
The educational module determines the education level of the individuals in
the data set. A description of these two modules is given in appendix C.
The labor market module is essentially the same as the model estimated in
chapter 3. This module determines each individual's probability vector of
labor market states. This is done by microsimulation, using the transition
probabilities calculated with the logit parameters estimated in chapter 3. Net
incomes affect the transition probabilities,   as in chapter 3. Individuals   move
between four different labor market states: 'full-time', 'part-time', 'disabled',
and 'out of the labor market'. The first two states concern labor supply, so
unemployed persons are in the first state when they are looking for a full-
time job, and in the second when they are looking for a part-time job. So, in
the simulations the distinction employed/unemployed is not made, except in
the state of origin in the first period. The group in 'disabled' does not only
contain persons receiving a disability benefit, but also pensioners under 65.
This reflects the fact that, in the period under consideration, the disability
insurance WAO had partly assumed the character of an early exit route
(WRR (1991: chapter 6)). For a further specification of the labor market
module see chapter   3.
In the simulations, the sorting method developed in chapter 2 is applied.
Table 2.7 in chapter 2 has shown that the standard deviations  of the results
become smaller by 30-50% under the sorting method relative to the tradition-
al random number method for variance reduction.
For the policy simulations in this chapter no standard deviations are pres-
ented, but only point estimates of the policy effects. The standard deviations
in chapter 2 are useful for comparing the sorting method with the random
number method, but not for evaluation of policy simulations. In practice,
almost no authors working in the field of microsimulation present standard
deviations of their results. An exception is Pudney and Sutherland (1993),
who calculate the standard deviations due to sampling errors. This is only
one of the reasons, besides the random variation analyzed in chapter 2, why
the simulated outcomes might differ from reality. Other reasons are:
measurement errors, misspecification of the behavioral relations, and errors
induced by the estimation of parameters (Pudney and Sutherland,  1993:  329).
Because the standard deviations presented in chapter 2 do not measure the
standard deviations policy makers should be interested in, standard deviations
are not presented in this chapter.
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An important part of the labor module is the income block, which determines
the net incomes individuals receive in the four different labor market states.
This block is described in the next section.
4.1.2 Incomes
For every individual, potential incomes are calculated in each of the four
possible labor market states: 'working full-time', 'working part-time', 'dis-
abled', and 'out of the labor market'. These potential incomes are derived
from the gross hourly wages, estimated in chapter 3 from the SEP data set.
Naturally, the higher the potential income a person can receive in a certain
state, the more attractive that state is, and thus the higher the probability to
move into that state. In the previous chapter we have found that income
coefficients are lower for the unemployed than for the employed. One
possible interpretation of this result is that for the unemployed, the potential
income in 'full-time' and in 'part-time' is less secure than for those individ-
uals who have a job.
Potential incomes depend not only on the individual's own characteristics,
but through the tax system also on those of the partner. Moreover, the
current labor market state affects potential incomes, e.g. because only
working people can apply for a disability benefit.
The tax system has been approximated by the tax module of the CPB--
program MICROTAX (CPB, 1987). This program calculates net incomes for
a selected group of standard individuals. The relation between gross and net
income in the income block is based on an interpolation between the kink
points that MICROTAX distinguishes. In table   4.1   the kink points   of  the
budget line are presented, and figure 4.1 shows the resulting budget lines.
Table 4.1 Kink points of the budget lines for various household categories, as
used in the simulations
 TWO-EARNERSI SINGLES IONE-EARN ERS:
gross net  marginal:gross net  marginal:gross net margi- 2
rate
 
rate i nal rate :
0 1 0.0 0.0 0.24 1 0.0 0.0 0.22 ' 0.0 0.0 0.14 3
1  7.4 5.7 0.32    1 11.2 8.0 0.23 . 14.9 12.8 0.23   
2   ' 22.5 15.9 0.49 1 26.2 18.8 0.44 1 30.0 24.4 0.53
3     29.6 19.5 0.60 .33.3 22.1 0.50  . 37.0 27.7 0.55
4  41.6 24.3 0.55  45.3 27.2 0.57 i 49.0 33.1 0.56 i
5    92.9 47.4 0.65 1 96.6 52.0 0.65  100.3 55.9 0.65 1
Gross and net incomes in thousands of guilders
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Figure 4.1 shows that for the 80
same gross income, two-earners
receive the lowest net income, 60 - 1-earner
and one-earners the highest.  M
Singles are placed in between.   o
,40 -                           2imerThe absolute difference
between    two-earners and one-earners
m- //, *44
sirigle
increases in the first part of the
budget line, and then remains OVconstant. This reflects the fact
0     20    40    60    80 100 120
that the tax exemption level is gross income (guilders, thousands per year)
transferred between partners; for
Figure 4.1 Budget lines for three house-partners with low incomes there
hold categories, 1985is not much to transfer.
In the rest of this chapter, the term 'transfer of the tax exemption level
between partners in a household' will be replaced by 'marriage relief'.
Although, strictly speaking, this term is incorrect, as transfer is also possible
for unmarried cohabitators, it is more convenient.
These approximations of the budget lines are much simpler than the real
budget lines. Figures that show the marginal tax rate against gross income,
have an erratic appearance with many hills and holes (Gelauff and Graafland
(1994: 142), and Committee-Oort, 1986: 44)). However, the resulting budget
lines, the analogon  of figure  4.1,  of which the marginal  rates  are the deriva-
tives, have a much smoother appearance (Bekkering, Grift, Ridder and
Siegers (1987: 57)). Blomquist (1988) shows that the exactness of the
presentation of the budget line does make a large difference for the labor
supply function. If the budget line contains nonconvexities, small changes in
gross income may result in discrete jumps of the utility maximum on the
budget line. Blomquist shows that complex budget lines may produce labor
supply functions that have a zig-zag appearance. That is why Blomquist
names them 'mongrel' labor supply functions. The point is that, in the
underlying model, labor supply is modelled as a well-behaved and continu-
ous function of net wage and net non-labor income. Labor supply as a
function of gross wage is then a result of both the utility function and the tax
regime, and that explains the zig-zag forms.
However, it is hard to imagine that these 'mongrel' labor supply functions
are really valid in practice. If that were the case, labor supply of individuals
would change each year as a reaction to changes in the tax regime, and the
individual jumps would be quite considerable, even when the tax regime
does not change much. Moreover, in each year many individuals would
choose their labor supply in such a way that they are near a kink point of
their budget line. There is no empirical evidence that these phenomena do
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occur in reality. That is easy to understand: labor supply is a long-term
decision; individuals  do not know their budget lines exactly;  and even  if they
did, they would not be able to change their working hours immediately, due
to demand restrictions.
Thus, to give an adequate description of labor supply decisions, it is not
necessary to use an exact representation of the budget lines. A rough ap-
proximation suffices, especially because not all necessary information on
income parts is available in the data set. In the model, individuals choose
between two labor supply states and two non-supply states. It is important
that the relative sizes of incomes in these states are approximately correct.
The   model is based on figure   3.1, which indicates   that many persons   work
either about 35-38 hours, or about 15-18 hours. The model describes   the
choice between these two labor supply states and two non-supply states, but
not the exact number of hours supplied.
Another reason why it is not necessary to give an exact representation  of the
budget lines is the size of the income effects of individualization. The
income effects are very large: between f 3,000 and f 5,000 per year, which
is  about   10%  of average income.   Of course, for policy measures with smaller
income consequences, it is more useful to calculate the budget lines in a
more detailed manner. But for the purpose of this thesis, a crude approxima-
tion suffices.
A more detailed approximation of the budget lines is also necessary, when-
ever the model must estimate the total cost or revenue of a tax change (as
has been stated in chapter   1).   For   such an exercise the income block   of  this
labor supply model is not suitable.
4.1.3   The data set in 1985
Appendix F describes the construction of the data set, with respect to
demographic characteristics. In appendix C a description is given of the
demographic block and the education block. But the long-term projections in
that appendix are relevant only for chapter 2, because the time horizon in the
current chapter is only one year. This section tries to compare the labor
market statistics of the simulation data set with the situation in the Nether-
lands. This is not easy, because of differences in definitions, and because the
only information about distributional statistics comes from other micro data
sources, which have their own drawbacks as well. The simulation data set is
a  sample   from  the WBO (housing survey)   in  1985',  and  it  will be compared
with statistics from the AKT (labor force survey) in that same year.
' see Bekkering (1989) for a description of the procedure used.
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Table 4.2 compares labor market situations in the simulation data set with
those according to the AKT 1985. The total number of males is higher in the
simulation data set than in the AKT, but the distribution across labor market
categories is almost equal. The difference in the total number of males can
only be caused by different registration methods of students between WBO
and AKT, as the total number of males in the simulation data set is almost
equal to that in the Netherlands (see table F.2). For females, WBO records a
3 percentage points higher participation rate than AKT.
Table 4.2 Labor market states   in 1985, simulation   data   set  and AKT, population
15-64 year, students excluded, thousands of persons
MODEL* AKT
MALES 4460 4275




retired 132                        66
others out of the                    35                                       193
labor market
FEMALES 4271 4274




retired                                     84                                              9
others out of the 2044 2160
labor market
* the simulation data set is based on WBO, see appendix F.
**ILO-definition
Although the differences between the model and AKT seem substantial in
places, they do not necessarily indicate that there is something wrong with
the simulation data set based on WBO. A comparison between two micro
data sets almost never leads to complete agreement. Differences can be
caused by the method of sampling, by the questionnaire, and by the method
of questioning. For example, when the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)
changed from the biannual AKT survey to the continuous EBB, measured
labor supply went up by 5 percentage points. According to CBS (1989), the
reason is probably that small part-time jobs are registered better in the EBB.
Apparently, the WBO figures are more similar to the EBB figures than to the
AKT ones.
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Another cause for differences between the data sets is the definition of
'unemployed'. Official measurements of 'registered unemployment'    in   1985
relied on the administration of the Labor Exchange. However, this is not an
accurate measure of excess supply on the labor market. Those who seek a
job, but are not entitled to an unemployment benefit, usually do not register
at these Bureaus. On the other hand, it is possible to receive an unemploy-
ment benefit without looking for a job. In table 4.2 the definition of 'unemp-
loyed' agrees with the ILO-definition2 People are unemployed  if they have
no job, are looking for a job, and can start work immediately. This is the
definition mostly used in CPB-publications (CPB (1989a: 94-96)), and also
in this thesis. As the questionnaires  of WBO and AKT differed with respect
to the question about the labor market situation, it is not easy to decide
which data set is 'right'.
4.2 TWO POLICY VARIANTS
As was discussed in chapter 1, individualization means   that all individuals
face the same tax regime, regardless of their household category. As figure
4.1   showed, with respect   to the present situation this means that either   one-
earners experience a financial loss, or two-earners gain, or a combination of
both. What happens to singles, who are in between the other two categories,
depends on the kind of compensation given.
It will be clear that the most 'pure' form of individualization is abolition of
the marriage relief. But this would result in large gains for the government,
and large income losses for one-earner families. It is therefore reasonable to
expect that some kind of compensation will be given: individualization  is not
meant to increase tax revenues. There are two possible variants for compen-
sation: generic or specific.
Generic compensation means that the revenues of individualization  are used
for an overall tax decrease. This may take the form of increasing the tax
exemption level, or decreasing the tax rate in the first bracket. Thus every
taxpayer benefits from the measure. In this chapter, generic compensation is
given via the tax exemption level. Following Grift et. al. (1991) the overall
budget line has been set equal to the line for singles in figure 4.1.
The second method for imposing budgetary neutrality is to compensate
households selectively for the income loss caused by individualization. For
instance, via the children's allowance. Such a compensation may be viewed
as a change from income support for breadwinners to income support for
2  I am thankful to Rocus van Opstal (CPB) who calculated the unemploy-
ment according to the ILO-definition on the AKT data set.
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parents. It has been advocated by the Scientific Council for Government
Policy (WRR (1991), Jansweijer (1987)). The argument is that in households
without children, there is no reason to subsidize a non-working partner.
The expected effect on labor supply differs between the two variants. An
increase in the tax exemption level makes working more attractive for the
whole population, because income in the states 'full-time' and 'part-time'
increases. Moreover, marginal tax rates decrease as all tax brackets move
upwards. Only breadwinners face the opposite effects. As breadwinners are
mostly men, and men's labor market behavior is not affected very much by
incomes policy, the effect on a breadwinner's labor supply will be small.
Their partners, however, face both lower marginal rates and a lower nonlabor
income. Thus, it is to be expected that overall participation increases,
especially among housewives.
Compensation by the children's allowance does not affect marginal tax rates.
It decreases the incentive for mothers to supply labor, because their nonlabor
income increases by a larger amount than that with which their partner's
income decreases. Thus we expect a small increase of labor supply, concen-
trated in the group of married women without children.
In practice, it is unlikely that either one of these policy variants will be
implemented instantaneously. The reason is that these individualization
variants have large adverse consequences for the incomes of one-earner
families. At the minimum wage level, the net income decrease would be
about 8% (WRR (1991: 219)). Under the Dutch welfare system, all minimum
welfare benefits are institutionally related to the net minimum wage for a
breadwinner. The unintended consequence of individualization would then be
that all net minimum benefits decrease by the same percentage. This might
be prevented by a compensating increase in the gross minimum wage, but
such a measure increases labor costs at the minimum level. Thus demand for
low-skilled labor would decrease (see also Gelauff and Graafland (1994:
227)). As unemployment is already high in the low-skilled segment of the
labor market, this is an undesirable effect.
That is why most proposals for abolition of the marriage relief aim at a
gradual implementation. There are several options:
- Implementation for the younger generations. This is the most gradual
method: it takes more than 50 years to reach complete abolition. The
argument is that younger women are better equipped for the labor market
than older women were, because in the fifties and sixties female labor
supply was under 20%. Implementation by generation does no harm to
those older women. Moreover, for the generations born after 1972 the
benefit regime is based on the principle that both partners in a household
should supply labor, if there are no children (TK (1988)). Marriage relief,
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which is also given to childless couples is not consistent with that prin-
ciple. Implementation by generation has been proposed by ER (1989).
- Implementation over a fixed time period, say ten years. The marriage
relief is decreased slowly over that period. The advantage of this method
is that it takes less time than does implementation by generation, while
partners in one-earner families still have time to find a job, and so com-
pensate their loss of income. On the other hand, one-earner families where
the partner does not succeed in finding a job will experience a continual
income decrease over a range of years. This variant, combined with
specific compensation via the children's allowance, has been proposed by
WRR (1991: chapter 5.1.3).
In section 4.3, the two compensation variants (generic via the tax exemption
level, and specific via the children's allowance) are compared. The model
results will answer several questions. The first and most important one is the
relation between static and dynamic effects of the individualization measure.
Simulations with static models show that, in the long run, the extra income
earned by partners that enter the labor market can (partly) compensate the
income losses of one-earner families (Gelauff and Graafland (1994), Van de
Stadt et.al. (1989)). But it is interesting to see if these effects are strong in
the first year, or if they are typically longer-term effects. If the dynamic
effects are strong in the short term, this may make individualization more
acceptable with regard to the income distribution.
A second question concerns the division of labor within households. Because
males have smaller supply elasticities than females, it is often supposed that
tax individualization influences only females and not males. But the situation
in Sweden suggests that labor supply of both partners is a household deci-
sion. In Sweden, female labor supply is higher, and male labor supply is
significantly lower, than in most other european countries (Gustafsson and
Bruyn-Hundt  (1991)).  For the evaluation  of the policy effect, this information
is important in two ways. First, a more equal division of labor within
households is an explicit policy objective of the Dutch government (SZW
(1985: 12-13)). Secondly, the total effect will become smaller when extra
labor supply by females is partly offset by lower labor supply by males.
The last question concerns the situation of those sections of the population
that have a weak position on the labor market. The results will be analyzed
separately for the subgroup of persons with low education. For this group, it
is likely that the static and dynamic effects will differ more than for the
higher educated groups: their wages are lower, and individualization results
in a fixed increase or decrease of net incomes. Thus the relative importance
of the effect is strongest at the lower side of the budget line. This suggests
that for low-income families supply reactions will be stronger than for high-
income families.
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4.3 EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUALIZATION
In this section the effects of individualization are presented, for the two
compensation variants discussed in the previous section. First, section 4.3.1
discusses the static income effects of individualization. Section 4.3.2 presents
the effects under compensation   via  the tax exemption level, and section  4.3.3
compensation via the children's allowance.
The dynamic effects in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 will be presented in two
ways. First, the long-term effects are shown by comparing the steady states
before and after individualization. These stationary states have been calculat-
ed by the same method as those in section 3.3.3. They represent the probabil-
ity distribution that will occur if all individual probabilities remain valid for
an infinite period of time. Next, the effects in the first year are presented.
The difference between those two effects is an indication how long it will
take until individualization  of the tax system has reached its full effect.
4.3.1 Static income effects
Table 4.3 presents the financial effects of the most 'pure' form of tax
individualization. This is abolition of the marriage relief, without any
compensation. The table shows the estimated static income effects over the
simulation   data  set. For instance,   in  the  data set there   are 1,501 households
with one partner working full-time and the other out of the labor market. The
average potential income of the working partner in the state 'full-time' is
f 35,100. If the first partner moves to 'part-time', his income decreases to
f 23,200. The average disability benefit for this group is f 26,100. If the first
partner withdraws from the labor market, on the average his income will
decrease  to the social minimum level of about  f 18,000, because  he  is  then
eligible for a welfare benefit.
The numbers in italics show each partner's change in potential in&omes in all
four possible labor market states after individualization. The effect on the
household's total income is the sum of the income changes of each partner.
For   instance,   for the household category just described, the first partner's
potential full-time income decreases by f 5,400 after individualization, which
makes working less attractive. For the second partner, working becomes
more attractive, as the potential income increases by almost the same
amount. The relative size of the income increase is much higher for the state
'part-time' than for 'full-time'. This is why we expect an increase in part-
time labor supply after individualization.
Although table 4.3 is complex, the presentation method in this table is the
only way to show the full effect of tax measures on labor supply incentives.
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Table 4.3 Effects of tax individualization  for the potential incomes of p
  -
Labor mar- Potential income Potential income
ket state partner 1N                                          partner 2
1-st 2nd Full-   :Part-   Dis-   Dut of Full-   Part-   Dis-    Out of
partner time kime labled LM time itime labled LM
FT 412
29.2  18.3 23.0 4.8 22.5  10.7  18.0  1.6
+.0 . +.0 . +.0  . -3.5
+.0  . .+.0 ,. .t:.0......1 -1.1
PT 703
30.9  ·  19.5   ·  24.0     11.1     23.2  ·   10.9       7.8  '   1.2
Full- +.0 . +.0 . +.0 -2.1 +.0 +.0 +.0  . -1.0
time 26.9 · 16.0 20.4 8.3 21.7  11.0  17.6 · 2.5DA         55
+.0   ,     +.0    ,     +.0    , -4.8 +.0 .  +.0  .  +.0  . -2.2
35.1  23.2 · 26.1 ' 17.5 14.7  3.4  0.0 ' .0OM 1501
-5.4 -4.1 -3.7 -.1       +3.3    i +5.3 +.0 +.1
37.0 22.8 18.7 10.5 24.5 11.7 8.4 4.4
PT    39
+.0 :  +.0 :  +.0 :  -2.2    +.0 :  +.0    +.0   -2.9
Part- 21.8 ' 9.8 7.4 8.8 24.2 · 15.6 · 17.6 · 11.7DA         53time +.0 - +.0 +.0 -3.3 +.0 t.0 +.0 -1.9
36.5  23.4  18.7 15.9 15.8 '  5.0 '  0.0   1.7OM        51
-5.3  i -3.3 -4.1 -2.5 +2.9 +2.8 t 0  1 +25
25.1 16.0 17.6  8.1 21.0  9.4 17.6  8.9DA         25
Dis- +.0 . +.0 . +.0  . -4.6 +.0 +.0 +.0 -5.3
abled 30.3    19.3    17.6    14.1    18.8      25    f"   0·8    f...3.5OM 226
-5.3 -3.2 +.0 +,0 +5.3 +4.7 +.0 +.0
Out of 40.1 25.7 0.0 12.0 25.4 . 12.7 0.0 4.6
Labor OM            10 -3.3 -4.6 +.0 +.0 -5.0 -4.4 +.0 +.0
Market
Incomes are in thousands of guilders per year.
Normal type: average income for this kind of household
Italic type: average income effect of tax individualization  for this kind of household
Financial incentives are based on the difference between several states on the
labor market. Thus, to give a complete overview of labor market incentives,
all possible combinations of labor market positions for both partners in a
household must be taken into account.
The effects presented in table  4.3 are specific   for  the   1985 tax regime.   As  a
result   of the   1990 tax reforms, tax exemption levels decreased substantially,
namely by about 50%. Thus, the marriage relief too has decreased by the
same percentage. This has two consequences for the interpretation of the
results in the next sections. First, abolition of the marriage relief will have
less  effect on female labor supply   in   1995   than it would   have   had   in   1985.
Secondly, because   the    1990 tax reform   may   be   seen   as a halving   of  the
marriage relief, it is to be expected that female labor supply has risen in
response. However, as female labor supply is increasing continually from the
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1960s  on,  such a supply response   is  not  easy to distinguish   from  the  long-
term trend. One of the possible explanations for this long-term trend is the
gradual individualization  of the tax system (WRR (1991: chapter 5)).
4.3.2   Compensation via the tax exemption level
The first policy variant is individualization with compensation via the tax
exemption level. This has been modeled as if all individuals face the budget
line of singles in figure 4.1, regardless of their household situation.
The effects on the stationary states are presented in table 4.4. The table
shows that individualization does not affect male labor supply, as has also
been noted by Gelauff and Graafland (1994) in their MIMIC model. Only
0.5% of males change their labor supply. Thus, individualization of taxes is
not the best policy to stimulate men to do more household work. The
division of labor within households does become more equal, but only
because women have less time for household work, not because men spend
more time in the household.
Table 4.4 Stationary states for males and females in the Central Path and after tax
individualization,  year 1986, compensation  via  the tax exemption level
M A L E S FEMALES
central path individua- central path individua-
lization lization
Fulltime 0.97 0.97 0.26 0.31
Parttime 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.29
Out of Labor Market 0.02 0.02 0.52 0.40
Female participation increases  by 13 percentage points  in  the  long  run.  This
is a strong effect: about 550,000 persons. This effect is much larger than that
predicted by the MIMIC model mentioned above. It is not surprising that our
model gives larger supply effects than MIMIC, because the cyclical effects
(most importantly a decrease of wages), that have been ignored here, will
dampen the initial supply response. Moreover, the financial incentives are
larger  than  in the MIMIC model, which  uses  the  1990 tax regime.
Another difference between the outcomes of our model and MIMIC is that
the female supply response is not concentrated in the 'part-time' category.
Full-time supply increases by about as many percentage points as part-time
supply. The reason is that, in the model estimated in chapter 3, the absolute
difference in income between the states is the variable that affects female
labor supply. Individualization causes an equal increase of net labor income
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in the states 'full-time' and 'part-time'. Moreover, the estimated coefficient
of full-time income is larger than that of part-time income (see table 3.7).
The first-year effects on labor supply are presented in table 4.5. The upper
part of the table presents numbers of households in various categories.  In this
table and the comparable tables that will follow, the partners in a household
have been categorized according to their labor supply. The partner who
supplies most labor is the first partner, and the other partner is the second.
So, the first partner is not necessarily the man. The figures in the upper part
of the table refer to households, and in the lower part to persons.
Each cell contains two numbers: the uppermost (in italics) is valid under
individualization, and the lower one under the Central Path. For instance, the
predicted number of households that have one member working full-time and
the other one part-time, is 679,000 after individualization, and 669,000 under
the existing tax regime in 1986. The row 'Total (families)' gives the total
numbers of persons who live in a family, in each labor market category. For
instance, the total number of persons, living in a family and working full-
time, under the 1985 tax regime, is 2x397 + 669 + 66 + 1476 = 3,005. There
are 1,828,000 singles supplying full-time labor,    so the total number    of
persons in 'full-time' is 4,833,000.
From table 4.5 we can draw several conclusions. First, the dichotomy
between households grows stronger after individualization. The number of
households that either have both partners participating or none at all,
increases: after individualization, 1,189,000 households have two partici-
pants, and 357 ,000 supply no labor. In the old system, these numbers were
1,098,000 and 334,000 respectively. This is because there are two possible
reactions when being a one-earner family is made less attractive: (1) become
a two-earner family, or (2) withdraw from the labor market and apply for a
welfare benefit. Both types of reactions occur, although overall participation
increases.
Officially, a household with two non-participating partners is not eligible for
a welfare benefit. But in practice the condition that both partners must be
looking  for  work is difficult to impose.  In the Netherlands   in the 198Os, there
were groups that viewed living off welfare as a permanent situation, as has
been shown by Kroft et. al. (1989). Also Millar (1988) finds that in the UK,
especially in the low-skilled population groups, in some households the
spouse withdraws from the labor market when her husband is on welfare,
and enters the labor market again when her husband has found another job.
Nevertheless, the finding that the dichotomy between households increases is
conditional on the implementation policy of the welfare authorities. Tile
more strictly the conditions for a welfare benefit are implemented, the less
attractive withdrawing from the labor market will become.
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Table 4.5 Dynamic effects  of tax individualization, compensation  via the  tax
exemption level, thousands of persons
1-st partner




679          29
Parttime
669          32
66           70           35
Disabled
66          70          34
1,362            43           274            48Out of Labor Market
1,476           43          264           36
3,069 850 480 1,775Total (families) 3,005 846 468 1,855
J,830 253 301 300
Singles 237 309 3101,828
4,899 1,103 781 2,075Total
4,833 1,083 777 2,165
Italic type: policy variant
Normal type: central path
The fact that total part-time labor supply by household members does not
change significantly, is unexpected, because table 4.4 showed that long-term
part-time supply does increase. Within the data set the flows from 'out of
labor market' into 'part-time', and from 'part-time' to 'full-time' are almost
of equal size (50,000 women), so the net change in 'part-time' supply is
small. Apparently, in the long term the flows into 'part-time' decrease slower
than those out of 'part-time'. The extra labor supply of singles is caused by
the increase of the tax exemption level for young singles. For older singles,
nothing changes. As young singles mostly supply part-time labor, total part-
time labor supply increases by about 20,000 persons. Total full-time supply
increases by about 65,000 persons.
The increase in disability is concentrated among men living in households.
The reason is that, as their potential net income in the labor supply states
decreases after individualization, the absolute difference between income
from work and the disability benefit becomes smaller. Thus the state 'dis-
abled' becomes more attractive. For singles, disability decreases because net
incomes from work increase, which has the opposite effect. The results
concerning disability must be interpreted with caution. Recent events show
that a pure supply model, as presented here, is not suitable for analyzing
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Table 4.6 Effects of individualization for households where at least one member
has a low education, compensation via the tax exemption level, thou-
sands of persons
1-st partner





143           3
Parttime
123            5
23           43           22
Disabled                                                         41                  1932
437           16          161           37
Out of Labor Market 481           16          159           29
751 208 271 688
Total (families) 744 190 270 714
235          29         124          81
Singles 222          32         128          87
986 237 395 769
Total 222 398 801966
Italic type: policy variant
Normal type: central path
disability flows. Institutional arrangements are not accounted for, and these
may change, e.g. more severe medical testing (Aarts and De Jong (1990) and
Ctsv (1995)).
In table 4.6 the effects are given for households that have at least one
member with low education (only elementary school). This group is about
25% of the total model population: 2,387,000 versus 8,858,000. As not
everybody with low education has a low educated partner, this percentage is
more than the percentage of low educated persons in the total population.
There is a marked difference in the reactions of this group and the total
population. The lower educated supply more part-time labor than higher
educated groups, after individualization. In table 4.6 full-time supply
increases most among young singles. There are two possible explanations:
first, hourly wages are lower, so the absolute difference between 'full-time'
and 'part-time' is not high, which makes 'part-time' more attractive. Second-
ly, women are overrepresented in the lower educational categories.
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The increase in total labor supply is 35,000, which is more than 25% of the
supply effect in table 4.5. So, as expected, individualization has larger effects
for the lower educated groups than for the population as a whole. However,
the model can not tell if the extra labor suppliers will be able to find a job.
As in table 4.5, the dichotomy between workers and nonworkers increases:
the number of participating households increases by 38,000 and the number
of nonparticipating households by 13,000.
4.3.3   Compensation via children's allowance
For compensation via the children's allowance, the proposal of WRR (1991:
section 5.1.3) has been implemented in the model. The benefit for parents is
increased   by   f  1,500   per year. According   to   the   WRR,   the   cost   of  this
increase of children's allowance is roughly compensated by the abolition of
the marriage relief.
Table 4.7 Stationary states for males and females in the Central Path and after tax
individualization,   year 1986, compensation via children's allowance
MALES FEMALES
central path individua- central path individua-
lization lization
Full-time 0.97 0.97 0.26 0.27
Part-time 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.32
Out of Labor Market 0.02 0.02 0.52 0.40
The effects on overall steady states are presented in table 4.7. The overall
increase in participation (decrease of the percentage 'out of the labor mar-
ket') is the same as under generic compensation. But here, part-time partici-
pation increases more, and full-time less. There are several reasons for this.
First, this variant of individualization affects elderly couples most strongly,
because they are more often childless. Elderly women choose more often for
'part-time' than younger women. Secondly, for couples with children,
nonlabor income increases, which stimulates part-time supply more than full-
time.
The first-year effects are given in table 4.8. As expected, part-time supply
increases more than in table 4.5, and full-time less. In this variant, there is
no flow of women from part-time supply to full-time. The reason  is, that for
women who work already, nothing changes in the tax exemption level. The
relative positions of 'full-time' and 'part-time' do not change, whereas 'out
of the labor market' becomes less attractive. So working women have no
incentive to leave the state they are in. On the other hand, housewives do
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have an incentive to participate in this variant of individualization, as their
marginal tax rates have decreased.
Table 4.8 Dynamic effects   of tax individualization, compensation via children's
allowance, thousands of persons
1-st partner





711           32
Parttime                                                          32669
70          78          35
Disabled                                                         70                  3466
1,384            43           271            38Out of Labor Market 1,476                  43                264                 36
3,015 896 489 1,774Total (families) 3,005 846 468 1,855
1,827 247 305 305
Singles 237 309 3101,828
4,842 1,143 794 2,079Total
4,833 1,083 777 2,165
Italic type: policy variant
Normal type: central path
As in table 4.5, the dichotomy between working and non-working households
becomes stronger. Both the number of households where both partners
participate and the number of non-participating households increase, but the
former number increeases more than the latter. Also, as in table 4.5, disabil-
ity increases. But, as has been mentioned there, the model presented here is
not fit to analyze the disability process.
Lastly, in table 4.9 the effects of table 4.8 are disaggregated for the lower
educated groups. As their wages are relatively low, the increase in the chil-
dren's allowance offsets the decrease of the breadwinner's income in house-
holds with children. As expected, full-time participation decreases because
nonlabor income has increased. However, as marginal wage rates have
become lower for women with low incomes, there is an increase in part-time
supply. The number of participating households increases,  and the number of
non-participating households remains roughly the same.
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Table 4.9 Effects of individualization for households where at least one member
has a low education, compensation via children's allowance, thousands
of persons
1-st partner




137            3Parttime
123            5
25           42           21Disabled
32          41           19
469          19         160           28Out of Labor Market
481           16         159          29
741 204 269 704Total (families) 744 190 270 714
224           33          125           87
Singles 222           32          128           87
965 237 394 791Total
966 222 398 801
Italic type: policy variant
Normal type: central path
The increase in labor supply among lower educated is less than 25% of the
overall effect in table 4.8. So, as opposed to generic compensation, under
compensation via the children's allowance the lower educated groups react
less strongly than the higher educated. The reason is that the increase in
nonlabor income, which is a disincentive to labor supply, is relatively more
important in this group.
4.4     SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter the effects of income tax individualization  have been analyzed
by combining the model and the estimation results of chapter 3 with two
policy variants of tax individualization.  In the first variant, the tax increase
resulting from abolition of the marriage relief is compensated by a generic
increase  of the tax exemption level, and in the second variant by an increase
in the children's allowance.
The effects on labor supply are presented for the long term by comparing
stationary states. But because the demand side of the labor market is not
111
included in the model, these long-term effects are not reliable. That is why
the first-year effects on labor supply are presented in more detail. Further-
more, special attention is paid to the division of labor within households.
Under both compensation methods, female labor supply increases, in the long
term  by +1 4 percentage points. The extra labor supply is concentrated   in  the
'part-time' state, the more so under compensation via the children's allow-
ance.
The first-year effects are much smaller than the long-term effects: female
labor supply increases by about 2 percentage points. Just like in the long
term, this extra supply is concentrated     in the state 'part-time'.     For    the
division of labor within households, tax individualization has two opposite
effects. Both the number of two-earner households, and the number of
households supplying no labor, increase. So, the dichotomy between working
and non-working households grows. This effect is stronger for generic
compensation, than for compensation via the children's allowance, and
stronger for the higher educated groups than for the lower educated. As
income tax individualization does not seem to affect male labor supply, we
may conclude that it is not an effective instrument to make the division of
labor within households more equal.
There is a marked difference between the supply reactions among lower
educated and higher educated. Under generic compensation, the lower
educated groups tend to increase their labor supply more than the higher
educated. But under compensation via the children's allowance, their reac-
tions are less strong. This is consistent with the differences in incentive
structure under the two compensation methods.
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift gaat over een microsimulatiemodel om de gevolgen te
analyseren van het afschaffen van de voetoverheveling in de inkomstenbelas-
ting. Het onderzoek bestaat uit vier afzonderlijke delen, die worden beschre-
ven in de hoofdstukken 1 t/m 4.
Hoofdstuk 1 is een inleidend hoofdstuk en bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste
deel gaat over individualisering van de inkomstenbelasting. Individualisering
betekent hier dat de uitkering of de te betalen belasting uitsluitend afhangen
van het eigen inkomen en vermogen, en niet van inkomen en vermogen van
een eventuele partner. In de afgelopen decennia is het nederlandse belasting-
stelsel steeds meer opgeschoven van een kostwinnersstelsel, waarin het
huishouden als de basis wordt gezien, in de richting van een geindividuali-
seerd stelsel waarin elk individu apart wordt belast. Op dit moment is de
voetoverheveling tan van de weinige kostwinnerselementen die het stelsel
nog bevat. De discussie over de behandeling van leefvormen gaat echter,
behalve over de voetoverheveling, ook om twee andere punten, namelijk de
alleenstaande-toeslag in de belasting en individualisering van uitkeringsrech-
ten.
Een nadere analyse van de argumenten die worden gebruikt in de discussie
laat zien dat men er makkelijk toe komt om inconsistente belasting- en
uitkeringsstelsels te ontwerpen. Twee voorbeelden kunnen dit illustreren. In
de jaren vijftig, toen het kostwinnershuishouden als een nastrevenswaardige
leefvorm gold, overheerste het kostwinnersstelsel in belastingen en uitkerin-
gen. Maar het kostwinnersstelsel bevat financi€le prikkels om alleen te gaan
wonen, en haalt daarmee de achterliggende principie-le keuzen onderuit.
Tegenwoordig wordt het feit dat steeds meer mensen op zichzelf wonen,
aangevoerd als argument v66r een geTndividualiseerd belastingstelsel. Maar
in een geindividualiseerd stelsel is het juist kostbaar om alleen te wonen.
Deze twee voorbeelden illustreren dat het goed denkbaar is dat het belasting-
en uitkeringsstelsel zodanige prikkels bevat dat de achterliggende principiele
keuzen over leetvormen worden tegengewerkt. Zulke combinaties van
principi€le standpunten noem ik instabiel. Stabiele combinaties horen bij een
belasting- en uitkeringsstelsel dat de achterliggende keuzen bevestigt.
De reden om individualisering van belastingen te onderzoeken in dit proef-
schrift is niet gelegen in ideedn over de beste leefvorm, of over de wijze
waarop leefvormen door het belastingstelsel moeten worden behandeld, maar
op het economische beginsel dat de prijssignalen die actoren ontvangen zo
veel mogelijk de werkelijke kosten zouden moeten weerspiegelen. Volgens
dat beginsel moet het marginale netto uurloon niet afhangen van de leefvorm,
maar uitsluitend van de produktiviteit. Als gehuwde vrouwen een lager netto
uurloon hebben dan alleenstaande vrouwen, omdat hun partners inkomen en
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vermogen hebben, dan zal hun arbeidsaanbod lager zijn dan economisch
gezien efficiEnt is. Om deze reden is het interessant om te onderzoeken wat
het effect is van individualisering van belastingen op het arbeidsaanbod van
vrouwen. Daarbij gaat het alleen om afschaffing van de overheveling van de
belastingvrije voet. Dit is de eenvoudigste maatregel om te onderzoeken.
Het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 1 gaat over de toepassing van microsimulatie
voor beleidsdoeleinden. Microsimulatie is de meest geschikte techniek bij de
gekozen vraagstelling. De effecten van individualisering namelijk z6 sterk
per individu verschillen, dat een macro benadering geen zin heeft. Bij
microsimulatie wordt uitgegaan van een databestand van individuen, dat
representatief is voor de bevolking. De effecten van een belastingmaatregel
kunnen verschillen per individu. De reacties van alle individuen worden
berekend, en door optelling wordt het totale resultaat verkregen. Er zijn
verschillende soorten modellen denkbaar, die op twee manieren van elkaar
verschillen. Ten eerste kan er wel of niet tijd in het model zijn opgenomen
(statische versus dynamische modellen), en ten tweede de mate waarin met
de gevolgen van beleidsmaatregelen rekening is gehouden: alleen de eerste-
orde effecten op de inkomensverdeling, de tweede-orde effecten van indivi-
duele gedragsreacties, of kringloopeffecten: de macro-economische  gevolgen
van de gedragsreacties. In totaal zijn er dus twee maal drie, dus zes soorten
modellen. Het model dat in dit proefschrift wordt toegepast is dynamisch en
bevat alleen de tweede-orde effecten: de gedragsreacties op individualisering
van belastingen.
De vraagzijde van de arbeidsmarkt wordt dus genegeerd in het model. Het
model zou echter wel eventueel gekoppeld kunnen worden aan macro-
economische modellen, waarin de vraagzijde van de arbeidsmarkt wordt
beschreven. Zulke exercities zijn in Nederland wel uitgevoerd, maar zijn zeer
bewerkelijk. Daarom is er van afgezien om een compleet model van de
arbeidsmarkt te maken in dit proefschrift.
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt een technisch aspect van microsimulatie, namelijk een
methode om de variantie van de simulatie-uitkomsten te beperken. Deze
variantie ontstaat door het gebruik van computer-gegenereerde random-
getallen. Bij het simuleren van bijvoorbeeld huwelijken trekt de computer
voor elke persoon  in het databestand een toevalsgetal tussen  0  en  1.  Is  dat
getal kleiner dan de huwelijkskans voor die persoon, dan simuleert het model
een huwelijk en anders niet. Het gesimuleerde aantal huwelijken hangt af van
de toevalsgetallen die de computer heeft gegenereerd en is dus een stochast
met een variantie. Dit kan leiden tot onnauwkeurige voorspellingen, vooral
bij beleidsvarianten. Daarom is het belangrijk om de variantie te reduceren.
De sorteermethode die in hoofdstuk 2 wordt ontwikkeld maakt geen gebruik
van computergegenereerde toevalsgetallen. De methode start met een orde-
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ning van het databestand naar de relevante karakteristieken (zoals leeftijd,
geslacht, burgerlijke staat, toestand op de arbeidsmarkt) die de overgangs-
kansen bepalen. Stel dat er K verschillende karakteristieken zijn. Elk individu
in het databestand kan dan worden gekarakteriseerd door een punt in de K-
dimensionale ruimte R: Het databestand kan dan dus worden gezien als een
puntenwolk in RK. De sorteermethode neemt deze puntenwolk als uitgangs-
punt, en kiest daarbinnen volgens bepaalde criteria een set van K-dimensio-
nale intervallen. Vervolgens wordt het aantal gebeurtenissen in elk van deze
intervallen in de puntenwolk dicht bij de verwachting gezet, waarbij een
afwijking in het ene interval wordt gecompenseerd door een tegenovergestel-
de afwijking in naastgelegen intervallen. De appendix bij hoofdstuk 2 bevat
een bewijs dat de variantie van het totaal aantal overgangen onder de
sorteermethode lager is dan bij gebruik van randomgetallen. Bovendien heeft
de sorteermethode niet meer rekentijd nodig dan de randomgetallenmethode.
Toch heeft de sorteermethode een nadeel: het is moeilijk om een algoritme te
vinden dat een optimale keuze maakt van de K-dimensionale intervallen. Het
algoritme dat in dit proefschrift is gekozen, is weliswaar net zo snel als de
randomgetallen methode, maar leidt niet tot optimale intervallen.
De sorteermethode wordt vervolgens geillustreerd aan de hand van een
demografisch model dat huwelijk, geboorte en sterfte beschrijft. Wat betreft
de voorspellingen van de omvang van deze stromen is de sorteermethode
inderdaad effectief: de variantie van de uitkomsten is kleiner dan bij gebruik
van computergegenereerde toevalsgetallen. Maar voor het schatten van
beleidse#ecten (het verschil tussen twee stromen afkomstig uit twee verschil-
lende modelberekeningen, verschillend doordat de overgangskansen verande-
ren) bestaat een effectieve variantiereductiemethode, genaamd Common
Random Numbers (CRN). De variantie van beleidseffecten in het voorbeeld
is onder de sorteermethode niet altijd kleiner dan bij gebruik van CRN.
Tenslotte blijkt dat de sorteermethode een nauwkeuriger schatting geeft van
de omvang van stromen binnen deelgroepen van het databestand dan de
methode met toevalsgetallen. De conclusie is dat de sorteermethode belang-
rijke voordelen heeft boven het gebruik van toevalsgetallen.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de relatie tussen arbeidsaanbod en inkomen op grond
van empirische gegevens geschat. Het gebruikte model is een Markov model,
dat stromen tussen toestanden op de arbeidsmarkt beschrijft. Het model
onderscheidt vier toestanden: 'full-time aanbod', 'part-time aanbod', 'invali-
de' en 'geen aanbod'. De te verklaren variabele is de kans dat een individu
van de ene naar de andere toestand beweegt in een periode van een jaar.
Verklarende variabelen zijn individuele kenmerken, zoals geslacht, leeftijd,
burgerlijke staat, opleiding en natuurlijk het potentiele netto inkomen dat het
individu in elke toestand kan ontvangen. Deze variabele is essentieel om
inkomensbeleid te kunnen doorrekenen.
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Het model is een uitbreiding van modellen die eerder zijn toegepast in de
literatuur, maar die geen inkomensgegevens bevatten. Opname van inko-
mensgegevens leidt tot een enigszins complexer model dan anderszins.
Natuurlijk is het mogelijk om het model nog verder te verbeteren: bijvoor-
beeld door meer toestanden te onderscheiden ('part-time' kan worden
gesplitst  in twee toestanden, voor grote en kleine banen),  of door de afhanke-
lijkheid van het arbeidsmarktgedrag van de partner meer expliciet in het
model op te nemen. Niettemin is het gebruikte model een goede basis voor
de simulaties van individualisering in hoofdstuk 4.
De uitkomsten van de schattingen zijn plausibel en bevestigen de resultaten
van ander onderzoek: mannen reageren niet sterk op inkomensbeleid,
vrouwen wel. Bij vrouwen hangt de reactie echter ook af van hun gezinssitu-
atie. Met name de aanwezigheid van kleine kinderen heeft grote invloed op
de keuze al of niet te gaan werken,  en zo ja voor hoeveel uur.
In hoo fdstuk 4 worden geschatte gedragsco E fficienten toegepast     om     de
gevolgen te berekenen van individualisering van de belastingen. Dat krijgt de
vorm van afschaffing van de overheveling van de belastingvrije voet. Dit is
gunstig voor tweeverdieners en ongunstig voor alleenverdieners. In totaal
stijgen de belastingontvangsten. Om een budgettair neutrale maatregel te
creEren zijn twee varianten voor compensatie onderzocht: generieke compen-
satie via een verhoging van de belastingvrije voet, en specifieke compensatie
via de kinderbijslag. Beide maatregelen leiden   tot een substantiele stijging
van het arbeidsaanbod van vrouwen. Op de lange termijn bedraagt die
stijging + 14 procentpunten. Hierbij moet echter worden aangetekend dat het
alleen gaat om aanbod van arbeid. Waarschijnlijk zal de stijging lager zijn
als ook de vraagkant van de arbeidsmarkt in het model wordt betrokken:
extra aanbod lokt immers een dating van de lonen uit, waardoor het aanbod
weer wat daalt. Het extra arbeidsaanbod zit vooral in de categorie 'part-
time', en dat effect is sterker bij compensatie via de kinderbijslag dan bij
compensatie via de belastingvrije voet.
Berekeningen van het effect in het eerste jaar geven een veel kleiner effect te
zien. Het arbeidsaanbod van vrouwen stijgt met ongeveer 2 procentpunten.
De verdeling over part-time en full-time is op de korte en de lange termijn
wel ongeveer gelijk. Wat betreft de arbeidsverdeling binnen huishoudens
heeft individualisering tegengestelde effecten. Zowel het aantal tweeverdie-
nershuishoudens, als het aantal huishoudens dat geen arbeid aanbiedt, stijgt.
Dus de tweedeling tussen werkende en niet-werkende huishoudens wordt
groter. Omdat individualisering ook al weinig effect heeft op het arbeidsaan-
bod van mannen, lijkt het dus niet een effectief instrument om een gelijke
arbeidsverdeling binnen huishoudens te bereiken.
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Tenslotte worden de effecten van individualisering bekeken voor de bevol-
kingsgroep met lagere opleiding. Ongeacht de vorm van de compensatie
blijkt dat lager opgeleiden veel vaker reageren door het part-time aanbod uit
te breiden. De groei van het full-time arbeidsaanbod vindt dus vooral plaats
onder hoger opgeleiden. Ook bij lager opgeleiden neemt de tweedeling
tussen werkende en niet-werkende huishoudens toe.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE DOMINANCE OF THE
SORTING METHOD
Given:
- a data set of individual observations with known transition probabilities into
state 2. The transition probabilities are known functions of the individuals'
characteristics. There are K characteristics known for each individual;
-   the data set consists of N subsets of individuals; per subset all K characteristics
are equal, so the data set is placed on a grid in Rx.
Notation:
PA transition probability into state  2 for individuals in subset  A;
nA        number of individuals in subset  A;
XA       PA  x  nA; the expected number of transitions into state  2 in subset  A;
mA the integer nearest to 4,
EA     XA - mA, the rounding error of X , so EA E [-1/6,+ 1/2 );
XA simulated number of transitions into state  2 in subset  A;
UA        XA  -XA, the simulation error in subset  A;
ZA   the set of grid points for which all characteristics have smaller or equal
values than those in A;
TrA    sum of X over A
2%A     sum of X over ZA
IPA   'TA - <A, the cumulative simulation error over ZA
GJ the distribution function of the sum ofj independent, U[-1/2,+1/2) distributed
random variables;
II.,bl the indicator function   on the interval   [a,b];
Random Number Method (random variables indicated by double underlining):
the sample space consists of individual transitions; the random variable of interest
is  uA · Under the Random Number method,   A  is a function  of the total number  of
transitions in subset  A.
Sorting Method (random variables single underlined)
the sample space consists of the values of 8 in each subset; the random variable of
interest   is   HA ' Under the sorting method,   liA   is a function   of all  g' s  in  ZA
A-2
Theorem  1.
Under the Random Number method:
E[16]= 0;
Var[L]   =  nAxpA>((1 -PA).
Under the sorting method:
If all mA E [2K-t,nA-21(-1] and all EA are independent and u[-th,+1/2) distributed
over the data set:
a. the QA are independent and U[-1/2,+1/2) distributed;
b. the HA are independent and G2K distributed, so:
E[UA] = 0;
Var[MA] = 2K/12 < nA x PA x (1-PA);
c. on each K-dimensional interval on the data grid, the sum of the simulation
errors has a G2K distribution.
Proof of theorem  1
Expectation and variance under the random method: evident.
Under the sorting method (induction):
I  Suppose K=1 (single characteristic).
1. Choose x,=m, => 9, = 4 has  a u[-1/2,92) distribution.
2. Suppose Q.1 has a u[-1/2,1/2) distribution.
Choose:
4  -  mj  -  It-1.-"i)(f ,-1 +5)  +  Ile.1)(f[3-1 +5) (A.1)
Such an x does always exist. If mj=0, then 5>0, so the first indicator function is
equal to 0. The second indicator function is equal to 0 if mj=nj.
Then:
m =T I   -8. . + pxn. -x. -
4     1-1    14     1   j -1 (A.2)
= 21-1 + m, + 61 - mj + II.,,_, )(fil,-1+Ej_1) - Ir,6.1,(f[14+Ej. 1).
Proof of a.: according to lemma  2,  -Q  has  a  u[- th,th) distribution   and is indepen-
dent of 4-1 and 4.
Proof  of b.: because     uj  =  4  +  II  t., ,(4  1+Ej)   -  II.,t 1 ,(fRi-1+4)     and    the     corollary     of
lemma 2, Rjhas a 62-distribution. This yields:
EL#)     - 0, (A.3)
Var[u,1 = 1.
A-3
Thus,    under the Sorting Method, the expectation    of  14,    E[14],    is   the    same    as
E dj], the expectation under the Random Number method. The variance under
the sorting method is smaller in those gridpoints where:
nAxpAx(1 -pA) >1. (A.4)
According to lemma 3 this is true if:
AA = pwxnA € (TAA -1) (A.5)
Thus, in all gridpoints A where m#0 and m#nA, the variance of u under the
sorting method is smaller than under the Random Number method. If m=0 or
m=nA, all individuals in the subset are expected to make the same transition. In
microsimulation models,  this  is not an interesting situation'.
Proof of c.:  Choose j  and  h, with j+h<N. Then
h
I aj.,  =  9.-93 , (A.6)
/=1
which means that the total simulation error over an interval in the grid has a G2
distribution under the sorting method.
Under the Random Number method, the total simulation error over this interval
has expectation zero and variance
h
E nj.,%6..x(1 -Pt.,) · (A.7)
i=1
According to the Mean Value Theorem there is a q between the minimum and
the maximum of the p's in (A.7) for which this is equal to
h
qx(1 -q)xI n.,. (A.8)
'=1
After application of (A.4) and (A.5) we see that the condition for the sorting
method  to be dominant is: q  E  ('/6,1 -1/6)·  So, only  if we expect that all individ-
' N.B. Note that, if m=0, because m=0 => 1-£>0, the variance of x under the
Random Number method should not be calculated according to the formulas
given  in  the text. Conditional   on  €>0,  Var[ ]  =  6(1-E)  =  1(1-X)  <  1(1-p).  More-
over, P{ x=l } = E. So, for N- 1 the sorting method always dominates. This
conclusion is not valid for N > 2.
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uals in the interval make the same transition, the Random Number method will
produce smaller variances over intervals.
Thus, the sorting method is dominant on each interval on the grid where E[x] E
[l,n-1], with n the total number of individuals in the intervals. It is now trivial
that the sorting method is dominant on the whole data grid.
II Suppose K-2. The g now have two indices. Apply the sorting method on the
'lowest edges'   of  the grid. There, the argument given under I. applies:   fet j   and
94 ,  have a u[-14,th) distribution  for all j.
Now  choose  i and j>  1 and suppose
fl!,-1 j-1,  fRu-1, fll-1., -   u[-th,W)  and  independent . (A.9)
This  yields  for <4
gi  =  71,  - c  =
= P Xny  - 34  + 2,-1 4-1    (fil, J-1 -f21-14_1 ) + (f2,-tj-fE_ij-t) (A.10)
= mv + 61 - 39 + 2,-12 + 2,1-1 - 2,-11-1 -
=m. -x. +6. +E.
U -4 -41             9
where
dj = -9,-ij + mij-1 - 2,_i,-1 · (A. 11)
Now choose 4 according to the following rule:
x4 - m,J
-
2II-2.-4)(41+80) - It-4.-,h)(61 +82 + (A.12)
I   , 4.+8.)+ 3    0 +6)
[,/i,F)     1
u [4,2)\-j   9,
This yields the condition for mu: mu E [2.k-2]. If mu satisfies this condition,
there is always a unique  x that satisfies   (A. 12).
Proof of a.: according to lemma 2, 21 has a u[-42, lh) distribution and is indepen-
dent of 8 and 8.
Proof of b.: according   to the corollary of lemma  2,4  has a G -distribution   and,
thus, its variance is 1/6. So, for all gridpoints where X € IY3,n-1/3] the sorting
method is dominant. This condition is always fulfilled if mu E  [2,nu-2]
Proof of c.: choose h and g such that the point (i-h,/-g) is on the grid. Now, of




I E lf„„' - f2  -  -hj - f214-g + (P,-h./-g ' (A. 13)4
n.1-h ni=J-g
the total simulation error over the 2-dimensional interval bounded by (i-hj-g)
and (i,/) has a G -distribution. Thus, the sorting method is dominant over the
Random Number method over each 2-dimensional interval A in the data grid
where mA € [2,nA-2].
III Suppose K>2, and suppose that theorem 1 is true for K-1.
Apply the sorting method on the subset of the data grid where at least one index
is equal  to  1.  On this subset, theorem  1  is true, because it consists of grids with
dimension   K-1.   Now,  all  2  that  have at least one index equal   to   1,  have   a
u[.th. 1,4)  distribution  and are independent.
Now choose a vector »(j,ji,···410' where all»1. Definez
j
au) = Ag - 20 (A. 14)
j-,
and suppose that all 2K- 1 gl' s  in this expression   have  a  u[-th, 1/L) distribution   and
are independent. So, W) has a GlK-1-distribution.
Choose
2.-I
30) = mci) - E h Ith.'h.h.,4/1+EU)) (A. 15)
h=-2"
This is always possible if m(/)  E  [2K-1,noi)-2K-1).
Proof of a: according to lemma  2,  SKi)  has  a u[-1/2,th) distribution  and  is
independent of the other -8 8 and b.
Proof of b: according  to the corollary of lemma 2, HOD has a GZK-distribution.
2K      2KAccording to lemma 3, if 106 I_,nOD--1, the variance of x (under the
12      12
Sorting Method) is smaller than that of x (under the Random Number method).
This condition is always fulfilled if mg) c  [2K-1.ng)-2K-11.




*   See lemma 4 for the definition of the function A.
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is  a  sum  of 2K independent,  u[-52, 'h) distributed random variables and, therefore,
has a G2K distribution. The sorting method is dominant on each K-dimensional
interval within the grid.
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Lemma 1. Denote  by  Hj the distribution  of the  sum  of j u[0,1) distributed, indepen-
dent random variables. Obviously the variance of H1 equals j 111.
I.      H,(x)     =   xI to. 11(x)
II.
I                            X X -7
H2(x)  =    H,(x-y) dH,09  -      IIo,11(u) duIro.,10') dy  =
-=
xx-y
       d.  dy  -
'hx' if xe[O,1)
"
.-1 1 ; .-9
fld'd'+11 du dy - 1-1/2(2-x)2    if KE[1,2)
III.
H„, 1 (x)   =     Hi (x-y)   dH,(y)   =
X X
  H (x-y)   dH, (y)   =    f  _1(x-y)"  dy   -j n!
-  1  [(x-y)„.1 - x"·1(-y)°]i =   1  Y"'  if xE[O,1)
(n+1)! 0 (n+1)!
  {(x-y)I0.,1(x-y)+Icl..)(x-y)}h.(y)   dy   =
.-1                  X
  h.(y)   dy   +       (x -y)h (y)
dy if xe [l,n)
X-]
because of symmetry: 1 -1(n+1-x)"' if xe[n,n +1)
(n +1)!
Corollary  1 of lemma  1:
1
xE [0,1)  =>  h (x) = -x n   =  H.(X)
n.1. n!.
Corollary  2 of lemma  1:
choose   k  E    [2,n-+1], k integer  and  6   c    [0,1).   Then:
A-8
A+6
H 4(k+6) = H (k+6-1) +     (k+6-y) h„(y) dy =
k+B-1
k+6
= H(k+6-1) + (k+6)(H(k+6) - H„(k+6-1)  -    yh„(y) dy -
*4-1
k+6
= (k+6)H (k+6) - (k+6-1)*4(k+6-1) -    yh (y) dy14-1
Corollary  3 of lemma  1:
choose  6  c [0,1).  Then:
.
I H.1(k+6)  = H.,1(6)  +
k=0
k+6n n
+I (k+6)H (k+6) -I (k+6-1)H (k+6-1)  -I   i yh„(y) dy  =
k=I k=I k,1 k+ -1
I                     8
1   .„.1
=   -0         +  (n +6)H (n +6)   -  6H (6)   -     yh (y)  dy   +    yh (y)   dy   =(n+1)!
6
-  i),5..1 + ·+5 - nl '"'1 - -  + "3{y. dy -
n                          1 n+1 n   1=·n= - +6+ 6"" C- - - +              +62 (n+1)! (n+1)! (n+1)! ]     2
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Lernma 2.
Suppose a has a Ht distribution and B a H .1 distribution, while a and B are
independent. Suppose further
A-1
y=a+B+E j Iw.1,(a +11)
/=0
Then  y  has  a H t distribution  and is independent  of a  and  B
Proof:
k-1 k-1





= E /40.+6)- E /40-2    + 6--2    = 6,
/=0 /=0
because of corollary  3 of lemma  1.
Independency follows from the fact that in the distribution function of y, the
variables a and B do not occur.
Corollary of lemma 2: Suppose
n - 7- B
Then n has a Hk distribution, because n is the sum of two independent random -
variables of which one has a Ht distribution and the other a Hk-1 distribution. Of
course, n and a are not independent.
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Lernrna  3.
lim  n -  -cn - 1/2C
n»co
Proof:
F.= A- _  c     1     -0(n -2)  =2n r---
 1-0
=* n - -=n- thc1      - 0(n -1)  4
 1-c
lim lim=* -n- vn--cn = -n-n + uc + 0(n-') = thC/1»00 n-+00
Corollary: If nxpx(1-p)>a2 then nxp e [a ,n-02]
Proof:
The solutions of the equation -np2+np-02=0 are:
| 402 1 402
p, - 1/2 - 1/2  1--;i    ,     P2 = 1/2 + 1/2,  1---n
This yields
np, = 1hn - 1/ 612-4 n  > 2 ;
npi = 1/2n + th, n 2-4 n  < n-02
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Lernma 4.
Suppose  a  and  h are K-vectors,   and f is a function  from  R'   to  R.
Define
b
Af(x)  =   I    E  ···  I   (-1)a'44' ff(41,42"."4N)
a                     4£(a„b,) 4€(a;,b,) 4,€(amb„)
where
.lif 4j= b
S =   O if 4j = aj
Then, on a grid in Rx:
4         4                4                                            b
I E ···Eul,J, 4 =  *





METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE RAN-
DOM NUMBER METHOD
In this appendix, two issues are treated which follow from the use of pseudo-
random numbers in microsimulation models. First, it is shown that even a good
quality pseudo-random generator may produce biases when this generator is used
carelessly, and a remedy is proposed for this problem. Second, some problems are
illustrated that may come up when, for the sake of repeatability, the method of
Common Random Numbers (CRN) is applied.
B.1         BIAS
The tables in chapter 2 compare the results of the Random Number (RN) method
with those of the sorting method. However, when the RN method was applied in its
pure form, a series of 25 runs of the demographic block produced systematically
10%   too many marriages   in the periods 1990-1994 and 1995-1999, whereas   the
sorting method produced results   near   the true expectations. Table   B.1    illustrates
this. The true expectations were not in the 95% confidence intervals that follow
from the average number of marriages in the 25 simulation runs and their standard
deviations. This is a strange result: intuitively we expect that the RN method
produces unbiased results, even if its standard deviations are larger than those of
the sorting method. There was no indication that the reason for the bias could lie
anywhere other than in the random number generator. However, this random
Table B.1 Means and variances of simulated transitions calculated by the random
number method and the sorting method, before correction
TrueRandom numbers
Expectation
1986-1989 154 ( 9.87) 155.84
Mortality 1990-1994 283 (15.93) 274.34
1995-1999 402 (20.40) 389.96
1986-1989 408 (11.15) 406.60
Marriages 1990-1994 442 (18.19)* 407.91
1995-1999 413 (17.58)* 387.16
1986-1989 718 (20.37) 723.97
Birth 1990-1994 1036 (27.95) 1022.53
1995-1999 1032 (30.40) 996.56
standard deviations in parentheses
* differs significantly from true expectation at 5% level
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number generator has been tested extensively, and has been chosen because the
correlations between sets of random numbers are small. The routine is described as
RAN3 in Press a.0. (1986:  199), and the FORTRAN text is given at the end of this
appendix.
The 25 simulation   runs each contained 15 simulation years. Each of these 375
simulations   of the marriage process uses 12852 (the number of individuals   in  the
data set) pseudorandom numbers. To illustrate the problem, the series of 12,852
numbers that produced the largest bias, will be analyzed more closely in the
following. This is the series of 12,852 random numbers, produced by the seed -
1689 in RAN3.
Figure B.1 shows the distribution 30-
of random numbers over the inter-                                   +
val   [0,1]. The interval   has  been           25 -    »                                  ,
divided    into 1000 parts of length ++
0.001. The line shows the expected     M
number of pseudorandom numbers             3.15 -114470*itist  1,0        1
in each interval (12,852). At
first       4= 10 _     1  1 Itt   " '1 AL#A psight, it seems that these »0 3+ 4 +  +5  - * +      tf'*itt t**,4 4+ +pseudorandom numbers are spread               »           +  »
4
evenly      over the interval      [0,1]:                   0
there is no indication that some 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
random numbers occur more often random numbers
than others. Figure B.1 Distribution of random numbers
over the interval [0,1], RAN3, seed -1689
To test if the pseudorandom num-
bers have a uniform distribution, a
Kolmogorov test is applicable. Such a test compares the 'analytical' distribution
function with the 'empirical' one. The test statistic is the maximum difference
between the empirical and the analytical distribution function. Figure B.2 shows the
difference between the analytical and the empirical distribution functions that
follow from figure B.1. The maximum difference is 0.00928. The Kolmogorov test
statistic  for a two-sided  test, with significance level  5% is 1.22/SQRT(12,852)  =
0.01076 (Sprent, 1989: 234). Thus, the hypothesis that the random numbers gener-
ated by RAN3 have a uniform distribution is not rejected. The test statistic is near
its significance level, but this does not mean much, as this series of random
numbers has been especially selected because it seemed to have a bias. The con-
clusion from the figures B. 1 and B.2 and their underlying data must be that the
random generator is of good quality.
None the less, this specific series does produce biased results when it is used to
simulate marriages. The sum of marriage probabilities over the data set was 219.53.
The simulated number of marriages was 269. Apparently, among the 24 other runs
of the model, there was no sequence of random numbers that compensated the
overestimation of marriages in this specific run. Figure B.2 shows that for random
numbers under 0.7, the empirical distribution is above the analytical one. A rough
estimate shows   that,   in the sequence generated   by   the   seed   -1689,   more   than   100
too many individuals receive a random number under 0.36. This could well be the
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explanation for the fact that there
0.010
are too many marriages in the data
set for this specific series of 0.008 -
pseudo random numbers. 0.006 -
0.004 -
The kind of pattern shown in fig-
ure B.2 is quite common. It can be 0.002 -
shown that the empirical and the    0.000   
analytical cumulative distributions
typically do not cross very often -0.002 -
for this kind of random process -0.004 -
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
(see e.g. Banerjee, Dolado, Gal-
braith and Hendry (1993: 32-40)). Figure B.2 Difference between analytical
The kind of problem that shows up and empirical distributions, following from
here is specific for microsimu- figure  B. 1
lation. In microsimulation, the
outcome of the simulation depends on the interval the random number is in,
whereas, in most dynamic simulation models the variable of interest is a continuous
function of the random number. Hence, even if the 'crossing points' of the analyti-
cal and empirical distribution functions were near 0.7 in all sequences generated by
RAN3, this would not mean that RAN3 is a bad random number generator.
Nevertheless, when applying RAN3 in microsimulation models, a bias may result
in the number of marriages, a process for which all probabilities are smaller than
0.36.
Fortunately, there is a relatively 1.0
simple remedy for this problem.
This is the following. First, for 0.8 -
every individual, a random number
is  drawn.   Then, all individuals   are          0.6 -                                               &
sorted with respect to their random .»--3
number. Next, to simulate e.g. 0.4 -
marriage, instead of using the orig-
inal random numbers, we use the 0.2 -                   .  
numbers k/N, where k is the indivi- O.0 '  1
dual's rank number in the series of 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
random numbers, and N the total -corrected  - perfect empirical
number of individuals. In this way
it   is made certain   that  the ' random Figure B.3 Illustration of the correction of
numbers' follow exactly the uni. the empirical distribution by sorting the
form distribution on [0,1]. This random numbers
method has been used for the
simulations in chapter 2.
It   is   clear   that this correction gives the desired result. Suppose that individual    i' s
marriage probability is Pi. Then i will marry if its rank number in the sorted series
of random numbers is smaller   than Pix 12,852. Because   the rank number   has   been
drawn   from the discrete   uni form distribution    over the integers   in [1, 12,852],    this
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probability is equal to P; (apart from rounding errors). Figure B.3 shows the effect
of the correction  for  a  set  of 10 random numbers.
When this remedy was applied to the demographic simulation model, the numbers
of marriages were spread evenly around their expectations. This is a final indica-
tion that the diagnosis given here is correct, as nothing else had been changed in
the demographic model.
B.2 COMMON RANDOM NUMBERS
Orcutt, Caldwell and Wertheimer (1976) mention controlling Monte Carlo variation
by the method of Common Random Numbers. They indicate that they give each
individual in the sample its own stream of pseudo random numbers. One way to
achieve this is to assign a unique starting seed to every individual in the sample.
This, however, can cause undesirable effects, as it may introduce correlation
between random numbers of subsequent individuals. As an example, table B.2
shows the first 7 random numbers generated   by the seeds   1000  to   1020  by  RAN3.
There is no obvious correlation between subsequent random numbers in the same
row (the random number generator has been tested extensively on correlation
between subsequent random numbers). But within each column there is a strong
correlation: the difference between subsequent numbers is a constant.
Of course, this is not a shortcoming of the random number generator, but of the
way it is (mis-)used. Picking each n-th number from different streams is not the
correct way to use a random generator. No random generator is designed for such
treatment. The table shows a strong correlation between the first and the second
random number, but there are other, hidden correlations as well. Figure B.4 shows
the relation between the 3-rd and the 14-th random number. Presumably, if we
draw random numbers for an even larger number of seeds (there are 4 million
different possible seeds for this generator) the correlation will disappear. However,
in microsimulation applications the data set, typically, contains several thousands of
individuals. The figure shows that there can be hidden relations between random
numbers taken from the streams generated by different seeds.
Correlation between the random numbers of subsequent individuals can have
important effects, if the order of individuals is the data set is not random. For
instance, members of the same household are often put near one another in a data
set, to save computer time. Suppose that the random numbers given in table B.2
were used to simulate labor market transitions in various years. Then members of
the same families will very often make the same decision in the years   1,2,4  and
5, but they will make different decisions in the years 3,6 and 7. So their decisions
are not independent, although that is what the model intends3.
'  Note that dependence among the decisions of family members can be modelled
by making the transition probabilities of individuals dependent on characteristics
of other household members. In the simulation process, however, transitions
should be independent, given the transition probabilities specified.
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Table  B.2 The first seven random numbers generated  by the seeds 1000-1020  with
RAN3
seed nr. 1 nr. 2 nr. 3 nr. 4 nx. 5 nr. 6 nr. 7
1000 0.796 0.213 0.125 0.117 0.502 0.807 0.742
1001 0.823 0.192 0.909 0.098 0.641 0.233 0.093
1002 0.851 0.171 0.692 0.079 0.781 0.659 0.444
1003 0.878 0.150 0.476 0.060 0.920 0.085 0.796
1004 0.906 0.130 0.259 0.042 0.060 0.511 0.147
1005 0.933 0.109 0.043 0.023 0.200 0.937 0.498
1006 0.961 0.088 0.827 0.004 0.339 0.363 0.849
1007 0.989 0.067 0.610 0.985 0.479 0.789 0.201
1008 0.016 0.047 0.394 0.966 0.618 0.215 0.552
1009 0.044 0.026 0.177 0.948 0.758 0.641 0.903
1010 0.071 0.005 0.961 0.929 0.897 0.067 0.254
1011 0.099 0.985 0.744 0.910 0.037 0.493 0.606
1012 0.127 0.964 0.528 0.891 0.176 0.919 0.957
1013 0.154 0.943 0.311 0.872 0.316 0.345 0.308
1014 0.182 0.922 0.095 0.854 0.455 0.771 0.659
1015 0.209 0.902 0.878 0.835 0.595 0.197 0.011
1016 0.237 0.881 0.662 0.816 0.735 0.623 0.362
1017 0.265 0.860 0.445 0.797 0.874 0.049 0.713
1018 0.292 0.840 0.229 0.778 0.014 0.475 0.064
1019 0.320 0.819 0.012 0.760 0.153 0.901 0.416
There is another kind of effect 1.0     ,·      ,,       ,  1.0' /I 'which is more complicated and I *IIdifficult to trace, because it :1 08'    '    'I I *
depends on the simulation model   =8 ' 1' // 0I liI Iand not on the random generator.  0.6 , , '              , ' *EIt results from correlation between    o I 0I
the    n-th    and    the n+k-th random            1                                   , ' '                 ' '
I
I
0,4   '         //III Inumber. Suppose, for instance,   that           J                        .' ''.,the 3-rd random number belongs to     i 2
0.2     ,/
I
' .a 'rare' transition, e.g. the transi-             'I I // 8tion into the state 'married' and
0.0 ., ''0.0
the probabilities for this transition 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
are mostly below 0.10. Then, as 3-rd random number
figure B.4 shows, persons who Figure B.4  The 3-rd and the 14-th randommade a transition when the third number from the sequences generated withrandom number was drawn, have a
.25 probability to have a random seeds 1000-1999 by RAN3
number below    .10    for    the     14-th
transition. This can cause nonsensical results in a data set, e.g. if the 14-th number
belongs to the probability for a woman to become a mother, too many women who
married in year t will have a child in the next year.
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Note, that the effects shown in table B.2 and figure B.4 are specific for the random
generator used. This is an a-typical one because it is not cyclical. Kleijnen and
Annink (1992) and Ripley (1987: 42) have shown that multiplicative congruential
random generators may give correlations between random numbers with the same
rank number for different seeds. As Orcutt, Caldwell and Wertheimer (1976) do
not mention which random generator they use, nor give an indication how exactly
they generated each individual's unique stream of random numbers, it is not
possible to speculate upon the effect on their results.
The conclusion is that assigning a separate stream of random numbers to each
individual can give rise to unexpected correlations within the data set, which can be
very difficult to trace. This is important, as the outcomes of microsimulation
models are used especially for distributional issues. Independence of the simulation
outcomes between individuals is necessary.
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B.3  FORTRAN TEXT OF RANDOM GENERATOR RAN3
1 REAL FUNCTION RAN3(IDUM)
2
3 c---machine independent randomgenerator
4 c---from: Numerical Recipes (Press a.0., 1986)
5 c---function RAN3, p.199
6
7 INTEGER*4 idum
8 REAL mbig, mseed, mz, fac, ma
9 INTEGER*4 i, ii, iff, k, inext, inextp
10 REAL mj, mk




15 COMMON /RAN3/ inext, inextp, ma, mj, mk
16
17 DATA IFF /0/
18 IF(IDUM.LT.O.OR.IFF.EQ.0)THEN
19 IFF=1











31 DO 13 K=1,4




















LONG-TERM SIMULATIONS WITH THE
DEMOGRAPHIC BLOCK
This appendix describes the two exogenous parts of the model: the demo-
graphic block and the educational block. These blocks determine most of the
individual characteristics that are exogenous to the transition probabilities.
The blocks were originally built with the aim to update the data set over a
longer period; that is why the simulation outcomes are compared with the
CBS   forecasts   over a 15-year period. In chapter  4,  the time horizon   is  only
one year, but in chapter 2 the model is used to compare the performance of
the sorting method and the random number method over the period 1985-
1999.
C.1 THE DEMOGRAPHIC BLOCK
The demographic block describes four processes: mortality, birth, marriage,
and divorce. The transition probabilities used in the block are taken from the
CBS-population forecast 1984-2035.    In the model period 1986-1989,    the
CBS probabilities from the year 1987 are used. In the period 1990-1994 the
probabilities from 1992 are applied. Mormli(y rates are specified by age and
sex. The birth process is used to determine if couples have children or not.
This affects their income and labor market behavior. The children's future
labor market behavior is outside the scope of the model. Therefore, birth is
registered in the mothers' records, but the dataset is not extended with a new
record. Birth rates are based on the mother's age. Only mothers with a
partner can have children. But because mothers can divorce, and because the
data set contains unmarried mothers, the simulation dataset does contain
single-parent families'.
Marriage rates are specified by age and sex. The marriage process consists
of two stages. First, the model decides which persons enter the marriage
market. The second part is the matching of partners. This matching is based
on the age distribution of marriage partners in the year 19862 Because there
is no mechanism that guarantees equality between the numbers of men and
women entering the marriage market, each year some of the marriage
' The data set is a sample from the WBO data set from the Central Bureau of
Statistics. See appendix F.
2 See Bekkering (1989) for a more elaborate description of the matching
process in the demographic block.
C-2
candidates have to remain single. As the number of candidates in each year
is fairly large (150-200) this does not affect the results significantly. The
model does not allow for two people of the same sex to live together.
Naturally, official CBS marriage rates ignore unmarried cohabitation. As the
model treats unmarried cohabitators as married couples, a correction is
necessary. This correction consists of two parts: the first term represents the
flow fron 'single' into 'unmarried cohabitation', and the second term repre-
sents the flow from 'unmarried cohabitation' into 'marriage'. The correction
terms are based on flow data of the LIPRO model, described  in Van Imhoff,
Keilman and Wolf (1990). Their model makes use of transition intensities,
which are given for five-year periodes and five-year age groups. The LIPRO
transition intensities between 'single' and 'unmarried cohabitation' and
between 'unmarried cohabitation' and 'married' have been transformed into
one-year transition probabilities. These have been used to correct the official
CBS marriage rates. The correction terms vary between +.5% and +2%.
Table C.1 compares the share of women living alone in the Netherlands
according to the CBS statistics and according to the model in two years. It is
clear  that the percentage of single women increased between   1982  and   1988.
This development is reflected fairly accurately in the simulation data set.
Table C.1 Percentage single women in the Netherlands and the simulation dataset
in various years and age groups
age MODEL ageCBS CBS MODEL
1982 1985 1988 1988
18-22        79           80           18-19        91           91
23-27             26                  33                  20-24             57                  61
27-32        15           19           25-29        21           26
33-37               13                    12                   30-37                9                    19
Source: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, Onderzoek Gezinsvorming 1982;
Voorburg/Heerlen,    1984, and Onderzoek Gezinsvorming 1988; Voorburg/Heerlen,
1989.
Divorce rates are given by CBS for persons, specified by age and sex. The
divorce rate for a couple is calculated by the model as the average of both
partners' divorce rates.
The  result of simulation of demographic processes  over the period 1985-1989
is  given in table  C.2. The total number of males and females  aged   15-64  in
the Netherlands has grown faster between 1985 and 1989, than in the
simulation data set. The reason is that migration is ignored in the model. In
the period 1986-1989 the Netherlands had a net immigration surplus of about
120,000  in  the age group 15-64 years  (CBS  (1991)). This explains  the
difference in population growth between the simulation model and the total
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Table C.2 Demographic characteristics   of the dataset  in   1989
NETHERLANDS MODEL
total total with
total married unmarried single
(abs) (index) partner
MALES 5159 2827 2332 5147 1.00 1.14 0.83
15-24 1188      46 1142 1089 0.92 2.17 0.87
25-34 1252 619 633 1312 1.05 1.37 0.73
35-44 1180 895 285 1197 1.01 1.09 0.76
45-54 857 699 158 847 0.99 1.02 0.85
55-64 682 568 114 702 1.03 1.01 1.12
FEMALES 5024 2951 2073 4954 0.99 1.14 0.77
15-24 1144 130 1014 1110 0.97 1.92 0.85
25-34 1213 760 453 1262 1.04 1.29 0.62
35-44 1127 886 241 1077 0.96 1.04 0.63
45-54 820 653 167 751 0.91 0.97 0.69
55-64 720 522 198 754 1.05 1.09 0.93
Table C.3 Demographic characteristics  of the dataset  in  1994
NETHERLANDS MODEL
total married unmar- total total with single
ried (abs) (index) partner
MALES 5223 2727 2496 5202 1.00 1.16 0.81
15-24 1013       35 978 968 0.96 2.23 0.91
25-34 1271 531 740 1277 1.00 1.42 0.71
35-44 1174 788 386 1186 1.01 1.15 0.72
45-54 1044 796 248 1061 1.02 1.08 0.80
55-64 721 577 144 710 0.98 1.00 0.93
FEMALES 5075 2854 2221 4967 0.98 1.16 0.75
15-24 975       93 882 952 0.98 2.22 0.85
25-34 1232 667 565 1225 0.99 1.31 0.62
35-44 1141 818 323 1108 0.97 1.11 0.62
45-54 995 751 244 967 0.97 1.07 0.68
55-64 732 525 207 715 0.98 0.99 0.95
Dutch population. Because the microsimulation model in this thesis is not fit
for an analysis of the labor market position of immigrants, and because the
immigration surplus is not very large, migration is neglected in the demo-
graphic block.
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Table C.3 shows the results of the demographic block over the period  1990-
1994. Transition probabilities are based on the CBS-population forecast
1984-2035, from which the rates   of  the   year    1992   have   been   used.   The
correction of marriage rates   is  the  same  as  in the period 1985-1989. Differ-
ences between total population and simulation data set are still not large.
C.2 EDUCATION BLOCK
The first part of the education block is determination of education levels of
school-leavers    in the period after   1985.   This is modelled   as two separate
choices: first the choice to leave school, and secondly the choice of educa-
tion level, conditional on being a school-leaver. The probabilities vary over
age and sex, and have been taken from the CPB's SKILL-model (Kuhry,
1986). The model assumes that the maximum age for students is 30, and it
distinguishes six educational categories, which are defined as follows:
LA only elementary school;
UL-A second level, general;
UL-B second level, vocational
M-A third level, general
M-B third level, vocational
H+SH  academic or professional
Table C.4 Probabilities in adult education
MALES: M-A-+SH+H UL-A-*M-B UL-B-*M-B
25-29 6.7% 4.0% 1.1%
30-34 5.6% 1.7% 0.9%
35-39 4.0% 0.4% 0.4%
FEMALES: UL-A-+M-B M-A-+SH+H M-B»SH+H
25-29 1.6% 6.7% 1.3%
30-34 1.0% 6.0% 1.2%
35-39 0.8% 4.3% 1.2%
40-44 0.7% 1.5% 1.0%
The second part of the education block is adult education. According to the
SKILL model,  in the period 1979-1984 a considerable  part of the non-student
population between 25 and 44 years acquired a higher education level.
Therefore, it is necessary to include adult education in the education block.
For adults in certain age/education groups (see table C.4) the model assumes
that the probability to move into a higher education group is positive. The
probabilities are based on a comparison of education levels of five-year
cohorts over a five-year period.
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Table C.5 Education   of the population   aged   15-64  in   1989  and 1994, according   to
SKILL, EBB, and simulation model
MODEL89 SKILL89 EBB89 MODEL94 SKILL94
MALES
LA 782 793 726 715 716
UL-A 330 323 246 325 307
UL-B 990 893 862 1019 882
M-A 218 166 161 231 166
M-B 1489 1580 1617 1521 1706
H+SH 808 815 892 902 951
Student 530 589 695 490 n.a.
Total 5147 5159 5199 5202 n.a.
FEMALES
LA 958 991 921 786 856
UL-A 624 673 451 630 651
UL-B 916 813 914 922 793
M-A 242 185 173 270 176
M-B 1132 1242 1318 1187 1365
H+SH 600 615 670 774 807
Student 484 505 613 398 n.a
Total 4956 5024 5060 4967 n.a.
As the input of the education block is largely based on the SKILL-model,  it
is no surprise that the outcomes of the block reflect the SKILL-outcomes.
Table C.5 compares the results of the education block with those of SKILL
for the years 1989 and 1994. In 1989 it is also possible to compare with the
actual education figures, as observed by the EBB3. Apart from a difference
in the definition of students, SKILL and the simulation data set resemble
fairly accurately the education level of the Dutch population.





Calculation of income variables
Section D. 1 of this appendix presents the regression results for the gross
hourly wages. Section D.2 gives the algorithm that calculates net incomes for
persons in each possible labor market state.
D.1 GROSS HOURLY WAGES
Potential incomes in the various labor market states were based on the
person's gross hourly wage. This was estimated by OLS regression; the
results are given in table D. 1.
Table D.1 Regression of gross hourly wage (logarithmic)
variable MALES FEMALES
CONSTANT 3.0070 (86.74) 2.7767 (60.65)
DNW
-0.1556 (3.53)-0.1633 (1.94)(no work in 1-1)
EDU2 0.0920 (2.88) 0.0966 (2.91)
(educ. level 2)
EDU3 0.2408 (7.74) 0.1489 (4.25)(educ. level 3)
EDU4 0.5682 (14.64) 0.3911 (8.27)(educ. level 4)
EDU5 0.8317 (17.14) 0.5754 (6.17)(educ. level 5)
j
-5.4250 (14.32) -3.2323 (8.84)
1/(age-12)
DSEMP 0.5046 (8.16) 0.1663 (0.78)
(self-employed)
DPUB -0.1061 (3.96)                  --(public sector)
R2 (adjusted) .3916 .2543
N 1588 740
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The effects are plausible: wage increases with education and age. The self-
employed earn higher wages, and new participants on the labor market earn
lower wages. The public sector pays less than the private sector, at least for
males. For females, this variable was discarded because there were few
observations.
The regression equations contain no term to correct for sample selectivity
bias, because in an earlier exercise on the same data set this correction term
was very small and insignificant.
D.2  POTENTIAL NET YEARLY INCOMES IN EACH STATE
The gross hourly wage serves as the basis for calculating the potential
income in each labor market state for each person. This is done according to
the following algorithm:
1: gross yearly income in 'full-time' and 'part-time' is set equal to the
estimated wage times the standard number of working hours in these
states;
2:   net yearly income in these states is calculated according to the relevant
tax regime, given the person's characteristics.
3:        if the person is working   in   year   t, the potential disability benefit   is
calculated as a percentage  of the net wage. These percentages are based
on information from the Department of Social Affairs over the years
1980-1985. They are larger than the legal minimum, because most labor
contracts in these periods contained supplementary benefits, financed by
the employers.  In most cases, the net benefit is about 90% of the net
wage. There is an upper limit on the net benefit of about f 40,000.
4:      for the unemployed, the potential disability benefit  is set equal  to  the
social minimum.
5: potential income in the 'out of the labor market' state is the welfare
benefit to which the person is entitled. This benefit is then lowered by
subtracting 80% of partner's net income. Hence, most partners of




Tables E. 1 and E.2 show the estimated coefficients for the model version
(3.7) which are interpreted in section 3.3. Coefficients are given relative to
the reference category 'full-time'. This reference category is left out of the
tables E. 1 and E.2. The coefficient of 'income in full-time' occurs with a
negative sign in all three other categories.
In some cases restrictions had to be imposed. For instance, the data set
contains no observations on students (DSTD=1), or mothers of young
children (DCHOO-06) moving into the 'disabled' state. Hence, this coefficient
cannot be estimated: the likelihood is maximized at the value of minus
infinity for this coefficient. Fortunately, HLOGIT allows for the possibility
that observations have different choice sets. For students, it seems reasonable
to exclude 'disabled' from the choice set. For other groups, however, the
coefficient for 'disabled' has been set equal to the coefficient of a group
which resembles it. As the norm category is 'full-time', this means that the
relative sizes of the transition probabilities into 'full-time' and 'disabled'
have been set equal, but the transition probabilities into the two other states
can vary freely.
For the data set of males, the following restrictions have been imposed:
Variable State Restriction
DSTD Disabled P=0






DEDU2 coefficients have beenDisabled
DEDU3 set equal
DCHL0006 coefficients have beenDisabledDCHL0712 set equal




Two variants of the model have been estimated, which might be distin-
guished as a static and a dynamic version of the model. The central variant,
on which the tables in this chapter have been based, contains dummies for
the state in year t-1. In addition, a static version has been estimated to check
if the parameter values of the other exogenous variables have been affected
by the inclusion of the lagged endogenous variables. Although there are
differences between the two model versions, they are not dramatic.
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Table E.1 Estimated coefficients, males, for the model (3.7) and the version
without lagged endogenous variables
part-time Out of labor market disabled
Central no t-dum- Central no t-dum- Central no t-dum-
Variant rnies Variant mies Variant rnies
CON- -4.644" -0.545 -5.315- -2.120 -1.217 -0.965
STANT (2.88) (0.45) (3.06) (1.86) (0.70) (0.65)
AGE -0.074 -0.071 -0.063 0.007 -0.226- -0.167
(0.82) (0.95) (0.73) (0.11) (2.92) (2.25)
AGE2 0.126 0.102 0.197 0.132 0.423" 0.369"
/100 (1.17) (1.14) (1.92) (1.69) (4.97) (4.59)
DEDU2 -0.270 -0.027 -0.646 -1.136 0.096 0.231
(0.75) (0.08) (1.66) (3.60) (0.37) (0.91)
DEDU3 1.004 2.764- -0.039 -0.074 0.311 0.977'
(2.44) (7.54) (0.06) (0.14) (0.71) (2.33)
DPART -0.021 -1.045- -0.248 -1.094" -0.271 -0.413
(0.05) (3.30) (0.68) (3.84) (0.81) (1.26)




DUPT 4.458- 6.408" (3.89)
(6.61) (7.92)




INCPRT 0.015 0.028' -0.069' -0.074" -0.011 -0.021
(1.07) (2.43) (2.03) (-2.69) (0.71) (1.36)
INC-FT -0.062" -0.101- -0.062" -0.101" -0.062" -0.101"
(3.85) (5.59) (3.85) (5.59) (3.85) (5.59)
INC-PT 0.087- 0.042            -
(2.84) (1.24)





'significant at 5% level
-significant  at  1 % level
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Table E.2 Estimated coefficients, females, for the model (3.7) and the version
without lagged endogenous variables
part-time Out of labor market disabled
Central no t-dum- Central no t-dum- Central no t-dum-
Variant mies Variant mies Variant nnies
CON- -7.280" -5.797- -3.815" -5.639- -2.843 -7.115'
STANT (6.53) (8.01) (3.48) (7.81) (1.16) (3.46)
AGE 0.369" 0.5404- 0.228- 0.894" -0.046 0.647"
(4.98) (11.54) (3.20) (16.33) (0.36) (5.67)
AGE2 -0.353" -0.514" -0.126 -0.756" 0.252 -0.407"
/100 (3.90) (9.00) (1.46) (11.76) (1.71) (3.06)
DEDU2 0.510" 0.079 -0.073 0.419'
(2.79) (0.62) (0.40) (3.04) 0.265 1.041"
DEDU3 1.658" 1.051" 0.836' 3.961- (0.68) (2.73)
(4.82) (4.96) (2.45) (13.72)
DPART 1.904" 1.858" 0.733' 1.563" 1.137 1.969"
(5.88) (8.15) (2.43) (6.34) (1.47) (2.69)
DCHL 2.187" 2.448- 2.853" 5.003-
0006 (8.54) (14.17) (11.35) (24.48) 0.113 1.451
DCHL 0.891- 1.642" 0.799- 2.653- (0.14) (1.77)
0712 (3.12) (8.37) (2.82) (12.07)
DCHL 0.160 0.673" 0.249 0.933" -0.668 -0.432
1318 (0.58) (3.62) (0.91) (4.54) (0.83) (0.54)
DUFT 1.807" 2.000-
(4.15) (4.90) 0.604
DUPT 3.210- 2.798" (0.55)
(7.56) (6.49)
DWPT 5.198" 1.925" 2.687"
(23.57) (7.41) (3.94)




INCPRT -0.039- -0.040" 0.016' -0.002 -0.005 -0.013
(4.79) (7.06) (2.44) (0.44) (0.26) (0.69)
INC-FT -0.3190" -0.958" -0.3190- -0.958" -0.3190" -0.958"
(8.99) (28.57) (8.99) (28.57) (8.99) (28.57)
INC-PT 0.173" 1.283"         -
(2.78) (23.95)





'significant at 5% level
significant  at  1 % level
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APPENDIX F. CONSTRUCTION OF THE
SIMULATION DATA SET
F.1 FOUR DIFFERENT MICRO DATA SETS
Each part of the research poses specific demands on the data used. For
estimation of the labor supply model in chapter 3, we need a panel data set;
the  simulations in chapter 4 require  a very large  data set representative  of the
Dutch population. The simulation outcomes must be comparable with the
available labor market statistics. It would be unreasonable to expect that one
data set fulfills all these requirements. Hence it is necessary to combine
different data sources.




Data set (Labor Force (Labor Force (HousingEconomic
Survey) Survey) Survey)Panel)





period (four-(twice yearly) (biannually) (monthly) yearly)
unit households individuals individuals households
30,000-size (respondents) 10,000 100,000 80,000300,000
Questions about:
labor market sta-
X          X          X         X
tus
labor market             Xtransitions
income                           X                                                               X
household compo-       x                                      Xsition
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Table  F. 1   compares the characteristics   of the   four  data sets which  are  used  in
various parts of this research. The panel data set SEP is useful to estimate
the labor supply model. To construct a representative simulation data set the
larger WBO is better equipped. Finally, AKT and its successor the EBB are
the traditional sources of labor market information. Because they provide no
information about household composition or income, they cannot be the
source of the simulation data set. Of course, to be comparable with official
labor market statistics, the simulation data set should reflect the AKT/EBB
figures as closely as possible.
F.2 CONSTRUCTION OF TIiE SIMULATION DATA SET
The WBO survey is chosen as the source of the simulation data set because
it is the largest data set which contains all necessary data. Nevertheless,
some adaptations were necessary to construct a representative simulation data
set.
First, WBO is not a representative sample of the Dutch population. Some
categories, such as unemployed people or singles, are underrepresented in the
data set. Therefore, CBS has constructed weight factors for households.
Secondly, the simulation data set must consist of individuals, whereas the
unit of analysis in WBO is the household. Of course, individual data can be
derived from the household records.
To construct the simulation data set, first a random sample of households
was drawn from WBO, in which each household's chance to be included in
the sample was proportional with its weight factor. This is explained in
Bekkering (1989). This procedure ensures that the simulation data set is
representative of the Dutch population. The second step is to split the
household records into records for each individual.
There is no reason to make the simulation data set exactly as large as the
original WBO sample. If the weight factor of a household is larger than a
certain threshold, that household is included in the sample with probability
one. It is even possible that certain households are included in the sample
more than once. In the procedure given above, the number of households in
the simulation data set can be chosen as one wishes. The size of the data set
used  for the model is chosen  such  that  it is almost a 1:1000 sample  of the
Dutch population. This choice is based partly on practical grounds (easily
comparable with official statistics) and partly on technical ones (a manage-
able data set on a micro computer). Furthermore, households of which all
members were older than 65 were excluded from the simulation data set, to
save computer space. The original WBO data set contains about 50,000
persons  and the simulation  data set 12,852.
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The fact that not every WBO-respondent is included in the simulation data
set has an important advantage. It is possible to draw a second sample from
the original WBO-data and to run the microsimulation model on it, as a test
how much the model results are dependent on the specific data set.
The microsimulation model consists of three parts: a demographic block, an
educational block an a labor market block. In the sequel the characteristics of
the data set will be analyzed for each block separately.
F.2.1 Demographic characteristics
Table F.2 Demographic characteristics  of the dataset  in  1985
NETHERLANDS MODEL
unmar- total total (iin- with
total married singleried (abs) dex) partner
MALES 5043 2903 2140 5091 1.01 1.09 0.90
15-24 1276      67 1209 1265 0.99 1.90 0.94
25-34 1204 701 503 1233 1.02 1.19 0.79
35-44 1102 896 206 1099 1.00 1.04 0.82
45-54 794 671 123 781 0.98 1.00 0.87
55-64 667 568      99 713 1.07 1.06 1.10
FEMALES 4917 3019 1898 4835 1.00 1.09 0.86
15-24 1226 179 1047 1211 0.99 1.56 0.89
25-34 1160 820 340 1124 0.97 1.10 0.65
35-44 1037 863 174 1018 0.98 1.06 0.61
45-54 770 632 138 746 1.10 1.01 1.50
55-64 724 525 199 736 1.02 1.07 0.88
The demographic characteristics   of the dataset   in   1985 are given in table  F.2.
To facilitate the comparison, the figures for the simulation dataset are given
as indices based on the numbers for the Netherlands. The total number of
males and females in the simulation dataset, and the distribution over age
groups, resemble the figures for the Netherlands as a whole, as registered by
the Central Bureau of Statistics.
Marital status, however, differs between the dataset and the Netherlands. The
reason is that, in the underlying WBO-dataset, cohabitating couples are not
distinguished from married ones. Official CBS figures, however, ignore
F-4
cohabitators and only count officially married persons as couples. As the
Dutch tax and benefit system does not distinguish between cohabitators and
married couples, the WBO system should be followed.
There is no official CBS-statistic which can be used as a check on the
number of people living with a partner in the simulation dataset. If the
differences in table F.2 can be wholly ascribed to differences in registration
method, cohabitators are mostly between 25 and 34 years old, which is a
plausible result. As will be seen later on in table ?, the numbers of singles
and couples in the simulation data set resemble the distribution in the Dutch
population fairly well.
F.2.2 Educational characteristics
Although the WBO data are based on a random sample from the Dutch
population, as are the AKT and SEP data, the education figures differ widely
between   the   two data sources.   This is shown in table   F.3. WBO reports
fewer people with medium vocational training, and more with lower voca-
Table F.3 Difference in education level reported by two statistical surveys in the
year 1985
WBO 1985 SEP 1986-1987 AKT   1985
education level FEMA- FEMA- FEMA-MALES MALES MALES
LES LES LES
Basic 14.0% 18.8% 14.1% 22.6% 1
 25.6%
37.0%
Low, general 5.5% 11.6% 1 21.3%  32.7% 1
Low, vocational 35.4% 33.6% J 21.4% 22.6%
Medium, general 3.4% 3.4% 1 3.9% 4.2% 44.6%  34.2%Medium, vocational 22.6% 22.7% J 32.7% 24.6%
High, academic 19.0% 10.0% 20.0% 10.6% 16.4% 10.6%
shares  of the population  aged 15-64, students excluded
AKT 1985 figures: quoted from Department of Social Affairs, Quarterly Report of
the Labor Market, 1990/4
tional training. The reason for this variation is not clear. Probably it is
caused by differences in the questionnaires used, but there is no way to
determine which of the data sets is 'right'.
Differences in educational characteristics between the various data sets may
cause problems. The transition probabilities used in the model are based on
the educational distribution in the SEP data set. Simulation on the WBO
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education figures would cause wrong numbers of transitions. Furthermore,  as
the AKT data are the basis of official labor market statistics, the educational
characteristics of the simulation data set should reflect those. For these
reasons the WBO education figures were adapted by changing the weight
factors of the various education categories.
Table F.4 compares the education levels in the simulation data set with the
Netherlands. Data for the Netherlands are taken from the CPB's SKILL
Table F.4 Education in the simulation data set and in the Netherlands, 1985
NETHERLANDS MODEL
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 total 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 total
MALES
Basic 34 67 66 687 854    22    68    61 700 851
L-gen      20    66    48 201 335     16    52    44 196 308
L-voc      71 141 115 542 869    59 138 138 616 951
M-gen 8    44    40    77 169 9    53    39 110 210
M-voc              16 165 207 1,052 1,439  26 224 217 978 1,445
High 0 25 108 572 704 0 21 110 590 721
student 479 140    34     18 671 440 138    25     2  605
total 628 648 618 3,149 5,043 572 693 634  3,192 5,091
FEMALES
Basic    28   63   74  949 1,114   20   65   70  921 1,078
L-gen      47   105    93 429 674    27    78    93 410 608
L-voc      39    78    75 617 809    48 108 108 626 890
M-gen  19 51 39 72 181 10 52 48 79 189
M-voc 32 195 196 688  1,111     31 194 196 637 1,058
High 1 47 102 331 480 1 51 104 315 471
student 435    86    18     8 547 429    97    17     0  543
total 601 625 597 3,094 4,917 566 645 636 2,988 4,835
model (see Kuhry (1986) for a description of the model). The SKILL model
is based on AKT data. The model describes flows of pupils in and out of
education.  It has been used to forecast the number of pupils in various school
types. The transition probabilities in the education block are provided by the
SKILL model.
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